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ABSTRACT
Boko Haram is a religious terrorist organisation. It has identified itself as an Islamic
organisation, but Muslims have argued against that identification. Boko Haram became
publicly violent in 2003 in Kanama, Yunusari Local Government Area of Yobe state, Nigeria
where they are believed to have originated in 2002. They see themselves as the only true
representatives of Allah, while attacking Western civilisation. They carried out their initial
public attacks between 21 December 2003 and January 2004 and caused much destruction in
Yunusari, Borsari, Tarnuwa, Geidam, and Damaturu Local Government Areas of Yobe State.
The problem of Boko Haram evidently entered Plateau state on 24 December 2010 with the
bombing of Kabong and Angwan Rukuba areas of Jos. Following those two attacks, the
activities of the Boko Haram religious terrorists had spread to other parts of Plateau state.
They carry out their attacks through guerrilla warfare, suicide bombing, placing explosives in
crowded places, shootings, assassinations and kidnapping. The study used phenomenological
method which deals with what is seen, heard, felt and experienced, also the characteristics of
Boko Haram. Unstructured interview method was used in collecting data from victims,
parents, relatives, security agents, religious leaders, traditional leaders and government
officials. Focus group discussions were held with selected groups of victims and security
agents. While other methods were being used in the study, observation method was keenly
used in collecting data from relevant areas in Plateau state. The study dwelt on
consequentialist ethical theory, which states that the consequences of a person’s action are the
basis of judging the rightness or wrongness of that action. Boko Haram’s religious terrorism
has caused a widespread destruction of life and property in Plateau state. Many people were
killed in different places, and property was destroyed on a larger scale, such as churches,
mosques, police stations, military bases, markets and houses. As a result, the people of
Plateau state have experienced emotional problems such as trauma, depression, frustration,
stress, distress, worry, hopelessness and desperation in different degrees. In the context of
this situation, there have been tension, threat and fear among the people of Plateau state. The
study has then made some recommendations. Religious terrorism should be included in the
educational curriculum in Nigeria. Sound theological education should be inculcated by
Christians and Muslims. Adequate and sustainable welfare programmes should be provided
for internally displaced persons (IDPs). Comprehensive reconciliation, rehabilitation and
reconstruction should be carried out in Plateau state. Finally, for efficient, creative,
innovative, effective, productive and prompt service delivery by the security agents,
maximum funding and effective equipment should be provided promptly in order to maintain
and sustain high morale among them.
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CHAPTER ONE
INTRODUCTION
1.1 BACKGROUND TO THE STUDY
Terrorism has become a disturbing global phenomenon. Terrorists also have attained
such astute prominence of gallantry to command the attention of the world powers, while
their striking exploits daily constitute the headlines of both local and international media. The
reckless confidence and destructive impact with which they carry out their onslaughts are so
overwhelming. They kill, maim and dehumanize their targets with such a callous feat that
leaves the ethicist wondering if terrorists are completely devoid of every sense of morality.
Properties worth billions of naira have been destroyed and various societies are turned upside
down, all in the attempt to send messages to the government and subjugate the people. What
is more worrisome is that these militias claim they fight for, in the name of, and with God.
That raises the question if God is, Himself a terrorist; or rather, if He has commanded
terrorism as an aspect of religious devotion. Or does the God of the religious terrorists differ
from the God of the average religious seekers? Every religion resonates on ethical principles.
However, whenever any religion or sect starts operating on unethical and unacceptable
standards, one cannot help but question the authenticity of their claims.
Terrorism is by no means a new concept, nor is its practice recent within human societies.
This is because terrorism dates back to the period of antiquity (Fafowora 3). Historically,
however, the most common early reference to terrorism in general and religious terrorism in
particular was the activity of the Jewish Zealots. The first acts of what is now described as
terrorism were carried out over 2,000 years ago by a radical religious sect, of Judaism, the
then Jewish Zealots who were active in Judea in the 1st and 2nd century AD, in their rebellious
attempts to militantly topple the Roman rule in Palestine. Hoffman details that they fought
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viciously against the rule of the Roman Empire over the place called Israel today through
various campaigns involving assassinations. The zealots used the sica, a primitive dagger, to
launch attacks on their targets in broad daylight, usually in crowded places, markets or on
feast days – mostly whenever a large number of people were to witness their violence. This is
quite reminiscent of modern terrorists, and of course the Boko Haram. The zealots, like the
Boko Haram, used their actions to communicate a larger target audience, in this case, the
Roman authority and their Jewish sympathizers or collaborators (Hoffman 255).
The extremist zealots turned to terrorism and consequent multiple assassinations in such
gravity that they came to be known as “si carri” (Greek sikarioi, “dagger men”). The dagger
men went to public places with hidden daggers with which they struck down anybody who
identified with Rome. The rebel zealots were quite revolting and suicidal similar to present
day terrorists, most especially in their primary revolt against Rome (AD 66-70) and in their
decision to commit suicide at their fortress, Masada (AD 73) instead of surrendering to
Roman forces (Jenkins, 2012). Also, between the period 1090 and 1272 an Islamic sect called
the Assassins used similar suicidal tactics against the Christian Crusaders who invaded parts
of the present Syria. The Assassins used what they saw as self-sacrifice and suicidal
martyrdom evidently present in today’s Islamic terrorist groups. They saw violence as a
divine act which would catapult the perpetrators to glorious paradise should they perish in the
act (175).
Similarly, terrorism was advocated openly by Maximilian de Robespierre (May 6,
1758 – July 28, 1794) during the French Resolution, a period known as “the reign of terror”.
Also, the Spanish inquisition arbitrarily arrested, tortured, and executed many to punish what
they viewed as religious heresy. The post-American civil war (1861-65), saw the rebellious
southerners form the clandestine, nocturnal and violent Ku Klux Klan (KKK) who through
underground violence and wizardry terrorized and intimidated the supporters of
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Reconstruction (1865-77) and the newly freed former slaves in order to continue white
supremacy. Terror was adopted in the latter half of the 19th century in Western Europe,
Russia, and the United States by anarchism adherents who believed that the assassination of
those in positions of power was the best way to bring about political and social revolution.
Meanwhile, terror has always characterized human society and history for a very long time
(Jenkins 318).
Terrorist organizations that possess a fundamentalist religious ideology, and which are
quite destructive and extreme emerged since the late 20th and early 21st centuries. These,
according to Jenkins, include, but not limited to Hamas, Al-Qaeda and Liberation Tigers of
Tamil Eelan (LTTE). ISIL and Boko Haram of present history also fall within this category.
They adopt the tactic of suicide bombing, in which the terrorist would attempt destroying
important military, political, economic, or symbolic target by detonating a bomb on his or her
person. The September 11, 2001 attacks on United States of America by the al-Qaeda suicide
terrorists have been rated the deadliest by many scholars. The fatality stood at over 3,000
people. Jenkins cautions that religious terrorism appears to be an enduring feature of political
life (2012).
Yonah Alexander attributes the rising of religious terrorism in Africa to the Libyan state-
sponsored terrorist bombing of Pan Am Flight 103 over Lockerbie, Scotland, on 21st
December 1988, which resulted in the death of 270 passengers, majorly Americans (212).
Alexander observes that though Muammar Gadhafi’s 42 years of dictatorship and terror was
changed in 2011, Libyan terrorism has continued to grow active and extended its ominous
tentacles to other countries in Africa such as Nigeria. He traced the techniques of religious
terrorists to a significant statement a Libyan Muslim cleric made during a Friday sermon days
after the brutal killing of United States government personnel in Benghazi on September 11,
2012 calling on Muslim faithful to “detonate our wrath upon them “and” stab them in their
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main artery” (Alexander 2012). Subsequent terrorist activities on the international scene had
followed, and on 25th December 2009, Nigeria was dishonourably represented by her citizen,
Umar Farouk Abdulmutallab (a Nigerian young man from a rich Kaduna family trained
terrorist by Al-Qaida branch in Yemen). This happened in the foiled 2009 Christmas Day
bombing of the Northwest flight 253, with 278 passengers and crew on board from
Amsterdam to Detroit.
Nigeria has witnessed much religious terrorist violence since her return to democracy on
May 29, 1999. The magnitude of the blood-letting is as terrifying as is reflected in the
captions of various print media: “Politics of the Jos Bloodbath” (Newswatch March 22, 2010).
More and more of such headlines abound in Nigeria dailies, as observed by Alubo, who
equally reiterated that such situations compelled him to join Uwazurike to lament that “we
are passing through an era when Nigerians could hardly make up their minds as to just what
sort of country they really aspired to erect” (2). Alubo laments further that Nigerians have
become inured to incessant blood flow from terrorist onslaughts and massacres, especially in
Plateau state. Alubo fears more that “Nigeria is grappling with a rising wave of religious
bloodshed”, in which her citizens have been killed in their thousands (2-3). Best and
Hoomlong affirm this position, that Nigeria has been witnessing recurrent “religion-type”
terrorist insurgencies mostly in Plateau state (10). More sarcastic is Ishaku’s assessment of
the Nigerian terrorist dilemma, when he wrote that:
Nigeria appears to be at a cross-road; one road leads to Mogadishu, the road to a failed
state where territories are shared between sectarian strongmen. Another is the road to
Sarajevo, the road to the dissolution of the federation as we know it. And yet, there may
be a third road, the road to Kigali, the road to ethno-religious bloodbath (19).
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Plateau state, Nigeria experienced a terrible blood bath in 2001, which affected almost
the entire state. The 2001 religious killings have been described in recent history as “the most
grievous bloodletting ever witnessed” (77), which has given rise to more terrorist killings that
have followed in the subsequent years. Since that Friday, September 7, 2001 till date killings
in the name of religion in Plateau state have unabatedly become almost a daily exercise, with
consequent notable episodes in 2004, 2008, 2010, and other intermittent skirmishes.
Meanwhile, terrorism in Plateau state has taken a religious nature, and manifests both at the
urban and rural areas alike. A steady rise in terror was maintained in the state from November
2008 till January 2010 which destabilized the peace of the society and disrupted religious,
political, social and economic activities.
It was in 2010 that the Boko Haram terrorist group admittedly launched their initial
public attacks on Plateau state. On the evening of December 24, 2010, usually described as
Christmas Eve, actually one of the most celebrated Christian holidays, Boko Haram terrorists
detonated multiple explosives in Kabong and Gada Biyu areas of Jos, predominantly
occupied by Christians. Scores of people were killed and many injured. Boko Haram claimed
they launched this attack in what they termed a retaliation of the atrocities done to Muslims in
Plateau state and other parts of Nigeria. They also promised to carry out more attacks on the
state, which they surely did (Punch 28th December 2010). The brutality, gravity and explosive
nature of the 2010 and subsequent Boko Haram violence in the already religiously polarized
and violence prone Plateau state are revealed in the rapid spread of reprisal attacks to towns,
villages and other areas around Jos and the incessant secret and open killings in various parts
of the state between Christians and Muslims till date. Wanton destruction of lives, properties
and livelihood, huge damage to socio-economic development and polarization of Jos
residential areas along religious fault-lines have been identified as some of the resultant
effects of religious terrorism that pervade the now volatile Plateau State (Para-Mallam 1).
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This research, therefore, investigated the Ethical Issues in the Boko Haram’s Religious
Terrorism in Plateau state, Nigeria.
1.2 STATEMENT OF THE PROBLEM
Boko Haram is a religious organisation which has identified and popularised itself as
religious terrorism. Boko Haram made a self-proclamation that it is an Islamic organisation;
however, Muslims have argued that it is not an Islamic organisation. The Boko Haram sect
originated from Kanama, Yunusari Local Government Area of Yobe State, in north-eastern
Nigeria in 2003. The members who formed the group of Boko Haram withdrew from their
former religious groups and mainstream society and formed the religious organisation which
is now called Boko Haram. They see themselves as the only true representatives of Allah. As
a result, they have condemned Western civilisation in general and Western education in
particular. This is the major cause of Boko Haram’s religious terrorism in Nigeria.
They began their initial attacks on Police stations and government owed buildings
between 21 December 2003 and January 2004 and caused a lot of destructions in Yunusari,
Borsari, Tarmuwa, Geidam, and Damaturu Local Government Areas of Yobe State. This
problem of Boko Haram came into Plateau state on 24 December 2010 when Boko Haram’s
terrorists bombed Kabong and Angwan Rukuba areas of Jos. From those bombings, Boko
Haram’s terrorist activities spread to other places in Plateau state.
Boko Haram’s religious terrorism has been studied by scholars in Peace and Conflict
Studies, Criminology and Security Studies, Political Science, Sociology, Anthropology, and
Economics among others. However, much has not been done in religion, especially in the
area of Christian Ethics. Therefore, the study has focused on the ethical issues that are
involved in the nature, causes, effects and solutions of the problem of Boko Haram. It is in
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the context of ethical issues involved in Boko Haram’s religious terrorist activities that the
study has made recommendations.
1.2 AIM AND OBJECTIVES OF THE STUDY
The aim of this study is to investigate Boko Haram’s religious terrorist organisation in
terms of the following objectives.
1. The nature of their activities.
2. Causes of their activities.
3. Effects of their activities.
4. Making appropriate suggestions as to the ways of tackling Boko Haram terrorism.
1.4 SCOPE OF THE STUDY
The research studied Boko Haram’s religious terrorist activities in Plateau State, Nigeria
with special attention paid to Plateau North Senatorial District, comprising Jos North, Jos
South, Jos East, Bassa, Riyom and Barkin Ladi Local government areas. The reason for
carrying out this research in Plateau North Senatorial District is because this part of the state
had recorded too many terrorist attacks. In order to gain a better understanding of the
activities of Boko Haram in Plateau state, the scope in time of the research was from 2010 to
2015. The choice of this study period was based on the fact that Boko Haram activities in
Plateau state were worse during this time frame.
1.5 SIGNIFICANCE OF THE STUDY
The study of Boko Haram’s religious terrorism has great significance. The study has
increased our understanding of the nature of Boko Haram’s religious terrorist activities, such
as suicide bombing, use of Improvised Explosive Devices (IEDs) in crowded places,
assassinations, kidnappings, burning down of buildings, attacking security forces, guerrilla
22
warfare, drive-by shootings, attacks at market places and parks as well as attacks at churches
and mosques.
The study has identified the major cause of the activities of Boko Haram in Plateau state.
The major cause is their rejection of Western civilisation, which includes Western education,
science, technology, medicine, law, governance, and social relationships. The study has
adequate potential of providing required information about the nature, causes and effects of
Boko Haram as well as appropriate solutions to the problem arising from Boko Haram’s
religious terrorist activities in Plateau state. Finally, the study has added a scholarly source of
information for further studies.
1.6 METHODOLOGY OF THE RESEARCH
The study of Boko Haram’s religious terrorist activities in Plateau state made use of
several methods in order to understand the nature, causes and effects of Boko Haram’s
activities in the state. The study made use of the phenomenological method which deals with
what is seen, heard, felt and experienced. The phenomenological method helped the
researcher to set aside his biases and preconceived ideas and beliefs about Boko Haram’s
religious terrorism. Therefore, the phenomenological method was used extensively in the
study.
Interview method was also used in the study. The people who were interviewed were
drawn from the victims, parents, relatives, teachers, students, rural dwellers, religious leaders,
traditional rulers, security agents, humanitarian organisations, politicians and government
officials. The total number of people interviewed was one hundred and twenty two (122). The
identity of each of the people who were interviewed included the name, age, occupation and
place of interview. Those sampled and interviewed were selected from relevant areas in
Plateau state.
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Focus group discussion was held at various times in the course of the study. The focus
groups were drawn from security officers and the victims of Boko Haram attacks. In addition,
the study keenly used observation method in order to understand the nature of Boko Haram’s
activities. Chat and informal conversation were also used to decipher information from
people who were not comfortable with interview.
1.7 THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK
While considering the theoretical framework of terrorism, it is important to bear in mind
that there are many kinds or forms of terrorist movements, and no particular single theory can
cover all of them. This is because not only are the groups engaged in terrorism extremely
diverse in members, beliefs, aims, and resources, but also varied are the religious and
political contexts or milieus of their campaigns (Jenkins 318).
Various attempts have been made by different scholars and authors to explain the
complex subject of terrorism. In so doing, many theories have been employed. One of such
theories is anarchism. Anarchism has always been referred to as the nineteenth century root
of terrorism. The word, Anarchism was derived from a Greek word Anarkos, which means
‘without a chief’. This term was introduced in 1840 by Pierre-Joseph Produhn. The idea was
maintained by Europeans, Russians and Americans in the 19th century. The essence of the
idea is abolishment of government system and its replacement with voluntary cooperation as
a society’s organized principle. This ideology was adopted by the industrial working classes
as a political voice for their rights (Fowler 4).
At the end of nineteenth century and earlier decade of the twentieth century, the major
political assassinations and casualties were instigated by anarchist ideas and labelled as
anarchist terrorism. These killings created an assurance and sense of fear among governments
about the existence of anarchist conspiracies on national and international level. Anarchism
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may not properly explain out religious terrorism of Boko Haram’s kind. This is because there
are weak theoretical linkages between anarchism and terrorism, as anarchists do not support
blind suicide bombing and target infrastructure, institutions like the terrorists (Stott 1).
Another theory that has been used to explain terrorism is the orthordox terrorism theory.
Orthodox terrorism theory explains, understands and deals with the logic of terrorism as a
doctrine and strategy for political action and change. While discussing political objectives of
terrorism, this theory focuses on established authority and state as the main targets of terrorist
act. The theory of Orthodox terrorism explains comprehensively that what, why and how
terrorism aims at to achieve. The purpose of this theory is not to engage in the discussion of
roots of or reasons for terrorism (Franks 14). Hence, the theory falls short in explaining Boko
Haram that has its root in fanatical Islamic history.
Also, Fascism has been used in an attempt to explain terrorism. The word Fascism is a
Latin word which means to use power to impress or scare people. In 1922, Benito Mussolini
introduced this term and in the same year Fascists attacked socialist officers, killed many
leading figures, set their homes at fire and occupied cities by using violent means (Blamires
8). Fascism supports the concentration of total power (economic, social and political) into a
sole supreme authority that is super patriot and forbids all kinds of opposition (Griffin 24).
Fascism is ideology of war, violence, domination and conflict. The theory of fascism falls
short of this research in that the political ideology supports violence for human progress and
advocates militarism for domination and oppressing adversaries. It also approves war as a
means of change in society and considers conflict as a fundamental law of life to gain
strength.
Fundamentalism/Fanaticism theory is another important theory that has been projected in
terrorism discourse. Fundamentalism theory states that faith, belief or doctrine should be
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literarily applied, implemented or enforced and not modified or altered. The term has a
Christian root, with the conservative movement of the Protestant churches in the United
States of America which started in the late 19th century (Redmond 216). Those Christians
taught what they considered as the basic Christian beliefs, including the infallibility of the
Bible, the virgin birth and divinity of Jesus Christ, the sacrificial death of Christ on the cross
to atone for the sin of the world, and the bodily resurrection of Christ and all believers.
Islamic fundamentalism is a term which has been used to describe the activities of various
Islamic groups whose activities are considered to be rather fanatical.
Fundamentalism theory suggests that religious terrorism is the creation or activity of
religious fanatics, fundamentalists and overzealous and misguided people who pursue
extreme and confrontational forms and interpretations of religious teachings. They are usually
non-tolerant of other beliefs and do not accommodate other religions in a pluralistic society
(Best and Hoomlong 60). Religious leaders can easily incite or provoked religious fanaticism
by what they say to or teach their followers. An instance is a statement credited to Sheikh
Abubakar Gumi, a well-respected Muslim cleric of his time: “if Christians do not accept
Muslims as their leader, we have to divide the country… once you are a Muslim, you cannot
accept to choose a non-Muslim to be your leader” (60). Similarly, in 2010, Col. Moumar
Gaddafi of Libya heated the Nigerian polity when he advocated that Nigeria should be
divided along religious lines into two: Muslim North and Christian South. No wonder some
Nigerians pointed accusing finger to him, his country (Libya) and his General, Youssef Dhiri,
whose mother was a Nigerian from Nguru, Yobe state and a town very close to Kanama in
Yunusari Local Government area where Boko Haram started operation in 2002 (Ishaku 19).
Tamuno argues that the radicalization of Islam and the provocative utterances of some
of their preachers in no small measure incite and inflame the passion of Nigerians in the
direction of religion (19). Fundamentalism, in this sense, gives birth to intolerance, which in
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turn produces religious clashes when different religious followers refuse to tolerate
themselves. Best and Hoomlong observe that fanaticism, overzealous teaching and
intolerance, though threatening factors may not be said to be the main causes of religious
terrorism in Nigeria; but on proper articulation, such factors have contributed variously to
both trigger and escalate religious violence, as can be seen in the case of Boko Haram (61).
Nigeria, however, being a pluralistic society, cannot thrive harmoniously without tolerance
and mutual accommodation by adherents of the various religions.
Larab opines that Boko Haram is just like other Islamic fundamentalist movements
that see “Islam as a comprehensive philosophy with a homogenous entity.” They maintain
that attempting to reform part of Qur’an by introducing certain foreign elements could
invariably mean destroying it. Larab states further, that the general ideology of Islamic
fundamentalism, as seen in Boko Haram run concurrently with the following characteristics:
1. Total rejection of rationality. The fundamentalists instead popularize their own
beliefs after fanning up the emotions of the people.
2. They rely on divine power, rejecting human reason to lead the people on the right
path.
3. They sternly refuse to compromise their beliefs.
4. They see and regard themselves as the genuine, properly guided adherents of
religion, while treating others as their enemies.
5. They are ready to sacrifice their lives for the sake of their beliefs, and are equally
prepared to kill their religious opponents or those they consider as opposers.
6. They make fanatical attempts to force their religious opinions or views on other
people through violent means (cited in Zakariya 44-45).
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Similarly, Gwamna revealed that Islamic fundamentalism took a new turn in the
1970s following the upswing of the Wahhabi Movement in Saudi Arabia, the Muslim
Brotherhood in Egypt, and the Shiite which was propagated by Ayatollah Khomeini of Iran,
all of which has resulted to the formation of various terrorist movements in the world today,
including the Boko Haram terrorists in Nigeria (69). Thus, Muhammed Yusuf maintained the
fundamental stance of earlier fanatical preachers of Islam in his teachings against allowing
any kind of innovation in Islam, attacking and destroying democratic system of governance
and eradicating civil service in order to return Nigeria to a pure Islamic society run on the
principles of sharia, as stipulated in the Qur’an. While fundamentalism could be used to
explain Boko Haram, many scholars have argued that it does not qualify for a theory. Hence
the researcher settled for and adopted the relative deprivation theory for this study. This is
because most of the reasons the founder of the Boko Haram sect, Muhammed Yusuf and the
fighters gave for their attack border on poverty, unemployment, marginalisation and poor
governance.
Another theory of interest in terrorism discourse is the Relative Deprivation Theory.
Ted Robert Gurr, an expert on violent behaviour and terrorist movements was the person who
proposed the relative deprivation theory along with the attendant frustration-aggression
theory in 1970. The theory was reformulated in 1973 by J. C. Davies to include the gap which
exists between rising expectations and need satisfaction. This theory states that human beings
have basic needs, which could be spiritual, physical, social or economic. The denial of these
basic needs by individuals or groups could be a source of violent behaviour (Hudson 19). The
term, deprivation is used to mean poverty; and also to imply the act of taking away something
from somebody or presenting somebody from having something. This reflects the Nigerian
parlance that “a hungry man is an angry man.”
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A number of scholars have attributed the rise of the Boko Haram terrorism in Nigeria to
social and economic recess and the attendant deprivations, particularly the very harsh and
austere socio-economic conditions in Northern Nigeria which has forced many idle youths to
avail themselves of religious terrorism. A number of these youths are not educated, and most
of the few who are educated have no jobs, whereas their politicians live in enviable affluence.
The poor, then, easily becomes a ready tool in the hands of the rich. Obetaro points out that
poverty is responsible for the religious terrorism being experienced in northern Nigeria, due
to the problem of unemployment, absence of social infrastructure and inadequate housing
(cited in Best and Hoomlong 62). Sanusi concurs that poverty and deprivation are the lot of
both Christians and Muslims in Northern Nigeria; and that the associated frustration is a
major cause of religious violence in that region. He reveals further that from 1986 onward,
over 90 per cent Nigerians have had to live below the poverty line. He maintains that the
general poor economic situation in the nation is a major factor which has contributed to
religious terrorism in Northern Nigeria (183).
The deplorable socio-economic condition of northern Nigeria that gave rise to Boko
Haram in the region has been equally attested to by some Nigerian leaders. During a media
chat with the British Broadcasting Corporation (BBC), Olusegun Obasanjo, former Nigerian
president outlines bad government, inadequate education and unemployment as the remote
causes of Boko Haram terrorism in northern Nigeria (Mukhtar 5). Meanwhile, the inequality
that exist between the political elite and the common populace, the marginalization, the wide
gap between the rich and the poor contributed in creating the enabling environment for Boko
Haram to spring up and thrive.
Some analysts are of the opinion that there has been a decomposition of the state, which
resulted in its decay, loss of focus and inability to respond positively to the cry and yearnings
of the people, as Jega notes:
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In essence, therefore, the process of the decomposition of the state, characterised by the
chaotic management of the economy, institutional decay, and the inability of the state to
provide basic socio-economic and security needs of the people, was simultaneously
accelerating the emergence of contending loci of power organized around identity politics
(31).
Best and Hoomlong emphasize that though unemployment and poverty, on their own, may
not be sufficient reason for terrorism, wherever they are given religious contextualization, as
in the case of northern Nigeria, they are bound to assume heightened functionality (63).
Though suitable for a research focusing on northern Nigeria which has become a
showground for religious terrorism, the economic deprivation theory also raises some
questions that are begging for answers. Does poverty always have to provoke violence?
Should that be the situation, why should it always be in certain northern Nigerian cities and
not so in other highly populated city centres in Nigeria? Again, why does this violence almost,
always tend to be sparked off by fanatical or fundamental Islamic sects in Nigeria? Finally,
are these terrorists fighting just to address the deplorable economic and social conditions
prevailing in northern Nigeria, or are there other salient issues that inform their struggle? The
researcher observes that these questions are yet to be adequately handled in academic
literature in Nigeria, and so are inviting more research.
It is true that mass poverty could complicate and deepen violent conflict. However, it is
not every poor society that is characterised by terrorist violence (65). That must be the reason
Egwu opined that the Boko Haram terrorism in Nigeria is not caused by only economic
deprivation, but also by politicisation of religion (in Best and Hoomlong 64). Buttressing this
point, Mu’azzam and Ibrahim reveal that more than any Nigerian city centres, fundamentalist
religious groups are strongest in the north, where religion has been turned into the largest
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industry where the economy has failed. These fundamental groups, they say, are usually led,
sponsored or supported by the elites (81). This boils down to what Usman calls the
manipulation of religion; a situation whereby the elites instigate religious violence in order to
confuse and divert the attention of the people from their harsh and deplorable conditions so as
to continue remaining in power (6). Meanwhile, relative deprivation theory may not
adequately suite this research on the ethical issues in Boko Haram’s religious terrorism in
Plateau state, Nigeria. Hence the researcher adopts consequentialist ethical theory.
Consequentialist Ethical Theory
Consequentialist ethical theory is otherwise known as consequentialism. It was G. E. M.
Anscombe who coined the term, “consequentialism” in an essay she wrote on “Modern Moral
Philosophy” in 1958. She used this term to describe what she understood as the central error
of certain moral theories, more particularly such as propounded by Mill and Sidgwick. Prior
to this time, however, the hedonistic utilitarianism of Jeremy Bentham (1789), John Stuart
Mill (1861), and Henry Sidgwick (1907) was seen as example of consequentialism (Stanford
Encyclopaedia of Philosophy online).
Consequentialism is a normative ethical theory which holds that the consequences of a
person’s action or conduct are the ultimate determinant or basis for judging the rightness or
wrongness of that person’s action. It suggests further that a good action is such that the result
favours a greater number of those that the action affects (Ayantayo 14). The theory embodies
the perception that what is right or best is that which can make the world better in the future.
This is owing to the fact that no one can change the past; so efforts should be invested in
making the future better.
Thus, this theory discourages evil actions, while encouraging good ones. Evil actions
damage, degrade and destroy the society, and so must be discouraged at all cost. Good
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activities, on the other hand build, develop and advance the society and should be encouraged
and emphasised. Consequentialism holds further that what makes any act morally right or
wrong depends on the consequences of such acts, or of something relating to that act, such as
the motive or a general rule regarding that act (Stanford Encyclopaedia of Philosophy online).
The theory, therefore, judges both motives and actions, while protecting the rights of people.
Boko Haram’s terrorist activities in Plateau state have been generally condemned by most
Nigerian citizens. Their onslaughts are hugely destructive and grossly detrimental. They
slaughter, shoot and bomb people and detonate themselves with such a callous feat that
makes the ethicist wonder if they ever had any moral virtue in their character. The effects and
aftermaths of their attacks leave many mourning their loved ones; the economy is broken
down; while the environment is badly damaged and polluted, leaving potential dangers even
for the yet unborn. The choice of the consequential ethical theory, therefore, is adequate for a
research on Boko Haram terrorism. This is considering, among other things the condemnable
activities of the sect and the destructive impacts they have on the people, society and
environment.
1.8 ORGANISATION OF CHAPTERS
The thesis was organised into five chapters. Chapter one was introductory, giving the
background to the study, statement of the problem, aim and objectives of the study, scope of
the study, significance of the study, methodology of the study, and organisation of chapters,
theoretical framework, and definition of terms. In chapter two, review of related literature to
the subject of the study was carried out. Here relevant published books and articles or
journals were examined. Reviewed were literature on religious terrorism and Boko Haram.
Chapter three investigated Boko Haram’s terrorist activities in Plateau state, giving
background information about Plateau state and examining the nature of the Boko Haram’s
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religious terrorist activities in the state. Chapter four considered the effects of Boko Haram’s
activities and their ethical implications in Plateau state. Chapter five concludes the study. In
this chapter, the researcher summarised the work, made recommendations, spelt out the
contribution to knowledge and gave concluding remarks based on the findings of the study.
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CHAPTER TWO
REVIEW OF RELATED LITERATURE
Efforts were made in this chapter to examine the relevant works of researchers and
writers on the subject of the study. This review exposed the researcher to what other
intellectuals had said about religious terrorism and Boko Haram. Reviewed are recent
literature on religious terrorism and Boko Haram in Nigeria. Earlier Literature, which has
relevant ideas to the research, was also reviewed.
The work of other academics provided the researcher the required background
knowledge and also helped him to identify the gap left by scholars, which this thesis sought
to fill as he made contribution to the field of study of Christian Ethics in particular and
Religious Studies in general in the management of terrorism in Nigeria. The researcher
discovered that many publications in Nigeria addressed the menace of Boko Haram. However,
the writings did not handle the ethical issues in Boko Haram’s religious terrorism, which this
study has addressed.
The review of the literature was thematically carried out in two major sections. The
first section examined literature on the conceptual development of religious terrorism in
Nigeria. This also included literature on religious development of terrorism in Plateau State.
The second section considered the conceptual and historical development of the Boko Haram
terrorist organization in Plateau State, Nigeria. The researcher summarised the review,
identifying the gap which may have to be filled as a contribution of the research to
knowledge.
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2.1 CONCEPTUAL DEVELOPMENT OF RELIGIOUS TERRORISM
Religious terrorism is a current biting issue all over the world. Many terrorist
organizations are carrying out their onslaughts in different countries in the name of religion,
such as Islamic State in Iraq and Syria (ISIS), Al-Qaeda, Hamas, Muslim Brotherhood and
others. Nigeria is also represented among nations with the presence and violence of religious
terrorists. Books were selected and reviewed here due to their relevance to this study.
In his book, White, Jonathan R. Terrorism and Homeland Security. Wadsworth:
Cengage Learning, White made a beautiful interplay between religion, politics, and terrorism.
He revealed that religion is the garment with which terrorists usually cover their political
motives. He noted that religious terrorism came on the rise during the Soviet-Afghan war
(1979-1989). At this time the mujahedeen or “holy warriors” were drawn from different
Muslim nations to fight the Soviets in guerrilla warfare (276). By the time that the Soviets
retreated in 1989 from Afghanistan, about 31 mujahedeen groups were left, who spread terror
to other places in the world, mostly to Israel and the western countries considered the
enemies of God.
White’s book layed a good background for contemporary religious terrorism. Being a
terrorism scholar, the author honestly admited that defining terrorism is not an academic
exercise; his reason being basically that terrorism changes over time (3). The book gave a
lucid presentation of a vivid history of religious terrorism, organization and financing, gender
roles, tactics, targets and suicide bombings in terrorism. All these are reminiscent of the Boko
Haram terrorist group. The work, however, locates religious terrorism outside the shores of
Nigeria in the Horn of Africa (Kenya, Ethiopia, Uganda, Sudan, Eritrea and Djibouti). White,
who wrote with a western bias, failed to consider the ideology of the religious terrorists,
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which is the major determinant of their actions. Equally, the book did not give any attention
to the ethical issues in religious terrorism. This is a very important gap this study has filled.
In his authorship titled Terrorism in North Africa and the Sahel in 2012: Global
Reach and Implications, Yonah Alexander, an expert in terrorism studies focused his study
on the global reach of terrorism in North Africa and the Sahel. The countries that constituted
his research include the Maghreb – Algeria, Libya, Mauritania, Morocco, and Tunisia, and
also part of the Sahel – Chad, Mali, and Niger. The two major terrorist groups he centred on
are the Al-Qaida in the Maghreb (AQIM) and Al-Shabaab. He also reflected on the activities
of some other terrorist groups, such as Ansar Al-Sharia, MUJAO, and Polisario (9).
Alexander demonstrated that the religious terrorism presently being suffered in some
African countries could be traced to Libya where, though Maummar Gaddafi’s 42 years of
dictatorship was changed with a new Tripoli regime in 2011, Libyan terrorism has remained
active and alive. The book further revealed that current religious terrorists operate with the
same terrorist ideology of Osama bin Laden’s Al-Qaida. Thus, the author established that Al-
Qaida, a major terrorist organisation is instrumental in the development of modern religious
terrorist movements that operate in some parts of Africa. However, the geography, approach
and content of the book are foreign to the Nigerian terrorist situation, while the study did not
provide any information on the ethical implications of terrorism. This left out a gap for the
current research to fill.
Mark A. Gabriel, in his Journey into the Mind of an Islamic Terrorist, actually took
an academic adventure into the mind of the terrorist and revealed how it works. A devout
Islamic scholar for decades prior to his conversion to Christianity, Gabriel explained
experientially that a very strong bond exist between Islam and terrorism. However, he
cautioned that all Muslims are not fanatical. Most Muslims, he explained, could be best
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described as secular, moderate, orthodox or traditional. This set he said disagree with the
ideology of the radical ones and blame them for making things difficult for other Muslims
(xi).
Gabriel identified five pillars of radical Islamic terrorist philosophy. First is what he
called the Islamic law, which he said is “the line that divides the religious terrorist from the
secular terrorist” (23). Others include: infidels are around (and should be seen as suspects);
Islam must rule; jihad is the only way to win; and finally, faith is the major reason for violent
attacks. Using the writings of Osama bin Laden, Ayman al-Zawahiri and others, Gabriel
explained how religious terrorists justify their actions through the Quran, life of Mohammed,
and Islamic history. He described how early terrorist groups were overcome and
recommended that the world should work together to end the terrorism of today.
Gabriel’s book clearly explained the factors that motivate religious terrorists to fight.
However, he located his work solely on the American society, thereby creating a literary gap
for a study on the African soil to fill. This study on ethical issues in Boko Haram’s religious
terrorist activites in Nigeria has filled that gap.
The work of Akpenpuun Dzurgba: The Psychology of Religion examined the
psychology of religion and the psychology of religious terrorism, among other issues.
Dzurgba discussed exhaustively on the concept of religious terrorism, aims of religious
terrorism, operational tactics of religious terrorism, combat weapons of religious terrorism,
and solutions to religious terrorism.
The book really surveyed religious terrorism broadly. Dzurgba, however, did not
handle Boko Haram terrorism, which has been a frontline security challenge and has dealt
deadly blows on Plateau state. His book equally did not consider the ethical implications of
Boko Haram’s terrorism. Therefore, this study on Boko Haram stepped in to fill the gap.
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Sun Tzu presented excellent tactical operational strategies in fighting terrorism in his
Sun Tzu’s The Art of War plus Strategy against Terror: Ancient Wisdom for Today’s War.
Originally written in Chinese, the book was translated into English language by Gary
Gagliardi. Sun Tzu developed and succinctly presented the basic principles of combating and
winning the war against terrorism in The Art of War. The fight against terrorism in this book
is described as “a religious war – not of Christianity against Islam, but of those who support
God’s gift of freedom against those who want to compel religious belief to justify their own
rise to power” (17). Sun Tzu’s winning tactics over terrorism resonate on five pivotal stands.
These include articulate analysis of the philosophy, the ground, the climate, the leader, and
the methods. These factors must be critically considered when planning any war against
terrorism (20).
War on terrorism is seen in this work as a battle between opposing philosophies. It is
a battle of the ideals of freedom against the ideals of religious and moral totalitarianism. Sun
Tzu warns that anyone who would like to fight current religious terrorism successfully should
learn from the history of fundamental and fanatical Islam, which he said is as old as the
religion itself. He revealed that starting from the dogmatic Kharijites in 657 till date,
successive dogmatic or fundamental Islamic sects have been fighting for political relevance
and control through religion. He said that the primary mandate of today’s religious terrorists
is to forcibly seize power on the deceptive notion of reforming those they consider less
dogmatic Muslims, while their second objective is to conquer, convert or kill non-Muslims
(10). The book equally provided key dates in modern Islamic terrorism, spanning from
November 4, 1979 to March 11, 2004.
The book excellently furnished the readers with operational tactics in the fight against
religious terrorism. It passes for a training manual for the military and other law enforcement
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personnel engaged in counter terrorism battles. The work, however, failed to provide any
recommendation on how to manage damages caused by religious terrorists, nor did it advice
the government on any other way of tackling the menace of terrorism other than the military
might; hence a necessity for a researche of this nature.
Dingsan Charles Chagu’s book, International Terrorism, a Global Threat is basically
historical in nature. Chagu identified and explained the origin of terrorism, both in ancient
and contemporary era. Chagu handled international terrrrorism, considering the causes,
impact, and made recommendations on how the global terrorism could be managed. He
called on African Union (AU), Common Wealth of Nations, Organisation of Petroleum
Exporting Countries (OPEC), European Union, church organistions and Organisation of
Islamic Countries to all rise up to the challenge of religious terrorism in the world (70-79).
The book presented international dimensions of terrorism. However, Chagu did not
explain properly what terrorism or religious terrorism entails. He kept switching between
world wars and terrorism, at the same time calling on Christians and Muslims to intervene
(78). Also, he did not localise his work to any part of the world. His work lack proper
structuring. Several gaps, therefore, exist in Chagu’s work, which this study has filled.
Michael Weiss and Hassan Hassan, in their book, ISIS: Inside the Army of Terror
explained how Islamic State of Iraq and Syria (ISIS), also called Islamic State have shocked
the world. The authors relayed how the religious terrorists have conquered large places in
both Iraq and Syria with a burning desire to create Muslim caliphates ruled with sharia law.
The authors further traced the history of ISIS from when the terrorist organisation was nearly
destroyed in Iraq to how the group developed into a jihadi army of international volunteers.
The authors traced the historical development of ISIS, beginning with the early days
of Abu Musab al-Zarqawi, who founded ISIS with its initial name as “al-Qaeda in Iraq.” The
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key leaders were discussed, including Abu Musab al-Zarqawi, Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi,
Saddam Baathists and others. Their local and international support, operational tactics, social
media strategies and illegal financial sources were revealed. The book exposed the true nature
of ISIS and demonstrated how the terrorist organisation has expanded religious terrorism to
other neighbouring nations. The book, however, left a gap by focusing majorly on the Middle
East, which this study has closed by looking at the activities of ISIS’s ally, Boko Haram in
Plateau state of Nigeria.
2.1.1 Concept of Religious Terrorism
Terrorism is a term that is difficult to define. This is owing to the fact that the tactics and
modes of operation of terrorists keep changing, and also because scholars have no consensus
definition of the concept. That is why, in the words of Anyacho, “the view of what constitute
terrorism varies widely” (115). Some regard terrorist act as legitimate and normal, mainly the
actors and their sympathizers, whereas others describe them as terrorist, usually the larger
society against whom the impact of their activities are directed and felt. Alemika supports
this view. He states that terrorism arouses both sympathy and fear among supporters and
victims alike, such that a singular action may be applauded or condemned by the differing
groups. He holds that terrorism is like beauty, which people say is in the eye of the beholder;
and that “one man’s terrorist is another man’s freedom fighter” (94). Corroborating this point,
Hoffman opines that any decision to describe any organization as “terrorist” is nearly
subjective, largely depending on whether you are a sympathizer or oppose of those concerned
(32).
Schmid presents the Revised Academic Consensus definition of terrorism:
Terrorism refers, on the one hand, to a doctrine about the presumed effectiveness of a
special form or tactic of fear-generating, coercive political violence and, on the other
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hand, to a conspiratorial practice of calculated, demonstrative, direct violent action
without legal or moral restraints, targeting mainly civilians and non-combatants,
performed for its propagandistic and psychological effects on various audiences and
conflict parties (cited in Alemika 94).
Nigerian Economic and Financial Crimes Commission (EFCC) Act gives a rather lengthy
definition of terrorism seeing it as a crime, which involves:
i. Any act which is a violation of the Criminal Code or the Penal Code and
which may endanger the life, physical integrity or freedom of, cause serious
injury or death to, any person, any number or group of persons or causes or
may cause damage to public property, natural resources, environmental or
cultural heritage and is calculated to -
1. Intimidate, put in fear, force, coerce, or induce any government, body,
institution, the general public or any segment of thereof, to do or abstain
from doing any act or to adopt a particular standpoint, or to act according
to certain principles; or
2. Disrupt any public service, the delivery of any essential service to the
public or to create a public emergency; or
3. Create general insurrection in a state;
ii. Any promotion, sponsorship of, contribution to, command, aid, incitement,
encouragement, attempt, threat, conspiracy, organization or procurement of
any person, with the intent to commit any act referred to in paragraph (a) (i)
(ii), (ii) [section 46 of the Act dealing with interpretations] (cited in Alemika,
95-96).
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Alemika observes that The EFCC Act’s definition of terrorism is a comprehensive
one, which paradoxically could eventually become a “catch-22 provision” which covers
everything and anything. He fears that this can lead to an abuse and give birth to a kind of
“law enforcement terrorism” by the government inappropriately and indiscriminately in many
unwarranting circumstances. It would also lead to undue arrest, trial and further judicial
prosecution (96).
2.1.2 Types of Terrorism
Terrorism has been classified in different ways by various scholars. Laquer discussed
terrorism under the far rightist, religious, state, exotic, and criminal terrorism (5). Hoffman
classified terrorism as separatist/ethno-nationalist, religious, international, and state-
sponsored terrorism (43). Barkan and Snowden described terrorism under vigilante, insurgent,
transnational, and state terrorism. Martin categorises terrorism as state, dissident, religious
and international terrorism. Martin’s categorisation is worth a little explanation. By state
terrorism, he refers to terrorism carried out from the top; usually by the government against
those they consider enemies of the state. Dissident terrorism operates from below, and is
carried out by non-state groups or actors against the government, religious groups, ethno-
national groups, and others perceived as enemies. Religious terrorism is that motivated by a
faith or an absolute belief that a religion permits violence or terrorism in the propagation and
practice of a religion. Religious terrorism is usually carried out in defence of faith (12). For
the purpose of this study, the types of terrorism have been discussed broadly under secular
and religious terrorism.
2.1.2.1 Secular terrorism
Secular terrorism is also called traditional of political terrorism. This type of terrorism
is sub-divided into three categories, including left wing, right wing and ethnic-separatist. Left
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wing terrorism primarily refers to the Marxist, Anarchist and Socialist ideological orientation,
which thrived in the 20th century in Europe, Latin America, and the Middle East (to a lesser
extent). Anarchists, particularly in Russia, emerged to destroy the monarchy and the state.
Examples include Argentinian Montoneros, Italian Red Brigades, German Red Army, and
Palestinian Popular Force for the Liberation of Palestine (PFLP), etc. Religious terrorism has
not been associated with the left-winged terrorists.
Right-wing terrorism talks about those groups with fascist, racist, or nationalistic
goals or motives. They have been strong and reasserted through the World Wars till date,
mostly in the West. Examples include Ku Klux Klan (KKK) in the United States, Rumanian
Iron guard of 1030s, neo-Nazis in Europe and United States etc. Religious terrorism has been
categorized often as a new breed or kind of right-winged terrorism, though some elements of
religious terrorism fit not into this category.
Ethnic separatist terrorism speaks of the groups using terrorism to fight for autonomy
or independence from a military force or nation. It has also been discovered that religious
terrorism is associated with this branch of traditional terrorism, though difference exists
between ethnic-separatist terrorists containing religious elements but whose primary goals are
not religious and those whose goals are religious. Irish Republican Army (IRA) is an example
of religious-ethnic group with non-religious goals. Though Catholic by constituency, they
only strive to drive out the British in their region in order to reunite Northern Ireland with the
Republic, not necessarily to form a religious state. Hamas is, in contrast, is an example of a
religious-ethnic group with religious goals. Hamas are fighting in order to expel Israeli forces
in order to create an Islamic state in Palestine. Table 1.1 gives Gregg’s summary of
traditional terrorism.
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Table 1: Traditional Terrorism
Type Defining Goals Examples
Left Anarchist – destroy the Government
Marxist – foment workers’ revolution
Socialist – economic restructuring
Argentinian Montoneros/ERP
Red Brigades, German/
Japanese Red Armies
Palestinian PFLP, Colombian
Elm
Right Racist – racial Supremacy
Fascist – State-sponsored, militant
Racism/nationalism
Nationalistic
Ku Klux Klan
Rumanian Iron Guard
Ethnic
Separatist
1. Dispel foreign occupying force
2. Create ethnically independent state
1. Nirgun
1. PLO, IRA, Basque ETA
2.1.2.2 Religious Terrorism
Gregg believes that religious terrorism or religiously motivated terrorism, as he calls
it, contains elements of the three branches of secular or traditional terrorism, though it differs
in some respects. He also notes that there is a lack of consensus on the definition of religious
terrorism from current literatures, and that authors also lack agreement on how traditional
terrorism differs from religious terrorism, with some saying that there is no difference (4).
David C. Rapoports, a scholar of religious terrorism argues that the precedents and
justification of religious terrorism are different from traditional terrorism. Religious terrorists
use historic examples and sacred texts or scriptures which are not obtainable in secular or
traditional terrorism. Secular terrorism, on the other hand, advances or develops a kind of
1. Neo-Nazis
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culture of actions, activities and boundaries which restrains the scope of brutal acts (cited in
Gregg, 5). Rapoport’s argument centres on the internal features of religion – religious
scriptures and traditions. He did not consider factors which are external to religion or how
those factors could explain the alteration or variation of violence and peace within religions.
Mark Sedgwick is of the opinion that religious terrorism could be understood better in
consideration of the immediate and ultimate objectives of the terrorists. He suggests that
inasmuch as the ultimate objectives could be religiously articulated, the immediate aims, no
doubt, are usually found to be almost entirely political (795). The observation of Sedgwick is
quite helpful in understanding that the aims of religious terrorists are not solely religious.
They have ulterior political motivation in their quest and clamour for religiosity. They carry
political undercurrent within their religious garb. They could be best described as political
gangsters in religious camouflage. This questions the ethical content of their hearts, thoughts,
teachings and activities. When a man is given to obtaining or acquiring things, privileges,
positions or wealth through pretence, falsehood, fraud, or deceit, such an individual is looked
upon as lacking in moral rectitude. This also keeps in doubt the ethical content of the
character of those religious terrorists and their credibility to provide the plausible leadership
they crave.
In Gregg’s view, it is not enough to distinguish between traditional terrorism and
religious terrorism by looking just at the use of religious adherents, scriptures and symbols,
but also by directing focus on the distinctive religious objectives which motivate them to
fight. This is why he proposes the following as his own adopted definition of religious
terrorism: “the threat or use of force with the purpose of influencing or coercing governments
and/or populations towards saliently religious goals” (6).
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Types of Religious Terrorism
Distinctive religious goals or objectives motivate religious terrorists to fight. Gregg
identifies three main goals of religious terrorism which include to: foment the apocalypse,
create a religious government, and religiously cleanse a society or state. These goals typifies
religious terrorists (7-10).
1. Apocalyptic Terrorism
Apocalyptic terrorists are those religiously motivated terrorist groups with apocalyptic
goals. Apocalypse here denotes a total destruction or devastation of something or someone or
some people. It also refers to a revelation of future events. The primary aim of this group is
to cataclysmically destroy property, people and the environment in order to foment the end
time and usher in a religiously promised new world. This form of religious terrorism exists
among traditional religions, cults or New Religious Movements (NRM). Rapoport opines that
apocalyptic terrorists, which he also descrides as the millenialist groups, are usually
motivated by their yearning for a coming Messiah, which they believe climaxes the end of the
world (cited in Gregg 6).
Mayer corroborates that apocalyptic imagination causes terrorism in NRM and cults,
but does not, by itself always result in violence, groups that turn to terrorizing rather, are
responding to real world threats, internal disputes and a mix of millennialism. Mayer further
gives some examples of apocalyptic terrorism to include the Gush Emunim in Israel and Aum
Shinrikyo cult in Japan. Members of Gush Emunim in 1984 plotted to blow up the Muslim
Dome in Jerusalem in order to spark of a chemical and nuclear war between Israel and the
Muslim world, with a catastrophic messianism – disaster that would hasten the coming of the
Messiah. In 1995, Aum Shinrikyo released nerve gas in an attack that killed 13 persons and
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injured 700 others with the aims of instigating World War III and to destroy the world
ultimately in order to save it.
There are also some of the apocalyptic terrorist groups who turn their attacks inward
so as to foment the apocalypse, as opposed to violence against those who are outside the
groups. They include the apocalyptic cult of Heaven’s Gate and the People’s Temple.
Heaven’s Gate followers believed that suicide would liberate their souls. Jim Jones, leader of
the People’s Temple aided over 900 followers to commit suicide en masse by drinking a
cyanide-laced soft drink in an apocalyptic standoff with the government of United States of
America, including over 240 children, in Jonestown in 1978. Reflecting on the incidence, the
American philosopher George Santayana warned that “those who do not remember the past
are condemned to repeat it” (Redmond 219). Mayer states that while these examples may not
strictly define terrorism as their aims did not go beyond their groups, they provide useful
clues on the situations within which apocalyptic thoughts emerge and consequently result in
mass violence (32). This made Gregg to point out that of the three goals of religious terrorism;
the apocalyptic religious terrorism goal appears to be the most dangerous for two reasons:
(1) The paradox of destroying the world to create a better order removes them from
rational thinking and negotiation, and
(2) The aim of destroying the world makes them prone to the use of weapon of mass
destruction (WMD) as a quick way to achieve such ends (7).
2. Religious Government Terrorism
There are religious terrorism groups whose aim is to create religious government out
of an already existing government, or to change and replace a secular government with an
entirely religious government. Gregg argues that “This goal is most commonly associated
with militant Islamic groups and their desire to establish a government run by Sharia Law”
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(7). His examples include the Lebanese Shia organization, Hezbollah which fight to establish
an Islamic government in Lebanon and the Sunni Palestinian Hamas which aim to sack Israel
and establish Islamic state in Palestine. Christian movements include the Christian Identity
Movement and the Covenant, the Sword and the Arm of the Lord (CSA). These movements
aim to use terrorism to force change in the government of United States of America. Kessler
revealed that Timothy McVeigh, Oklahoma City bomber was discovered to have strong link
with both CSA and Christian Identity. The bombing of the Federal building in Oklahoma on
April 19, 1995 happened to be one of the worst terrorist acts in United States history, with
168 persons killed and 850 others injured. McVeigh, a former U.S. soldier was found guilty
of the bombing in June 1997 and sentenced to death. (Microsoft Encarta).
There are religious government terrorists groups who are confined or limited within a
nation’s borders, such as Christian Identity Movement in USA and such others who maintain
transnational ties and objectives through support from similar counterparts in other countries.
Greg reveals that the Lebanese Hezbollah, receives material and financial support from the
government of Iran; Hamas allegedly gets enormous monetary support from Saudi Arabia,
Iran and the Gulf States; while Kach is considerably supported by similar minded Jews in
United States (7). Apart from creating a religious government within a nation state, some
other religious sects are fighting to form religious region or supper-states - a pan-Islamic
regional entity that will transcend national boundaries. Example of this includes the Al-Qaeda
network and their subsidiaries: Al – Qaeda in Iraq, Al – Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb and
Al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula. Jemiyyah Islamia in Southeast Asia also shares this goal
of creation of a regional Caliphate (8). Currently, the Islamic State (IS) is a very perfect
example.
The creation of a religious state or government is betide with numerous problems,
whether through a peaceful or violent means, forcing Gregg to warn that the government of
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any nation where religious terrorist groups operate should not sleep on their oars, but should
tackle such sets with maximum caution, as they have the propensity to inflict various degrees
of havoc on the society. He sees the problems of a single-religion state or region to include
maltreatment of religious minorities, suppression of secularity, refugee problems, national
and regional instability. Iran is used here as a case-in-point. With the creation of the Islamic
Republic of Iran in 1979, Iran’s theocracy has been characterized with notorious intolerance
towards religious minorities, mostly the Baha’i faith as well as towards opposition groups.
Also, regionally, Iran has instigated enormous instability in their spread of religious fervor
and violence across Shia populated countries, mostly, Iraq, Lebanon, Bahrain, Saudi Arabia,
with outright war with Iraq from 1980 – 1988 (8).
Internal problems also abound within such religious entities, as they always disagree
among themselves on what should be the scope and nature of the involvement of religion in
the state. For example, in 1959, the prime minister of Sri Lanka of the Sri Lanka Freedom
Party (SLFP) was assassinated by a Buddhist Monk when his government failed to deliver on
the promise to give Buddhism a superior place in the country. Also, Yitzhak Rabin, Israeli
Prime minister was assassinated in 1995 by the Israeli Yigal Amir because Rabin was seen as
compromising true Jewish integrity in having negotiations with Palestinians. Thus, clamour
for the creation of a religious state is usually full of disruptions, bringing to question the true
nature of the state and who speaks for the religion (9).
3. Religious Cleansing Terrorism
These are religions terrorists whose objective is to wipe out “unbelievers” or
“infidels”, who they regard to be unfaithful within their own tradition or in other religions, so
as to enable the creation of a religiously pure state. Mayer expresses that religious cleansing
could be explained specifically as eradicating another group, or broadly as the cleansing of
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ideas, norms, culture which do not conform to the worldview of the group (47). They differ in
goal from religious government terrorists in that their aim is to force everyone within the
nation state or region to conform to their own interpretation of faith and religious practice.
They therefore make efforts to fight, subject and subjugate other religions and those within
their own kind of religion whose understanding and interpretation differ from theirs. Example
include the Judaism’s Jewish Defence League (JDL) and Kach in the West Bank whose one
of their objectives is to expel non-Jews, non-Jewish religions, and battle other Jews who do
not confirm to their own interpretation of faith together with the government of Israel, who
they believe are not holding up the true tenets of faith. Rabbi Meir Kahane, who co-founded
JDL and is the founder of Kach stated in 1980 that their mandate is the creation of a
government based and run on the Torah. They assassinate targets and destroy religious sites
in the attempt to achieve their goals (49).
Gregg observes that terrorism directed at religious cleansing is comparable to non-
religious terrorism that aims at ethnic cleansing. Religious terrorism is a form of religious
fratricide (brother killing brother), making violence intra-religious. These terrorists attack and
kill members of their religion, who do not belong to their own sect; who they look upon as
not upholding or corrupting the teaching of their faith. In each case, the salient point is faith,
not different ethnicities (9). Gregg gives a succinct summary of religious terrorism below (10.)
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Table 2: Religious Terrorism
Terrorism Goal Defining Goals Examples
Apocalyptic
Create Religious
Government
Create Religiously Pure
State
1. Cataclysmic
destruction of people,
property and
environment
2. Hasten the arrival of a
new world
1. Abolish secular state
2. Create a state
governed by religious
law and doctrine
3. Create trans state
religious government
1. Remove groups from
other religions
2. Remove groups
within same religion
with different
interpretation of faith
Aum Shinrikyo, Elements of
ID’S/Kach, strains of
Christian Identity, Lebanese
Hezbollah, Christian
indentity, Hemas, Elements
of ID’S/Kach, Element of
IDL/Kach, Let,shir sena,RSS
Among other things, Gregg’s examples and summary reveal that a particular religious
terrorist group could be characterized by more than one goal. Contemporary examples
include the Islamic State (IS), a regional religious terrorist organization, and the Nigerian
Boko Haram, currently owing their allegiance to IS.
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Leadership and Targets of Religious Terrorism
A common feature of religious terrorist groups is that they are usually led by the
clergy or religious leaders such as the rabbi, imam, swami, or alim. Mayer asserts that such
leadership could be self-appointed, as with the founder and spiritual leader of Aum Shinrikyo,
Shoko Asahara; derived by charismatic and influential personality, as in the case of Osama
bin Laden who led Al-Qaeda - he was seen as a warrior in the Afghan-Soviet war and
various terrorist operations; or conferred religious training as in the case of spiritual leader of
the Lebanese Hezbollah, Sheikh Fadlallah, who trained as a Shai cleric in Iraq, Iran, Qun,
Najaf, and Meir Kahene of IDL/Kach, who trained in the United States as a Rabbi (50-51).
Whatever the source of religious authority, it is characteristic of religious terrorist sects to
have a religious leader recognized and respected as the authentic person who is accorded the
authority by his followers to represent them and speak on their behalf in matters of faith and
action. Meanwhile, religious authority rests with the followers of the group (Gregg11).
Mayer reveals that religious terrorist groups have two types of targets, namely,
tactical targets which serve specific earthly goals, and does not differ from other forms of
terrorism, and symbolic targets (52). Tactical targets are meant for greater, earthly campaigns.
It includes attacks on head of state, government functionaries and establishments, as in
Egyptian Gammat’s killing of Anwar Sadat in 1981. Yigal Amir’s assassination of Yitzhak
Rabin in 1994; and bombing of Alfred P. Murray’s national building in Oklahoma in 1995
inspired partly by Christian Identity movement. Tactical targets also include religious
terrorist attacks on the presence of foreign governments or embassies within their religion,
such as the bombing of Egyptian embassies in Pakistan in 1995 and AL-Qaeda’s bombing of
United States embassies in Tanzania and Kenya in 1998. Equally inclusive are religious
terrorist attacks on foreign targets located beyond their borders of residence, for example
Islamic religious terrorist groups in Egypt and Pakistan names United States as a major target
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for their support to Sadat’s and Mubarak’s regimes which they termed un-Islamic and their
support to Pakistan government which they see as secular. Mayer states that religious terrorist
tactical targets are not different from the secular, Marxist, ethnic-separatist or anarchist
terrorists whose goal include political change, insurgency or revolution (56-58).
Symbolic targets of religious terrorists appear abstract in nature and are directed
towards specific religious aims and objectives. Here, the religious terrorists attack cultures,
norms, values and practices which do not conform to their own religious ideas or principles,
which could manifest in attacks launched at bars, hotels, clubs, theatres and other social
centers. Examples include Muslim terrorist burning down a hotel in Turkey in 1993; Algerian
fundamentalists’ suppression of Rai music in the 1990 for having a mix of western styles,
attacking and exiling the singer, Khalid; Christian Identity’s bombing of a lesbian bar and
Hindu militants’ destruction of many paintings of a Muslim artist, Magbod Fida Husain
which depicted Hindu deities (68-69).
Gregg presents his summary of the targets of religious terrorism in the table below.
Table 3: Religious Terrorism Targets
Specific Targets Abstract Targets
Domestic Workings on establishments
of the state –assassinate
leaders, attack infrastructure,
undermined state authority
 States that support
regimes
1. Attacks on peculiar
art and other cultural
institutions.
2. Attacks on secular
intellectuals
3. Attacks on historic
other religious sites or
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International
 Foreign government
presence/militaries
 International tourists
artifacts or “Secular”
“western” culture
Globalization
In their own efforts, Crenshaw, Schmid and Luz identified eight goals and seven
techniques of terrorists (cited on Alemike 97). The goals they aim to achieve include the
following.
1. To draw attention to grievances.
2. To secure concessions.
3. Intimidating groups of people or the government in other to prevent a particular
course of action.
4. To frustrate the implementation of programmes and policies of government.
5. To change the constitutional order or pattern of a nation - right wing/left wing,
democratic/non-democratic, secular/theocratic.
6. Defending or achieving economic goal (demand for the control of resources, resisting
exploitation and poverty).
7. Defending or achieving political goals (freedom from secession, repression, under-
representation, etc.).
8. Defending or achieving ideological goals (religious and racial supremacy of freedom,
left-wing, right-wing).
The techniques of terrorism here mentioned include bombing, kidnapping and hostage
taking; assassination of important personalities; tampering with various means of
transportation to cause accident and destroying equipment, electric and electronic facilities;
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computers and telecommunication system; and weapons of mass destruction (nuclear and
biological weapons).
2.2 CONCEPTUAL DEVELOPMENT OF BOKO HARAM
The terrorist activities of the Boko Haram sect in Nigeria have generated a lot
authorship. Jonathan Ishaku, in his book, The Road to Mogadishu: How Jihadist Terrorism
Tears Nigeria Apart gave a narrative on the state of insecurity in Northern Nigeria brought
about by Boko Haram against Christians, Southerners and opposing Muslims. Ishaku traced
the history of Boko Haram to the emergence of religious extremism in Northern Nigeria in
the 1980s and 1990s and the adoption of Sharia law by 12 Northern states in Nigeria,
beginning with Zamfara state in year 2000.
Revealing that the Boko Haram group was formed in a village called Zagi-Biriri in
Tarmuwa Local Government Area of Yobe state; Ishaku focused his study on the impact of
Boko Haram on Jos and Maiduguri. The book disclosed the weapons of the terrorists;
discussing their resorting to asymmetric warfare and the factors that had favoured such a
tactic. By recommending ways to check the extant vulnerabilities, the book offers solution to
the current terrorist onslaughts. Ishaku’s work provided a background understanding of the
activities of Boko Haram in Plateau state. However, the book did not consider the causes of
Boko Haram in Plateau state. This gap has been closed by this study.
Marc-Antonie Pe`rouse de Montclos’s Boko Haram: Islamism, Politics, Security and the
State of Nigeria is the result of the research of scholars who worked with the French Institute
for Research in Africa (IFRA-Nigeria), drawn from Nigeria, France, Germany, the United
Kingdom and United States of America. The assemblage of their papers presented a
constructive debate on Boko Haram. Their work was a combination of theory, fieldwork,
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qualitative and quantitative analysis. The book provided a good understanding of the Boko
Haram sect.
The authors made evaluations of the causes and consequences of Boko Haram on
Nigerian from religious, political, and social standpoints.Also, the book looked at the extent
to which the sect could be seen as a product of economic deprivation and marginalization. It
also exposed the role of security forces, political parties, and Islamic bodies in the
radicalization of the Boko Haram movement. The book provided good background
knowledge for a research which centres on Boko Haram. However, it did not describe the
Plateau state experience of Boko Haram, which this work has done.
Another work on the activities of the Boko Haram sect that is relevant to this study is
Abdulkareem Mohammed’s The Paradox of Boko Haram. Mohammed described Boko
Haram as a religious terrorist group of a special type. According to him, Boko Haram is
different in the sense that previous religious crises in Nigeria were either intra or inter
religious, whereas Boko Haram is basically against the government and governmental
establishments. He states that what makes Boko Haram a paradox is the fact that their
violence started during democratic governance which guarantees constitutional provisions for
freedom of expression, religion and association; operating under the rule of law (64).
Commendable is the author’s effort in tracing the historical development of the sect;
looking at their ideology, and admitting that the sect poses a serious challenge to the Ulama
(Muslim elites). The author believes strongly that Boko Haram came up as a result of
economic deprivation. He, however, did not border to define clearly some of the terms he
used in his work, such as paradox, Ulama, etc. He wrote as if all his readers are familiar with
Islamic terminologies and other related concepts. Also, he did not cite the sources of most of
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his sources, nor did he make academic representation of his data. These gaps have been
carefully filled in this study.
Chukwuemka Emmanuel Mbaezue carried out a research on “Early Warning Signals
and Conflict Prevention: An Examination of the Rise of the Boko Haram insurgency in
Northern Nigeria”. Mbaezue’s research focused on early warning signs of Boko Haram and
how the terrorism could have been prevented. He discovered that the early warning signals
came in two ways: structural and behavioural. The structural early warning signals, according
to him were revealed in poverty, unemployment, illiteracy, bad governance and economic
problems. Behavioural early warning signs, on the other hand, were reflected through
prejudice, exclusion, intolerance, exploitation, discrimination and extremism.
The research revealed that the Boko Haram’s violence being suffered today was
announced early enough by early warning signs, which were neglected by the Nigerian
government and the general public. The prize of such neglect, he said, is the pain Nigeria is
suffering today. Mbaezue’s study provided general information on why Nigerian government
should be proactive in addressing serious issues that border on the security and general well
being of her people. Mbaezue, however, did not bother about the ideology, operational tactics
and targets of Boko Haram. The gap has been filled by this study.
Salisu Uba, in his contribution to the Boko Haram carried out a study on “Press
Coverage of Boko Haram Insurgency (2012-2014): An Analysis of Some Selected Nigerian
Newspapers.” Salisu’s research focused on media’s coverage of Boko Haram activities in
some selected Nigerian Newspapers, such as the Punch, the Daily Trust, and the Guardian.
He discovered that the newspapers he sampled portrayed Boko Haram terrorism as a religion-
political instead of ethno-religious organisation. He further observed that the assessed
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newspapers displayed social responsibility by avoiding sensationalism in reporting Boko
Haram violence so as to minimize the psychological impact of such news on the people.
The research of Salisu demonstrated its strength in providing media perspective on
Boko Haram. Professional media practitioners were advised to check political interference,
ownership factor and religious sentiments if they must discharge their duties equitably. Also
to be avoided is making inciting, abusive and insensitive statements while reporting terrorist
activities. Salisu’s research, however, did not border to explain the problem of Boko Haram
or what they stand for. The gap has been closed by the present study.
Isma’ila Bashari Baba’s research on “The Role of the Youths in Boko Haram Crises: A
Case Study of Selected Attempts in Kano (2012 to 2014)” takes a look at the role the youths
have played in perpetrating Boko Haram terrorism, focusing on Kano metropolis. Bashari
hinges his research on the displaced-aggression theory of Neal Miller (1984), which states
that when a provoked person cannot retaliate directly against the one who provoked him, he
could transfer his retaliation on a seemingly innocent target. The researcher used this theory
to explain that the Boko Haram menace came as a result of the numerous Nigerian youths
who for a long time have suffered hunger, unemployment, marginalization and illiteracy
while the ruling class looted all the resources meant for the people. Since the youths could
not attack those rich politicians directly, they resorted to venting their anger on government
establishments and innocent citizens.
The research provided the perspective of the youth on the question of Boko Haram.
However, Baba failed to explain why children, women and older men also constitute the
membership of Boko Haram. The existing gap has been closed by this study.
Mark Lipdo made startling revelations in his book titled Killings in North and Central
Nigeria: A Threat to Ethno-Religious Freedom and Democracy. In this book, Stefanos
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Foundation research group made a comprehensive compilation of all known incidences of
terrorist violence in Central and Northern Nigeria from 2010 to 2014. The book revealed that
Boko Haram terrorism is not just a happenstance. Rather, it is the continuation of the long
struggle to Islamize Nigeria by both local and international forces; a struggle that started even
before Nigerian independence. The book also recognized that the terrorism in Northern and
Central Nigeria is caused largely by religious, political and cultural factors.
The book further looks at targets of Boko Haram’s attack, patterns of the attack, and
beneficiaries of the attack. Lipdo made a very strong argument, that Northern and Central
Nigeria have a large number of Christians, and lamented that the people affected most by
Boko Haram violence are the minority ethnic groups and Christians. He used charts, maps,
photographs and tables to illustrate his points. Lipdo’s work, however, appears somehow
biased, seemingly pitching Islam against Christianity. This gap was closed in the book.
Another work that largely discussed Boko Haram is that of the National Institute for
Policy and Strategic Studies (NIPSS), titled Eminent Persons and Expert Group Meeting on
Complex Insugencies in Nigeria. This book presents the articulation of academic papers from
different scholars on terrorism in Nigeria. The authors diagnosed Boko Haram terrorism
deeply from the religious, economic, sociological, cultural, legal, political and psychological
dimensions, revealing the sources, causes and offering remedies in its management. Also
studied in this book are such ethnic groups such as Odua Peoples Congress (OPC),
Movement for the Actualisation of the Sovereign State of Biafra (MASSOB) and Niger Delta
Militants.
The book approached the issue of terrorism and of course Boko Haram rather
academically. However, it book did not specifically discuss the Plateau state experience of
Boko Haram activities, thereby creating a gap that has been filled by this study.
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Funsho Omotoso, in his book, Terrorism in Nigeria: Stemming a Rising Menace
presents a vivid picture of terrorism in Nigeria, ranging from insurgency in the Niger Delta
region to the religious terrorism in Plateau state. Drawing definitions of terrorism from
organisations and countries such as the League of Nations, United Nations (UN), European
Union, United States of America, United Kingdom, and terrorism scholars like Raffoul
Saadeh, Tamar Meisels, Andrew Byrnes, Daniel D. Notovotny, Walter Laquer and others, the
author, who admitted that defining terrorism is a difficult task took to Hoffman’s submission
that the decision to label a person or an organisation as “terrorist” could be a subjective one.
This he argues, depends on whether the individual opposes the act or sympathises with it (29).
Funsho made a brief survey of 33 organisations whose activities have been condemned as
terrorism, and whose ideology and operational tactics are similar to that of Boko Haram,
including the Anarchists, Abolitionists, Ku Klux Klan (KKK), Muslim Brotherhood,
Hezbollah, Hamas, Al-Qaeda, among others.
The author observed further that religious terrorism in Plateau state is about the most
prolonged form of violence in any part of Nigeria. He maintained that violence in the name of
religion in the state operate in two major dimensions. The first is the religious clashes
between Christians and Muslims, which has been worsened by the activities of Boko Haram
in the state. The other is the ethnic violence between the Muslim herders and Christian
farmers, which he saw as an indigene-settler contestation over the ownership of Jos (103).
He opines that the rise of Islamic fundamentalism, extremism or radicalism, among
other factors served as a veritable dynamic for religious terrorism in Nigeria. While
fundamentalism entrenched its position against common Islamic beliefs and practices,
extremism took divergent and extreme stance on economic and political philosophies
contrasting acceptable and defined moral, social and political views. Thus, Islamic
fundamentalists and extremists see themselves as the genuine adherents of their religion. A
60
marriage of these two concepts, according to Funsho, had produced terrorism, and infact,
Boko Haram in Nigeria. He adduces that while many Muslim scholars condemn Boko Haram
and argue that Islam is a religion of peace, so many of them had supported the imposition of
shari’a in 12 northern states of Nigeria, which posed a constitutional problem, going by the
fact that Nigerian constitution guarantees a secular state, freedom of religion and a judicial
system. The wide adoption of sharia’a, therefore, provided the Boko Haram elements a
galvanised impetus to terrorise the government and the citizenry in an attempt to establish an
Islamic state in place of the existing secular society (141-46).
Funsho stated further that Boko Haram, which started in North Eastern states of
Nigeria, had invaded Plateau state with its mandate to conquer and topple the government
and possibly turn it into an Islamic society (103). He recommended different ways by which
Boko Haram could be tackled in Nigeria. The book, however, did not provide a chronicle of
Boko Haram attacks in Plateau state, which this study has addressed.
Des Wilson edited a work, The Media, Terrorism and Political Communication in
Nigeria which focused on the role of the media in the fight against terrorism in Nigeria. The
book is an assemblage and synthesis of the works of many communication scholars across
Nigerian institutions of higher learning. The book recognises the causes of Boko Haram and
other forms of violence in Nigeria to include greed, lust for power, unequal access to
resources, oppression of the people, suppression of the public will, hegemonic tendencies,
usurpation of authority, etcetera. The book acknowledged that terrorism is understood
differently among Nigerians, as in other countries. While some people see terrorism as a
positive force which helps in making right perceived wrongs, others picture it as a negative
agency that commits heinous crimes against humankind.
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The book provided relevant media perspectives generally on terrorism and
particularly on Boko Haram but lacked on Boko Haram experience in Plateau state, thereby
creating a gap that has filled by this study.
Solomon E. Arase’s National Security: Intelligence and Community Partnership
Approach spells out the imperative of intelligence-led policing and community partnership in
the fight against Boko Haram and general internal security. The book explains that if the war
on Boko Haram will be a success, the Police, which have the constitutional responsibility of
providing internal security, must be efficient in the discharge of their duties. The success of
the Police, to a large extent, the book reveals depends on operational partnership between the
citizens and the personnel of the Nigeria Police and responsive and accountable leadership
form all levels of government.
The book sets out a functional operational synergy between the police and traditional
rulers, religious leaders, civil society organisations, men, women, youths, and the mass media.
The book revealed Community Policing strategies in the fight against Boko Haram. The
author, however, did not discuss the ideology of Boko Haram, which this study has addressed.
2.2.1 Concept of Boko Haram
Before explaining what Boko Haram is, worthy of note is the fact that the Hausa
language has been infused with or corrupt by the Arabic language. This, perhaps, is because
of the long use of Arabic language or terms in religious/Islamic expressions and teachings in
Hausa speaking places. Hausa language is the second lingua franca after English language in
northern Nigerian states. Etymologically, the term, “Boko” is Hausa, while “Haram” is
Arabic. The Bargery’s Hausa-English Dictionary and English-Hausa Vocabulary define
“Boko” as “any reading or education which is not connected to Islam or any government or
native administrative school or establishment in Roman character (117). In Hausa language,
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“Boko” means western education, westernization or western system of life. Haram is an
Arabic term, meaning that which is unlawful or taboo. Boko Haram, therefore, means that
westernization or western education is forbidden or unlawful (4). In a simpler understanding,
“Boko” in Hausa is what the Igbo and Yoruba in Nigeria may refer to as Bekee or oyinbo
respectively, meaning people of the west or white people. The West here refers to the
countries in Europe and the Americas (North and South America), whose culture and society
are influenced mostly by such traditions that are rooted in Greek and Roman culture and in
Christianity.
Abba reports that the Boko Haram sect members do not address or call themselves by
the name, “Boko Haram”. Rather, the residents of Maiduguri, where the sect was formed in
2002 nicknamed them Boko Haram due to their ideological underpinnings. Others called
them the Nigerian Taliban, while some others addressed them as Yusufiya, after their late
founder and former leader, Muhammed Yusuf. The group’s officially adopted name, however,
is Jama’atu Ahlis Sunna Lidda’awati wal-Jihad (People Commited to the Propagation of the
Prophet’s Teachings and Jihad) (40). Kyari corroborates that the Yusufiya movement had no
official name for itself until the July 2009 crushing by Nigerian security forces. Prior to that
time, he said, the group referred to itself as “dawaah”; identifying its mission as a return to
the Ahlus Sunnah wal Jama’a (Adherents to the Sunnah the Community of Muslims), also
referring to its followers or members as “brothers”. He hints further that the initial reference
to the present preferred name Ahlus Sunnah Liddawa’ati wal Jihad came up in the aftermath
of the prison break in Bauchi in September 2010 (13-14).
Contributing to the etymological discourse on Boko Haram, Adamu concurs with
Abba that “it is the persistent theme of condemning aspects of western schooling that earned
the group the sobriquet of boko haram in the Nigeria media” (43). However, Adamu frowns
that the expression “Boko Haram” has widely been translated wrongly to mean “western
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education is sin”. This, he says is because writers wrongly assume that “boko”, a Hausa
onomatopoetic of “book” means “western education based on western books”. He quips that
scholars often make this mistake due to poor knowledge of the Hausa language, lack of
content analysis of the statements of the group, and complete reliance on newspaper reports
of the activities of the sect.
While citing Bargery (117), Adamu explains further that the term “boko” in Hausa
lexicon has 11 meanings, 10 of which conveys the same idea, implying “doing anything to
create impression that one is better off, or that it is of better quality or larger amount than is
the case”. This, according to him entails deception. The eleventh meaning of “boko”, he says,
refers to “English book”. He argues that the classical definition of “boko” has retained its
original colonial meaning of deception. Technically speaking, Adamu remarks, Boko Haram
implies the “deceptive knowledge which is sinful”, and not “western education is sin”.
Still harping on the meaning of boko, Adamu makes reference to the meaning of
“book” in the New Dictionary of Hausa Language, which presents four meanings of the word:
1. Ilimin zamani (modern knowledge) 2. Rubutun Hausa da bakaken Romawa (Hausa written
in Latin alphabet) 3. Giri (deception, lying) 4. Makirci (guile). Adamu then submits:
Thus Muhammad Yusuf’s lectures and writings were geared precisely towards
convincing his followers that knowledge by western idea is false in some aspects, but
neither he, nor his followers after his death, ever actually proclaimed that such
knowledge is sinful. He thus used the word ‘boko’ in its original Hausa context to
mean ‘false’. It is the process of demonizing the movement that created the projected
medieval persona of the group as condemning Western education – a fact they found
amusing, since they do not only use products of Western technology and knowledge
(laptops, arms, explosives), but at one stage they even had a full blown website to
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proclaim their ideals. In addition, their attack on Bauchi prison in August 2010 was
facilitated by extensive use of Google Map which helped them to map out the prison
location and its access roads, and subsequently take strategic locations that hampered
counter attack by security agents, as documented in their video release, “Gazqatu Abi
Ibrahim” [Abi Ibrahim’s War] (44).
The submissions of Adamu are worthy of pertinent observations. In the first place,
Adamu appears at some points to be attacking persons instead of issues. For example, he
describes some scholars as “charlatan and marabouts – basing their epistemology on faulty
interpretation of Islamic injunctions to deceive their clients – [they] are also “yan boko”
(dispensers of deceptive knowledge)” (44). The researcher sees such injurious affronts as not
being truly reflective of objective reasoning for an academic. Secondly, Adamu’s arguments
appear to be somewhat sympathetic of the Boko Haram sect. Thirdly, he seems rather
contradictory in his representation of ideas. Having argued that the term, ‘boko haram’ was
the invention of members of the public in describing the sect, he went on to contend that the
sect’s original leader, Muhammed Yusuf invented the word ‘boko’ to express the falsity of
western thought and practice. Finally, Adamu’s semantics dwells mainly of ‘boko’, leaving
out ‘haram’. Moreover, he did not bother about explaining out the meaning of the sect’s
chosen name: Jama’atu Ahlissunnah Lid-da’awati wal Jihad, implying a “People Committed
to the Propagation of the Prophet’s Teachings and Jihad”.
Abba’s understanding of Boko Haram is reminiscent of politics. He sees them as the
Islamic sect seeking to impose Sharia legal code in the entire northern Nigeria region. The
followers of this sect, he says, are influenced by the Koranic passage that states: “Anyone
who is not governed by what Allah has revealed is among the transgressors.” Thus, continues
Abba, Boko Haram sect sees it as ‘haram’ or forbidden for any Muslim to partake in politics
or social activities that are associated with the West, including receiving secular education,
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wearing of shirts and trousers, voting during elections, taking up political appointments, etc.
The sect condemns Nigerian president, though himself a Muslim, for the fact that he is
partaking in democratic governance seen to reflect western thought (41).
Buttressing Abba’s political stance on Boko Haram, Perouse de Montclos maintains
that the sect is a political clique, despite its religious shade. He opines:
Despite its religious background, Boko Haram is political in nature because it contests
Western values, challenges the secularity of the state, and reveals the corruption of a
system that relies on a predatory ruling elite. Yet its leaders have never actually
proposed a political programme to establish a caliphate and govern Nigeria according
to Sharia law. In this regard, Boko Haram is first and foremost a challenge to a
divided ‘ummah’ that never succeeded in setting up a party to play the democratic
game and contest elections with a religious programme instead of resorting to
violence as an alternative channel to reform (5).
Many scholars who have written on Boko Haram have bordered their semantics on
the public imposed sobriquet, “Boko Haram” rather than the sect’s preferred designation as
Jama’atu Ahlissunnah Lid-da’awati wal Jihad, suggesting they are a “People Committed to
the Propagation of the Prophet’s Teachings and Jihad”. Meanwhile, the members of the sect
are not happy that they are being addressed as boko haram. This is revealed in a statement
released by the Vanguard Newspaper in August 2009, quoting one of the sect’s self-
acclaimed interim leader, Mallam Sanni Umaru:
Boko Haram does not in any way mean “Western education is forbidden” as the
infidel media continue to portray us. Boko Haram actually means “Western
Civilization” is forbidden. The difference is that the first gives the impression that we
are opposed to formal education coming from the West…which is not true, the second
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affirms our belief in the supremacy of Islamic culture (not education), for culture is
broader, it includes education but not determined by Western Education (De Montclos
160).
This explains clearly that the members of the sect prefer to be addressed and
described by what they truly stand for “ People Committed to the Propagation of the
Prophet’s Teachings and Jihad” – a people committed to the propagation of Islam and the
teachings of the prophet of Islam through jihad (researcher’s emphasis). Note the following
salient points discernable from the sect’s preferred name as stated above: 1. Boko Haram is
unarguably an Islamic sect 2. Boko Haram is committed to propagating or spreading Islam
widely. This suggests missions or evangelisation. 3. Boko Haram uses Jihad (warfare) as a
veritable means of carrying out their missionary mandate. Thus, while there are arguments
and counter-arguments on boko haram by observers and scholars alike, the sect members are
busy championing their course as revealed in their preferred name of “Jama’atu Ahlissunnah
Lid-da’awati wal Jihad, (People Committed to the Propagation of the Prophet’s Teachings
and Jihad).
Over the years, the sect has metamorphosed under various names, such as the
Nigerian Taliban, Muhajirun, Yusufiyyah movement, and Boko Haram or Boko Haram
Terrorists (BH or BHT). The group, however, prefers to be known and addressed as Jama’atu
Alhlissunnah Lidda’awati wal Jihad, which the sect adopted publicly as their official address
(Onuoha www.e-ir.info). The official name of the group, Jama’atu Alhlissunnah lidda’awati
wal Jihad (JASLWJ), was formally launched in August 2010, the same time its Islamic
agenda was declared. The delay in making this declaration would have been because prior to
this time, the group had been engaged in proving its ideological and epistemological stance
on various aspects of knowledge with different scholars (Adamu 55).
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2.2.2 Ideology of Boko Haram
The main rubric of Boko Haram discuss is their ideology. Ideology here entails
philosophy, body of beliefs or principles, set of teaching or doctrine of an individual or group.
It is the belief or set of beliefs that a religious, political, moral or philosophical group holds to
be true (Redmond 512). Many people have argued that Boko Haram is an ideology. The
ideology of Boko Haram requires equitable attention, as everything the group does is
determined by their ideology.
Richardson argues that every insurgent or terrorist has at least one formidable or
outstanding asset – the ideological power of a cause on which to base his actions. This
ideology, he says extensively transforms frustrations and aggressions into a political
programme for violence and terrorism, and plays a major role in the development of terrorism.
Ideology greatly affects the way people interpret situations; the way they respond; and their
choice of strategies for action (cited in Abba 36).
In most occasions, the belief system of religious fanatics is tied up to religious
zealotry or terrorism. The religious terrorist usually sees himself as an instrument of justice.
He goes on to commit terrorist violence as an act of conscience. He keeps turning to religion
as he commits terrorist acts, believing that his activities amount to religious service. Hacker,
in this regard notes that:
Some terrorists are quite reconciled, though by no means resigned to the role of
martyrs who unlike heroes, do not succeed but failed honourably at least they knew
they tried: the unshakable belief that they work, fight and die for purposes
transcending their own narrow interest give them that fanatic self-righteousness which
makes their often self-destructive acts so destructive, dangerous and contagious (Abba
36).
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Larab opines that Boko Haram is just like any other Islamic fundamentalist
movements that see “Islam as a comprehensive philosophy with a homogenous entity.” They
maintain that attempting to reform part of Qur’an by introducing certain foreign elements
could invariably mean destroying it. Larab states further, that the general ideology of Islamic
fundamentalism, as seen in Boko Haram run concurrently with the following characteristics:
7. Total rejection of rationality. The fundamentalists instead popularize their own
beliefs after fanning up the emotions of the people.
8. They rely on divine power, rejecting human reason to lead the people on the right
path.
9. They sternly refuse to compromise their beliefs.
10. They see and regard themselves as the genuine, properly guided adherents of
religion, while treating others as their enemies.
11. They are ready to sacrifice their lives for the sake of their beliefs, and are equally
prepared to kill their religious opponents or those they consider as opposers.
12. They make fanatical attempts to force their religious opinions or views on other
people through violent means (cited in Zakariya 44-45).
Gwamna notes that Islamic fundamentalism took a new turn in the 1970s following
the upswing of the Wahhabi Movement in Saudi Arabia, the Muslim Brotherhood in Egypt,
and the Shiite which was propagated by Ayatollah Khomeini of Iran, all of which has resulted
to the formation of various terrorist movements in the world today, including the Boko
Haram terrorists in Nigeria (69).
Onuoha spells out that the ideology of Boko Haram is deeply rooted in Salafi
Jihadism, while their actions are compelled by Takfirism. Salafism is an aspect of Islam that
seeks to purge the religion of every outside influence while striving to return the Muslims to
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the kind of Islam which was practiced by those considered as the pious ancestors
(Muhammad and the early Islamic community). This kind of Islam emphasises strict
adherence to a rigorous interpretation of the Qur’an and the Hadith, aiming to reform the
behaviour of every individual Muslim. It equally warns Muslims to change their ways with
the strict requirements of the Qur’an. Onuoha observes further that it is only one particular
interpretation of Salafism that encourages the use of violence in achieving radical change,
which is known commonly as Salafist Jihadism (160).
Takfirism is another ideological term that goes with the salafist Boko Haram. Takfir is
Arabic word which means to pronounce an individual or action un-Islamic. Shahzad notes
that Takfirism categorises every non-Muslim as kafir (infidel), and calls on every true
Muslim to vacate or abandon existing societies and settle himself in isolated places or
communities, and take up arms and fight infidels ( cited in Onuoha 160). This is exactly what
Boko Haram followers did in their formative years. Sani reports it this way: “calling
themselves Nigerian Taliban, Boko Haram adopted a ‘live-off-the-land’ lifestyle and
established a camp in a remote area of northeast Nigeria, which the group dubbed
‘Afghanistan’” (cited in Madueke 45).
Abba affirms that Boko Haram is a local Salafist group that turned a Salafist Jihadist
movement in Nigeria in 2009. The group, he continues, is an Islamic fundamentalist sect
opposed to the constitution and every other man made law. They advocate for strict
enforcement and application of Sharia law; try to propagate a form of Islam that sees it as
forbidden all interactions with Western society; and also fight against traditional Islam and
the democratic government of Nigeria. This school of thought interprets everything western
as religious deviation and unislamic. They consider western influence on Islamic society as
the reason for Islam’s weakness in the society. Therefore, they declared western education,
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and of course all western institutions as haram (forbidden), and as such, must be avoided by
all Muslims (50).
Further, Abba explains that the ideology of the sect is clearly spelt out by the two
words that make up their popular name – boko (western or foreign) and haram (forbidden) –
which when pieced together forms Boko Haram, meaning to forbid anything western/western
education. The motive behind this ideology, Abba reveals is to replace Nigerian secular state
with traditional Islamic state, because they feel that western values are opposed to Islamic
values. Evil prevalent in the society, they hold is due to the fact that western civilization has
been embraced. In order to check the unpleasant situation, therefore, a model Islamic society
has to be established by ensuring that secular institutions and systems are destroyed. This
ideology accounts for the imposition of Sharia law on modern society, as well as the multiple
attacks on state institutions (50-51).
Assenting to the foregoing, Mohammed avers that the pronouncement and emphasis
of the sect that western education is prohibited is what translates simply as Boko Haram in
Hausa language. He stresses that the word, haram is primarily an Arabic term which has been
adapted into Hausa language to imply anything that is islamically unacceptable (44). In his
words, Boko Haram views western secular education to be islamically prohibited. Also, they
hold that Christian evangelism, which to them is camouflaged deceptively as western
education is islamically rejected. This viewpoint, Mohammed observes is not new in northern
Nigeria. This is because, according to him, this perception has always been held in the
Muslim north that since western education was brought to the area by Christian missionaries,
Muslim children attending such schools would easily convert to Christianity. This he said,
has led to strong opposition against western education against western education in northern
Nigeria since colonial times.
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Boko Haram’s ideology of opposing Western education or westernization has
encountered several clashes with many Islamic scholars and religious experts. Islamic
jurisprudence has categorised all issues and actions that require Islamic verdict (fatwa) into
two. The first is Ibadat (worship and devotion to Allah) the Qur’an and Sunnah of Prophet
Muhammad stipulate. The second is Mu’amalat which includes other issues not stipulated in
Ibadat. Boko falls under mu’amalat and not ibadat. Mohammed argues strongly that
advocates of boko haram have the difficult task of explaining their position to the Muslim
ummah. This is so, according to him, because the responsibility of providing evidence for a
ruling on issues of mu’amalat rests upon whoever claims a thing is permissible. He states that
the best deduction from the viewpoint of Islamic jurisprudence is that Boko is halal
(permissible) except that which may be haram (prohibited) within it (45). However, he did
not spell out that which could qualify as haram in boko.
In addition, Islamic legal system does not classify knowledge or information on the
basis of its cultural or geographical origin. It rather rejects such information or knowledge on
the basis that it contradicts the two main sources of Islam; which are the Qur’an and the
hadith (Sunnah). Both the Qur’an and the Sunnah unarguably enjoin the Muslims to seek
useful knowledge in every field of endeavour. Based on this premise, Mohammed dismisses
the impression that boko, education or knowledge can be considered haram, prescribed or
prohibited for the singular reason that it is new, modern or western (46). This position is
equally expressed by the Da’awah Coordination Council of Nigeria (DCCN). They state that
if anything in the contents and method of Boko does not contradict the clear teachings of the
Qur’an and the Sunnah or the objectives (maqasid) of Sharia, then it cannot be regarded as
haram from an Islamic perspective (143).
Isa Ali Ibrahim (Pantami) was the chief Imam of the Abubakar Tafawa Balewa
University Central Mosque as at the time he wrote to refute the ideological position of Boko
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Haram and called on Muslims to defend Islam from extremists. He observed that the fatwa
(verdict) issued by Boko Haram which prohibits worldly knowledge (western education),
civil service and recognizing the authority of government is contrary to basic established
Islamic injunctions, principles and system. His based his argument on the following reasons:
One, the verdict is certainly contrary to that of permanent committee of verdict in
Saudi Arabia, volume 12. This is a standing Islamic Committee comprising about 290
members of eminent scholars whose credentials in the different spheres of Islamic
Religious Knowledge are impeccable. They give out fatwah (judgement) on current
issues to the benefit of Muslim ummah. Secondly, the verdict is again contrary to the
book authored by Sheik Salman Al-Audah entitled: ‘Islam and the Pursuit of Worldly
Knowledge.’ Thirdly, the Boko Haram verdict is contrary to the teachings of Prophet
Muhammad (SWA) and all the pious predecessors. And finally, the methodologies of
Ahlus-Sunnah wal Jama’ah popularly known as As-Salafiyya never support the
verdict of boko haram (Mohammed 55).
Conversely, to Salim I. Hassan, the Boko Haram movement deserve a hearing from
the general public. He argues that people ought to be fair in their understanding and attitude
towards Boko Haram. This, he says, is because when the sect declares that boko is haram,
they refer to the negative aspects or attributes of western education/westernization. He
contends further that all genuine Muslims profess that western education, be it social or
natural science is embedded with elements of kufr (infidelity) which should be discouraged
and supressed in Islamic schools; while the same treatment should be given to democracy and
its constitutional limits. Hassan identifies what he calls basic anti-Islamic and heretical
theories and ideas contained in the curriculum of western education and democracy. This
includes Charles Darwin’s evolution theory, which by his interpretation claims Allah does
not exist nor is He an eternal Creator, by suggesting that every human being came through
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natural selection. Hassan calls this“typical kufr knowledge.” He goes ahead to explain that
“kufr can be best described as secularism, and democracy is a tool or agent through which
secularism is being imposed upon nations by the West. By this, he asserts that for the Muslim,
the conflict here is the secularism claims that Allah has sovereign power only over the
heavens, whereas humankind has sovereign power over the earth. Moreso, he holds that
democracy “asserts that man-made laws as embodied in democratic constitution are superior
to that of Allah – in obvious discord with Shari’ah”. He calls on all Muslims to rise up, like
Boko Haram to the challenge and attack of westernisation on Islam (Mohammed 56-57).
Mohammed observes that when the Boko Haram movement started gathering
momentum, the government and Muslim community (ulama) initiated approaches aimed at
checking their excesses. Islamic scholars engaged their founder, Mohammad Yusuf on
debates and dialogues aimed at convincing him and his followers to withdraw their fatawah
that boko is haram and discourage further influx of membership to the sect. Those debates,
according to Mohammed were counterproductive due to the fact that they were directed at
attacking the personality of the sect’s leader than addressing the issues raised. This, he said
helped the sect to win more public sympathy and become more strengthened (58). Toing
Hassan’s line of argument, therefore, Mohammed makes the following assertions:
In Islam, there is also the danger in branding or condemning the practice of any
Muslim or even accusing him of “extremism” if he decides to adopt a hard-line
opinion based on juristic judgement through which he seeks Allah’s blessings. In such
a situation, he cannot be forced to abandon his choice or make him follow a line of
behaviour which is contrary to his convictions. Yet the Qur’an says in this respect: “if
you differ on anything among yourselves, refer it to Allah and His Messenger, if you
do believe in Allah and the Last Day” Qur’an 4:59. The duty, therefore, remains to
appeal to the person with wisdom, argue with him patiently and try to convince him
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by citing evidence in the hope that he may change his mind and fall in line with
majority view (59).
An analysis of the taped sermons of the founder of Boko Haram, Mohammed Yusuf
reveals further the ideology of the sect. The sermons focus on the following issues. 1.
Condemning Nigerian constitution and describing it as dagut (idolatory). 2. Condemning
various aspects of western education. 3. Condemning the government and everything related
to it, and regarding anyone who identify with it as an infidel. 4. Accusing Nigerian
government of not allowing Islam to be properly practiced (Adamu 43). Adamu adds that the
fundamental philosophy of Boko Haram is based on core Islamic values – and entails not
accepting anything which does not conform or have a place within the knowledge framework
of Islam. He notes that Yusuf’s epistemology is derived from the book authored by Ibn
Taymiyyah, titled “The Decisive Criterion between the Allies of the Merciful and the Allies
of the Devil”. This book’s content, he said, influenced Yusuf and his followers and “sets the
stage for his non-compromising views on the role of secular epistemology in Islamicate
social structure” (48). Adamu also reveals that Boko Haram ideology is further contained in a
book authored by Mohammed Yusuf himself, titled “Hazihi Akeedatum wa Minhaju
Da’awatuna” (This is Our Manifesto and Our Path), published in 2009 in Arabic. This book
presents the outline of the important features of Yusufiya philosophy. Adamu observes that
from a close look at the book, it appears Yufu’s book drew great inspiration from two other
books earlier written by Ibn Tammiyyah, including Minjhaj as-Sunnah an-Nabawiyyah ( The
Pathway of as-Sunnah an-Nabawiyyah ), and al-Furqan baina Awliya al-Rahman wa-Awliya
al-Shaitan (The Decisive Criterion between the Allies of the Merciful and the Allies of the
Devil). An aspect of Yusuf’s book addressing the “Dangers of Western Schooling” has the
following:
75
According to Darwinism, human beings originated from a small animal which
evolved millions of years before becoming human. Subhannallah! This is a big lie!
Whereas Allah has detailed how He created human beings from dust and water. This
is our belief and on which we base our Islam. The amazing aspects of creation are
stated in the Qur’an in many places (Adamu 52).
In another passage of Yusuf’s book dwelling on democracy, he wrote:
I am warning you about the troubles of our modern times, especially on democracy,
infidel, modern idol to whom its followers worship. We will not accept, interact, or
partake in this democracy because it is the path of the infidels; following it,
interacting with it and using it is following the path of the infidel. It is prohibited for
any Muslim to be in it, or to elect an infidel under the system of democracy (Adamu
53).
Many debates and dialogues took place between the founder of Boko Haram, Yusuf
and prominent Islamic scholars both in Saudi Arabia and northern Nigeria (Mohammed 64).
Notable among those debates are those led by Malam Isa Ibrahim Pantami (Pantami debate),
Imam of Abubakar Tafawa Balewa University of Technology, Bauchi on Sunday, 25 June
2006. Another is the one led by Ustaz Idris Abdul’Aziz of Jama’at Izalatul al Bidiah Wa
Ikamat and al-Sunnah, which took place in February 2008 (Adamu 45-46). The first debate
lasted for two hours, forty eight minutes and fifty one seconds (02:48:51). The debate was to
determine the acceptability or otherwise of western education and democracy within the
ambit of Islamic culture. The debate ended in a stalemate, with each of the scholars
maintaining his position. While Pantami argued that westernization could be allowed within
Islamic precincts, Yusuf opposed that, stating that western education and anything that has to
do with the government is haram (46-49). “Consequently, any form of organized modern
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secular education is considered sinful in Islam because of its potentials in aiding immorality”
(52).
In Yusuf’s debate with Ustaz Idris Abdul’Aziz, Idris asked him to give a categorical
answer if boko is haram or halal? Yusuf’s answer was a straightforward one: “western
education as taught in the kinds of schools we have in Nigeria is haram”. He continues:
There are aspects of western education as taught in our schools that make it haram.
The mixing of opposite sexes makes it haram. The importance given to some non-
Muslim days in the schools’ calendar (Saturday being Jewish holiday and Sunday
being Christian holiday) also makes it haram. Allah in the Qur’an said He created
man from clay but its disputation by evolutionary theory makes it haram, even
bordering on shirk. And the claim in western education that there are nine planets also
contradicts what Allah says, thereby making it haram (57).
It is a plain fact that the emergence of the ideology of Boko Haram has posed a very
serious challenge to the peace, unity and corporate existence of Nigeria. It is therefore, not
the best to ignore this ideology. This glaring challenge should be studied, analysed and
properly understood from all angles of ramification. Then a wise and practical approach at
addressing it should be articulated. Proffering modifications or alternatives on rational issues
highlighted could make for better management and existence than the present use of force
and suppression prevalent in the country.
2.2.3 Leadership, Organizational Structure and Membership of Boko Haram
Leadership
The group popularly known today as Boko Haram was primarily being headed by one
Mallam Abubakar Lawal under the name, Shabab Muslim Youth Organization with its base
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in Indimi mosque, along Damboa road, Maiduguri. Lawal led the group from 1995 till the
time he departed Maiduguri to the University of Medina, Saudi Arabia for further studies
(Baba 44). The group came under the supervision of other Muslim clerics until 1997 when
Muhammed Yusuf was chosen to be their new leader because he was seen by older clergies
to be a vibrant young man who possessed the necessary qualities that could help him cope
with the rigours of handling the group. It was not long, however, before Yusuf had a fall out
with the other clergies of the mosque, who he accused of corruption and improper
interpretation of the Qur’an. He quickly started changing the teachings of the group to
assume a hard-line Islamic position (Ibrahim 20).
Ustaz Abu Yusuf Muhammad Yusuf (29 January 1970-30 July 2009) was a native of
Jakusko, Yusufari Local Government Area (LGA) of Yobe state, Nigeria (Mohammed 107).
Yusuf was the spiritual leader of the Yusufiya Movement (Boko Haram) which his followers
named after him. He was a product of Tsangaya (Qur’anic school). He became so involved in
Islamic youth activities early in his preaching life. Sheik Mahmud Jafaar, a prominent Saudi-
trained Islamic scholar in Maiduguri who strengthened an existing Ahl-Sunna group that
preached against innovations in Islam had a very strong early influence on Yusuf and other
teaming youths who got attracted to his group, Shababul Islam (Islamic Youth Vanguard),
which Yusuf eventually emerged as the leader of its youth wing. Yusuf and his Maiduguri
youths became engrossed in the anti-Western and anti-Jewish preaching of a United Kingdom
based Islamic scholar, Sheik Abdullah al-Faisal (born Trevor William Forrest) to the
disappointment of Sheik Jafaar and other superior clerics of Ahl-Sunna, leading to Yusuf
parting ways with them and setting up his own mosque in Maiduguri city (43).
Abubakar reveals that Yusuf got his Qur’anic education in Niger Republic and Sudan
(though some add Chad) where he allegedly got radicalised (6). Marchal corroborates that
Yusuf’s religious orientation came from a Kano based Islamic scholar, Sheik Jafar Mahmud,
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and Sheik Abubakar Gumi of the Izala group who was a strict adherent of the Salafi group
and a disciple of the renowned Ibn Tamiyya. The Izala movement, which stood against every
form of innovation in Islam, was formed in Jos, Plateau state under Sheik Ismaila Idris (1937-
2000).
Madueke informs that Mallam Muhammad Yusuf started the Boko Haram movement
due to the general dissatisfaction and concerns being expressed by various Muslims in
Nigeria against western thought, dressing and political system and the attendant negative
impact on the Nigerian society. Thus, in an effort to reverse the perceived negative trends,
Yusuf built his model mosque and school where he started the indoctrination of puritanical
Islamic values (46). He founded and led the Boko Haram sect until 30th July 2009, the day he
died in the hands of Nigerian security personnel in what has been described as questionable
circumstances or extrajudicial killing.
On the demise of Yusuf, his deputy, the notorious imam Abubakar Shekau took up
leadership of the group and directed their affairs until August 2016, when Abu Musab al-
Barnawi took over from him. Meanwhile, under the leadership of Shekau, factions emerged
within the sect. These include the Abubakar Shekau led faction, Abu Qaqa led faction, Abu
Musab al-Barnawi’s faction, Mamman Nur led faction, and the Ansaru splinter group. There
may be some other groups that are not yet reported. The two main rival factions, however, are
those led by Shekau and al-Barnawi (africanarguments.org/2016/09/20making-sense-of-
boko-harams-differdnt-factions/). These factions emerged due to operational strategy,
ideological difference and ethnic identity. Abu Qaqa controlled one of the factions before he
was captured in 2013 by security operatives. During interrogation, he disclosed that
Abubakar Shekau was too protective of the Kanuri, and would always select non-Kanuri for
suicide attacks. Refusal to embark on such a mission, he said would warrant death penalty.
This affected membership and alienated members from other tribes, leading to the formation
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of Abu Qaqa’s faction. Meanwhile, fundamental Islamic ideology, Kanuri ethnic identity and
manipulation of the historical narrative of the Kanem-Borno Empire’s heritage - three
inseparable factors have played significant roles in the recruitment, establishment and
expansion of Boko Haram in Nigeria. These factors have also led to the factions and affected
leadership in the group today (www.religionandpolitics.org/boko-haram).
Organisational Structure of Boko Haram
Boko Haram has an effective organizational structure and a functional networking
within its ranks. By their structure, the Amir ul-Aam is the overall spiritual leader and
Commander in chief of the group. He works with two deputies (Na’ib Amir ul-Aam I and II).
Every state where they operate has one Amir (leader/commander) who is in charge of the
state. Each Local Government Area has an Amir. All other followers/fighters are organized
and operate under the Local Government Amirs, according to their various roles as servants,
police, soldiers, et cetera. Also, the Amir ul-Aam has under his leadership the Shura Council,
which is the highest decision making cabinet that oversees the entire affairs of the group
(Da’awah Cordination Council of Nigeria (DCCN) 14). Prior to his death in 2009,
Muhammed Yusuf was the Na’ib Amir ul-Aam, a position that Abubakar Shekau, one of his
deputies occupied on his demise.
The sect has amirs, cells and units in northern Nigerian states as well as in some
neighbouring countries of Cameroon, Chad and Niger Republic. In its early stage, Boko
Haram had about 22 zonal/state commanders in Nigeria, some of which included Babagana
Mustapha (Yobe), Ibrahim Bazan (Borno), Musa Mohammed (Adamawa), Mohammed
Awwal (Kano), Isa Kumbia (Gombe), Mohammed Sani Sambo (Kaduna), Abubakar Habib
(Katsina), and Abubakar Mohammed (Bauchi) (Oloja 3). Muhammed Yusuf was the Amir ul-
Aam, a position that Abubakar Shekau, one of his deputies occupied after the death of Yusuf
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in 2009. Shekau inherited this structure, but perhaps modified it to maintain a loose
command-and-control structure that allows autonomous operation. The group operates from
interlinked cells; however, receive directives from a general commander (Onuoha 160).
Figure 1: Hypothetical Organizational Structure of Boko Haram
Source: https://rampages.us/bokoharam/wp-content/uploads/sites/7589/2015/07/bokoH-
1.png accessed on 26 August 2017
Membership of Boko Haram
The membership of Boko Haram is drawn from diverse geographical enclaves and
professional diversities, both within and outside Nigeria. There are those members from
northern Nigeria of such backgrounds as dissatisfied and alienated young people,
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unemployed graduates, students, almajirai, and also wealthy businessmen, politicians and
civil servants. A good number of them were students in their secondary and tertiary
institutions who had to abandon their academic pursuit to dedicate themselves fully to
Yusuf’s teachings and movement. Those who had graduated from different fields of study
had to destroy their certificates as a proof of total allegiance to the group. Muhammad Yusuf
was equally able to pull to his fold some important figures in the government of his day, such
as Alhaji Buji Foi, a two-term Local Government Chairman, also an honourable
commissioner who served under the administration of former governor Ali Modu Sheriff of
Borno State, Dr Kida from University of Maiduguri Teaching Hospital and many business
moguls from Borno state and beyond. One of the members unveiled that Mallam Yusuf, as
they called him, would always serve tea, chewing stick, et cetera to those who visited him;
and once such things were taken, the one who took it would mindlessly become his follower
due to the fact that those items contained charms that could easily turn a person to his pawn
(Ibrahim 21). The group also draws its members from the neighbouring African countries of
Chad, Niger, Cameroun, and Sudan, which are nations where they have their presence (161).
Many people believe that a significant part of the foot soldiers of Boko Haram are
made up of the almajirai (plural of almajiri). Though there is no empirical data to
substantiate this claim, the almajiri have been usually “associated with Islamic radicalization,
militancy, and the periodic riots that have blighted many northern Nigerian cities.” The
almajirai are pupils in traditional Qur’anic schools, mostly boys and young men who wander
about begging of alms (Hoechner 63). In 2012, the Newswatch magazine published the
comments of Wole Soyinka on the harmfulness of the almajirai in Boko Haram terrorism.
Describing Boko Haram as the “butchers of Nigeria”, Soyinka dirges that they have:
Been deliberately bred, nurtured, sheltered, rendered pliant, obedient to only one line
of command, ready to be unleashed at the rest of society. They were bred in
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madrassas and are generally known as the almajiris. From knives and machetes, bows
and poisonous arrows they graduated to AK-47s, homemade bombs, and explosive
packed vehicles (cited in Hoechner 64).
Some scholars, such as Hoechner question what they see as unfounded stigmatization
of the almajirai, while some other scholars decry the vulnerability of the almajiri to radical
activities. Awofeso, Ritchie and Degeling identified four characteristics of the almajirai
which Boko Haram terrorists and other radical movements could easily take advantage of. 1.
It involves children being separated or relocated from their family members and friends to the
guardianship of Mallams in various towns. 2. The practice is almost exclusively restricted to
boys. 3. The curriculum of those schools is primarily concerned with rote memorization of
the sixty six chapters of the Qur’an. 4. Each of the schools keeps 25 to 500 pupils at a time,
ranging from ages 6 to 25. Moreover, these schools are generally independent of government
supervision and control (314). Onuoha affirms that the almajirai are extremely vulnerable to
religious extremism and financial inducement, given their poor economic, social and
religious status (163).
The Boko Haram sect has had in its membership, in addition to the almajirai, some
influential, wealthy and well-educated Nigerian followers. This includes Bunu Wakil (a very
wealthy contractor based in Borno), Kadiru Atiku (former University lecturer), and Alhaji
Buji Foi (ex-commissioner in Borno state). The strength of Boko Haram’s membership is not
publically known, though Adele projected in 2011 about 1.5 million followers, which
Onuoha describes as “outrageous” (163). The major recruitment strategy is through
indoctrination. Adamu reports that within a period of seven years (1999-2006), Yusuf had
successfully indoctrinated over 2000 youths who resigned their appointments, abandoned
tertiary education or tore their certificates to embrace petty businesses while imbibing
Yusuf’s ideology (44). Recruitment has also been done through kidnapping, prison jail breaks
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where escapees were co-opted into the sect, and by the use of the internet in propagating their
ideologies.
2.2.4 Funding of Boko Haram
Onuoha has identified four sources of fund to the Boko Haram sect. These include
dues, donations, external funding, and bank robberies (163). Prior to Muhammad Yusuf’s
death, each member of the Yusufiya movement paid to Yusuf, their leader a daily levy of one
hundred naira. Most of the members then were petty traders, peasant farmers, road-side car
washers, and cyclists. Some of the motorcycles were believed to belong to Yusuf himself,
which yielded him regular returns. Since Yusuf’s death, however, the sect’s activities have
become very secretive, thereby hampering investigation into the economic life of Boko
Haram adherents, or whether or not members still pay dues.
In terms of donations to the support of Boko Haram activities, some notable Nigerian
politicians, businessmen, individuals and organisations have been accused. The Nigeria
Police Force, on 5 January 2011, celebrated the arrest of Bunu Wakil and 91 others. Wakil, a
very wealthy contractor from Borno state was alleged to be a principal Boko Haram financier.
Also, the state security operatives on 21 November 2011 arrested Senator Mohammed Ali
Ndume, a senator representing Borno South Senatorial District who was arraigned
subsequently before a High Court in Abuja for maintaining ties with and sponsoring Boko
Haram (Onuoha 164). Little wonder the immediate past Nigerian president, Goodluck Ebele
Jonathan allayed that Boko Haram had pervaded the entire strata of the society.
Boko Haram is also alleged to be receiving fund from foreign terrorist groups.
Muhammed Yusuf and Mohammed Damagun were tried in 2007 for offences related to
terrorism. Damagun, the proprietor of Daily Trust newspapers was arraigned before an Abuja
High Court on a three count charge, including that he: 1. was a member the Nigerian Taliban;
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2. received a total of 300,000USD from Al-Qaeda for recruiting and training Nigerians in
Mauritania for terrorist activities; 3. was supporting terrorists in Nigeria. Similarly,
Mohammed Yusuf was arraigned on a five count charges which border on receiving funds
from Al-Qaeda terrorists operating in Pakistan for the purpose of recruiting local terrorists to
train and attack foreigners in Nigeria, especially Americans. Also, Abul Qaqa, a self-
proclaimed spokesperson of Boko Haram explicitly declared to the Guardian newspaper that
the Boko Haram terrorists are spiritual disciples of Al-Qaeda and late Osama bin Laden, and
that Mohammed Abubakar Shekau, their leader had in August 2011 met with leaders of Al-
Qaeda in Saudi Arabia to receive all the technical and financial supports they required. Some
people, however, doubt the authenticity of this claim and see it as a propaganda aimed at
creating more tension. Likewise, during the prosecution of Kabiru Abubakar Dikko Umar,
also known as Kabiru Sokoto, the mastermind of the Christmas Day Bombing of a church in
Madalla, Niger state, before an Abuja Federal High Court, a prosecution witness stated that
Sokoto revealed in his statement that the insurgents receive fund from an Islamic group based
in Algeria, called Musilimi Yaa’maa, and that those funds had led to the disintegration of
Boko Haram, due to quarrels over the sharing formula (Onuoha 164-5).
Furthermore, Boko Haram engages in criminality to raise fund for their operations.
They operate on the principle of Fai, by which the terrorists argue to justify the robbery of
banks, jewellery stores and other financial outlets to support their jihadist violence. Sheriff
Shettima, a member of a notorious robbery gang made confessions after his arrest by the
police in 2011 that his gang had carried out several robbery operations in Borno state in order
to raise fund for Boko Haram activities. Such operations included the raiding of Damboa
branch of First Bank Nigeria Plc., on October 2011, where they made away with 21 million
naira and killed a policeman. In 2011 alone, out of about 100 bank robberies in Nigeria, over
30 attacks were attributed to Boko Haram. While confirming this, Kabiru Sokoto further
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revealed that Boko Haram raises fund for their operations through robbery; and the proceeds
of the robbery are shared into five for the following groups: 1. The leaders (used for the
prosecution of the jihad) 2. The robbers who bring the money 3. Zakat 4. Widows of those
who have died in the jihad 5. The less privileged (165).
This practice raises serious ethical questions. What is the moral basis of “robbing
Peter to pay Paul”? Could the robbery be justified because they share the loot with the less
privileged? Are the recipients of such “alms” not as guilty as the raiders? If the robbery
should amount to piety, would Allah accept such as devotion? The researcher submits that the
morality of the Boko Haram jihadists is seriously to question. Moreover, with heightened
security around the banks today, it could be observed that the terrorists would have turned to
other forms of criminality to raise fund for their escapades, such as kidnapping, illicit arms
deal, pipeline vandalism, car theft, human trafficking, drugs trafficking, and even
ransomeware (internet hijacking).
2.2.5 Historical Development of Boko Haram
The incubation of the Boko Haram sect in northern Nigeria dates back to 1995. The
transformation of the organisation to an armed, complex and violent movement, however,
could be traced to various incidents that led up to the general election in Nigeria in 2003.
When the original founder of the group, Abubakar Lawan, departed Nigeria to Saudi Arabia
for further studies, Muhammad Yusuf was appointed as the new leader by a committee of
clerics in 2002. Subsequently, Muhammed Yusuf overthrew the clerics, accusing them of
corruption and poor interpretation of the Qur’an (Onuoha 165). Following the altercation that
ensued, he withdrew with his followers and sympathisers from the others and built his
mosque complex in Maiduguri called Ibn Taimiyya Masjid or Markaz Ibn Taimmiya. The
mosque was named after Ibn Taymmiya, a fiery medieval Islamic scholar who maliciously
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criticised and condemned various Islamic sects, such as the Sufis, Shia and the ruling Sunni
elite in his days. By naming his mosque after a prominent Salafist jihadist, Yusuf also
demonstrated his hatred to the ruling Muslim elite of his day, as well as his disapproval to the
traditional Islam being practiced in Nigeria. He started preaching puritanical sermons
supposedly aimed at calling Muslims back to Islam as spelt out in the Qur’an and
Hadith/Sunnah. He took up an ideology which abhors western education and sciences;
blaming the failure prevalent in the society on the corrupt ruling class, whom he called yan
boko, meaning present day elites who were educated at secular schools. The sect maintain
that the Nigerian system as being exemplified by the yan boko is secular, unjust, corrupt and
lacks divine origin or authority, and is so totally unislamic.
Three overlapping and yet distinct phases are discernible in the historical
development of the Boko Haram movement. The first is the Kanama phase (2003-05), when
they fought the Nigerian state but were suppressed by the security forces. The second is the
dawah phase, which started with the Kanama upheaval and ended with the suppression of the
group in July 2009. The third phase, which could be termed the terrorist phase, started with
the suppression of the group and killing of their leaders by Nigerian security forces in 2009,
and has continued till date (Muhammed, Kyari 10).
2.2.5.1 The Kanama Phase (2003-05)
Islamic thought and identity in Nigeria is derived from the Sufi brotherhoods of
Qadiriyya and Tijaniyya, basically due to the historical role played by Kanem-Borno and
Sokoto caliphates in spreading Islam. The Sufi orders and the Izala (Izalatul Bidi’a wa
Ikamatis Sunnah – People Committed to the Removal of innovations in Islam) are obviously
the major dominant Muslim modes of identity (11). The disdain for western education has
always characterised the Muslim north since the colonial era. The colonialists equally took
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advantage of this to under educate the northern Nigerians. Due to the fact that the British did
not have the intention of proper education in Nigeria, they produced a very low cadre of
western educated elites among the northerners. The aim of colonial education, mostly in
northern Nigeria was just to maintain existing status quo, whereby they imparted limited
education to the children of the aristocratic class, while neglecting the commoners (Tukur
886). Thus, in the course of time, the children of the aristocratic class who had western
education emerged above their counterparts who had Qur’anic education to assume
leadership position and control economic resources. Mohammed reports that:
This was the origin of the animosity and distrust between the traditionally educated
and Western-educated elite in Northern Nigeria. Though subordinate to the Europeans,
these educated elites were perceived as collaborators by their Arabic educated fellows.
Thus antagonism towards Western education continues in many northern Nigerian
communities, which have defied government campaigns for enrolment to this day.
Mohammed Yusuf simply resurrected and built on an existing historical narrative (11-
12).
In its formative stage, the Boko Haram followers withdrew from the mainstream
society they considered evil and corrupt. They started living far away from the urban
landscape of Maiduguri, in the rural village of Kanama, Yunusari Local Government Area
(LGA) of Yobe state, north-eastern Nigeria in 2003. This was in a bid to intellectualise,
radicalise and attempt the revolutionary process that would eventually lead to the overthrow
of the Nigerian government. The choice of the village, Kanama as a base camp was for
security and military reasons. It was quite remote and easily defensible. The camp was
thickly forested and located between two water bodies close to the border of Nigeria and
Niger. The jihadists dug trenches and laid camouflages across the two major roads between
Kanama and Niger Republic, using sandbags to reinforce their defences. Then began their
88
initial attacks between 21 December 2003 and January 2004 on police stations and
government owed buildings, where they caused a lot of havoc in Yunusari, Borsari, Tarmuwa,
Geidam, and Damaturu LGAs of Yobe state (12). Cook reports that between January and
September 2004, the group resurfaced and attacked Damaturu, capital of Yobe state, and
Damboa, Bama, and Gwoza in the neighbouring Borno state, attacking police stations and
attempting to force prison breaks (10). They took twelve policemen captive in Kala Balge in
October 2004 and nothing has been heard about those hostages. They eventually settled at the
top of Mandara Mountains, from where they were fought and dislodged by Nigerian military
with the aid of artillery shells.
These attacks were led by Muhammed Ali, a Nigerian believed to have been
radicalised in Saudi Arabia, and alleged to have fought together with the mujahideen in
Afghanistan. By this time, the group referred to themselves as the “Nigerian Taliban”. The
role of Muhammad Yusuf, along with Abu Umar and Ibrahim Abdulganiyu was talent
spotting, recruitment and indoctrination of members. Muhammed Yusuf, however, escaped to
Saudi Arabia where he remained throughout the Kanama uprising. On his return from his
self-imposed exile in Saudi Arabia in 2005, the sect members who survived the Kanama
adventure re-joined him and boosted the Yusufiya movement. Mohammed Ali is considered
one of those who introduced Mohammad Yusuf into militant jihadi ideology, making Yusuf
to drop his mainstream Islamic rhetoric for destructive violence in 2005 (Mohammed, Kyari
13).
2.2.5.2 The Dawah Phase
The dawah phase refers to the period between the Kanama debacle and the
suppression of Boko Haram by Nigerian security forces in July 2009. During a pilgrimage in
Saudi Arabia in 2005, there was a peaceful agreement between Muhammad Yusuf and the
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Borno state government, which was brokered by the then deputy governor, Adamu Shettima
Dibal and Sheik Ja’far Mahmud Adam. Sheik Adam reported that Yusuf denied being a party
to the Kanama uprising and swore to discontinue preaching inciting messages. Based on this
truce, Yusuf was permitted to return to Nigeria, where he continued his preaching within and
outside Maiduguri, Borno state capital. From this time to July 2009, the Yusufiya movement
referred to itself as dawah, identifying its mission as returning to the Ahlus Sunnah wal
Jama’a (Adherents to the Sunnah and the Company of the Muslims); while referring to its
members as “brothers”. Their official address, Ahlus Sunnah liddawa’ati wal Jihad came in
force after the prison break in Bauchi in September 2010 (Adamu 32).
The term, dawah, according to Sivan, is an important issue in radical Islam. He states
that dawah is the:
Islamic term which denotes a combination of propaganda, education, medical and
welfare action – and its practitioners. Yet the da’wah has an importance beyond that
of being a possible cradle for violence. It is bringing about change in the many
Muslim societies, and sometimes plays a role – albeit indirect – in politics (27).
Yusuf’s dawah was centred on his followers, who believed totally in their leader and
in the genuineness of their cause. He prepared their mind ahead with his sermons, stating that
“in this dawah we agreed that we are going to suffer…anyone who dies in the process goes to
paradise. This is our dawah (Mohammed, Kyari 15). In another sermon he preached on 30
June 2006, he declared the following to his followers:
In the process they will abuse you, call you names and some of you may even die.
They will shoot some of you, and we will just pray “may Allah give you aljana
[Paradise] and proceed without any qualms. Can we endure? We ought to endure.
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May Allah give us the will to endure. This is how our dawah is …even if we die in
the process, this dawah will continue – even after a hundred years (15).
The dawah phase of Boko Haram metamorphosis was devoted to extensive
recruitment, proselytism and radicalisation of the followers. Equally observed are destructive
criticisms of the secular system; debates and counter debates on the propriety or otherwise of
secularism, democracy, western education or westernisation with opposing Ulama (Muslim
cleric); and constant criticism of the bad governance and corruption experienced under
Governor Ali Modu Sheriff (2003-2011) of Borno state. Also condemned is the wealth and
extravagant spending of Western-educated elites in the midst of the poor and helpless (10).
Kyari Mohammed identifies that the following major planks of Yusuf’s narratives
characterise the dawah phase, which are quite reminiscent of the jihad ideology of the puritan
Salafi scholar, Ahmad Ibn Taymiyya (1268-1328 CE): 1. The concept of taghut (idolatory),
considering as taghut, secularism, partisan politics, democracy – and any form of judicial,
legislative and executive function that derives from a secular constitution instead of Shariah
law. 2. Western education and westernisation. 3. Working for a unislamic government (civil
service); and 4. Repudiating the charge of Kharijism as levelled against the sect by the Ulama,
especially Yusuf’s former Wahabbi group in Maiduguri. These positions resulted into the
clashes between Boko Haram movement and Nigerian security forces, which culminated in
the 2009 fracas (15).
2.2.5.3 The Terrorist Phase
The third phase of Boko Haram history started with the military suppression of the
group in 2009, leading to the death of their founder, Muhammad Yusuf and other leaders and
members of the sect by the hands of Nigerian security agents. Boko Haram withdrew from
public domain, hibernated, regrouped, and surfaced again in 2010 with such a destructive
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vengeance that has laid the nation bare till date. It was within this period that the sect was
declared a terrorist organisation by the United States of America. While blaming the security
forces for high-handedness, Onuoha opines that the way the 2009 revolt was repressed by the
Nigerian state proved to be a critical factor in the deadly escalation of Boko Haram’s violent
attacks (169).
Continuing Onuoha’s argument, Mohammed, Kyari adduced that “the metamorphosis
of Boko Haram from a dawah to an arms-bearing sect was in part the making of security
agents” (23). He regrets that there was no known attempt made by the government to
understand, analyse and give attention to the issues raised by the group which border on
political and socio-economic failures in the society. Mohammed’s analysis of the factors that
led to the Boko Haram sect becoming violent at this stage could be outlined in the following
order.
1. Boko Haram’s contest over the ownership of a mosque at Monguno, Borno
state which started in 2008. Boko Haram followers were thrown out of the
mosque because Izala could not dissuade Yusuf from his firm religious
convictions. On their way to reclaim the mosque, about 67 boko haram
followers, including Abubakar Shekau, were arrested and locked up at
Maiduguri prison by state security agents, seemingly at Izala’s instigation.
Muhammad Yusuf, who vowed to revenge this affront, encouraged his
followers to use the prison to convert and proselytise other inmates to their
fold.
2. Operation Flush II, a Borno state based joint military outfit was established
primarily to combat armed banditry in the state. Operation Flush had
severally harassed Boko Haram members while going or returning from
carrying out their dawah (preaching activities). Operation Flush had also
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stopped the movement of motorcycles at night, which brought about a
serious misunderstanding between the sect members and the security men,
leading to the shooting and wounding of 17 boko Haram men while they
were going to bury their members who died in automobile accident at
Gwanje cemetery in June 2009. With the subsequent denial of medication
to the sect members wounded in that clash, Yusuf and his men saw this as a
declaration of war. This precipitated violence at Maiduguri.
3. The death of Yusuf while in the hands of security personnel coupled with a
massive onslaught and killing of Boko Haram members and the video
footage by local media and Aljazeera further helped in radicalising the
group. Many who survived went for further military training; some melted
into the society for intelligence, while others went underground to plan
resurgence. This is added to the destruction of Boko Haram headquarters
complex, Markaz Ibn Taymiyyah, which was razed to the ground (22-24).
With their resurgence, Boko Haram fighters have carried out countless targeted and
indiscriminate attacks on perceived opponents, politicians, security operatives and civil
population. They have even bombed high profile targets at Abuja, such as Nigeria Police
Force headquarters and United Nations offices in June and August 2011 respectively. The
more the military crackdown on them intensifies the more ruthless, desperate and terroristic
they become.
2.3 ETHICAL ISSUES IN BOKO HARAM’S RELIGIOUS TERRORISM
Global Terrorism Index report of 2015 ranked Boko Haram, the Nigeria based
religious terrorist organisation as the world’s most dangerous and deadliest terrorist group in
the year 2014. According to the report, the Boko Haram religious terrorist attacks were
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responsible for the death of 6, 644 persons in 2014. The deaths came from 453 attacks of
Boko Haram on people mainly in Nigeria, as well as in Cameroon and Chad. The number of
people killed by Boko Haram in 2014 was higher than those killed by the dreaded Islamic
State of Iraq and Syria (ISIS), which stood at 6073, making ISIS to be rated the second
deadliest terrorist organisation in the world for that year. The report further revealed that
Nigeria recorded the highest increased number of deaths from terrorism ever recorded in one
year period, in 2014 with 7512 deaths, against the recorded 1850 deaths in 2013. This stands
for 300 per cent increase in deaths (Botha et al 1).
The 2016 report of United Nations Children’s Emergency Fund (UNICEF) equally
stated that in year 2015, about 1.3 million children from Nigeria, Cameroon, Niger and Chad
were displaced following Boko Haram activities. This is in addition to the over 270
kidnapped Chibok School girls and 44 cases where children were used for suicide bombing
attacks in 2015 (UNICEF http://files.unicef.org/). Various sources have given different death
figures caused by Boko Haram since they came into the public space in 2002. Some have
recorded 20000 to 35000 deaths, while Kashim Shettima, Borno State governor estimated
100000 deaths (The Nigeria Security Tracker www.fas.org/sgp/crs/). While much of the
deaths and destructions occurred in north-east states of Adamawa, Borno and Yobe, other
states, such as Plateau State had equally experienced different levels, intensity and frequency
of Boko Haram religious terrorist attacks.
Meanwhile, scholars have been forced to brainstorm on the morality or ethical issues
in Boko Haram terrorism. Obi and Ezeogu assert that Boko Haram religious terrorism has
raised lots of ethical questions, stating that a major moral challenge with Boko Haram
terrorism is in the methods they choose to carry out their violent activities (185). To Kainz,
when questions are asked on the morality of terrorism or suicide bombing, some tend to
justify it, stating that these are acts of desperation by people who are oppressed and forced to
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take up extreme defensive measures. The question, however is, if terrorist attack is the only
available option to an oppressed people? Have they considered, tried and exhausted other
reasonable options? It is quite unfortunate that some religious leaders interpret suicide
terrorism as “martyrdom,” thus enticing their naïve followers with a supposed heavenly
reward. One may then ask, if suicide bombing is as much rewarding in the afterlife as it is
being portrayed, why is it that the religious leaders who propagate such teachings are not the
first to blow themselves up in order to exhibit leadership by example? When questioned on
the killing of innocent civilians, the defenders of suicide terrorism argue that there are no
non-combatants in their struggle. Thus, Kainz asserts that morality is useless to the Boko
Haram terrorist who does not see any difference between religion and ethics (29). The Boko
Haram considers sharia as the final authority, and so believes he has the religious mandate to
carry out terrorist act.
Seto opines that the question about the morality of Boko Haram religious terrorism is
worth asking for three reasons. First, a clear answer to Boko Haram religious terrorism may
convince many people to join in the fight against terrorism, and dissuade those who intend to
join the terrorists. Secondly, could terrorist acts be justified by the context in which such acts
occur? Thirdly, when a terrorist act is described as immoral, the question that arises is if
terrorism is implicitly moral. This also includes a mirror question, if adjudging an act as
terrorism is moral. Seto asserts that terrorists believe that they are pursuing a righteous cause,
and that their actions are both justified and moral. The terrorists are just like other criminals
who know that what they do to others is wrong, and they go ahead to do it. Seto further asks,
if terrorists believe that they are right, while other people believe they are wrong, whose
position is right? He argues that if terrorists are to lay any claim to morality, they must
include a communicative component. This implies that the terrorists need to state the cause of
the unfairness, distress, pain, grief, injustice, and suffering they cause the public before
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carrying out such actions. Failure to do so weakens any claim to morality the terrorist may
make. Going about to kill people and bomb places is totally unwarranted, unjustified,
unnecessary and unreasonable (Seto digitacommons.imu.edu/).
Madson is of the opinion that suicide terrorism is the weapon of the weak against a
superior and more powerful enemy. He quoted the General Secretary of the Palestinian
Islamic Jihad:
“Our enemy possesses the most sophisticated weapons in the world and its army is
trained to a very high standard…We have nothing with which to repel the killing and
thuggery against us except the weapon of martyrdom. It is easy and costs us only our
lives…human bombs cannot be defeated, not even by nuclear bombs (190).”
The argument above is that Boko Haram terrorists consider the Nigeria state to be too
strong and more sophisticated. To be able to fight the government favourably, suicide
bombing and sporadic attacks become reasonable or rational options to the terrorists in their
struggle. It then becomes necessary to ask if morality is identical with rationality. Does an
action become moral because it is the most rational thing to be done? Is reason the
determinant of morality? The question of Boko Haram religious terrorism puts us in a very
serious ethical dilemma.
Lending his contribution to the discussion on the ethical issues in Boko Haram
terrorism, Asthappan stated that the natural survival instinct of the human person would stop
an individual from endangering himself. However, it is an exception to this natural human
drive that may explain why terrorists logically kill themselves in order to kill others.
Asthappan argues further that death in itself cannot be accepted at an experimental level, as it
must be rationalised as the religious transition from temporal earthly life to eternal life (15).
Enders and Sandler added that suicide bombers could be considered rational when “the utility
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obtained from living with the current state of affairs is less than that obtained by a life-ending
action” (18).
The nature of Boko Haram religious terrorism has indeed, raised a lot of ethical
concerns. The terrorists attacked their victims through guerrilla tactics, shooting,
assassination, planting explosive in crowded places, suicide bombing, and use of women and
children in suicide attacks. The terrorists kill people arbitrarily, including soldiers, police and
innocent civilians. Their terrorist activities have also brought about the destruction of
economic and social activities, internally displaced persons problems, environmental
pollution, among other detrimental effects. The terrorist activities of Boko Haram have
caused many people psychological trauma, stress, high blood pressure, hopelessness,
frustration, and desperation. Many bread winners are no more able to provide for their
families. People live in fear and anxiety. Many people have lost sight of their ancestral homes.
Crime, such as theft, house breaking and robbery are on the increase because the sources of
livelihood of many young people have been destroyed. Also, some women practice begging
or prostitution in order to survive.
In ethical terms, therefore, the Boko Haram’s religious terrorism state of affairs could
be best described in the words of Martin Luther King Jr., as a “midnight within the moral
order”, where “moral principles have lost their distinctiveness” (Strength of Love 491).
African ethics encourages love, peace, brotherliness, good neighbourliness, unity and
harmony and discourages fighting, murder, enmity, discord, disunity, killing or bloodshed.
Even when war becomes inevitable, the battle is between the warriors, as it is considered a
sacrilege and against African war ethics to kill the children, women, and the elderly. Elechi
Amadi buttresses that Nigerian social ethics abhors murder, theft, adultery, rape, kidnapping
and similar vices, which characterise Boko Haram religious terrorism (32). The ethics of
Christianity and Islam also uphold same injunctions. God, Himself, who the Boko Haram
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terrorists claim to serve and fight for forbids murder. God’s biblical injunctions clearly forbid
and condemn the activities of the religious terrorists in the following order: “You shall not
murder. You shall not commit adultery. You shall not steal. You shall not bear false witness
against your neighbor. You shall not covet” (Exodus 20:13-17, New King James Version).
All these vices, however, characterize the conducts of the Boko Haram religious terrorists,
who have been killing innocent and helpless people in Plateau state.
A good example of Boko Haram’s terrorist attacks on the people of Plateau state is
what happened at Dogo Nahawa, a suburb of Jos where about 400 people were brutally killed,
mostly women, little children and the elderly. Another instance is the massacre of over 140
persons at Maseh village in Riyom Local Government Area on Sunday, July 8, 2012 during
the mass burial of 64 victims of terrorism who were killed the previous day. Two prominent
Nigerian law makers who attended the mass burial died in the ensued stampede, including
Gyang Dantong, a senator representing Plateau North senatorial district and Gyang Fulani,
who represented Barkin Ladi constituency in Plateau state House of Assembly. Chris Ajero
described the killers as religious terrorists who were heavily armed with assorted rifles and
dressed in mobile police camouflage and bullet proof vests, who opened fire on the mourners
at the mass burial site (17). It is pertinent to note that the nature of Boko Haram terrorism in
Plateau state is quite destructive and obviously pathetic.
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CHAPTER THREE
BOKO HARAM’S TERRORIST ACTIVITIES IN PLATEAU STATE
This chapter discussed the Boko Haram’s terrorist activities in Plateau state, paying
attention to background history of Plateau state, nature of Boko Haram’s activities and causes
of the activities in the state.
3.1 BACKGROUND HISTORY OF PLATEAU STATE
Plateau state is located in North-Central Nigeria. Created in 1976, the state is rated the
twelfth largest state in Nigeria, with a population of about 3.5 million people, according to
the 2006 census figures (Best 3).
3.1.1 Historical Heritage
The history of Plateau State dates back to the colonial era, when it was a part of the
Bauchi province. Plateau state was carved out of Bauchi in 1926, with the following sub-
divisions: Jos, Keffi, Akwanga, Lafia, Langtang, Pankshin, Nasarawa, Shendam and Wase,
under the leadership of the then British Divisional Officer (D.O). In 1967, under the regime
of General Yakubu Gowon, Plateau and Benue were merged to form one state – the Benue-
Plateau State. That was when Gowon’s military administration created twelve states in
Nigeria. In 1976, the military government of General Murtala Muhammed created nineteen
states from the former twelve, and Plateau State then emerged out of the defunct Benue-
Plateau, with fourteen Local Governemnt Areas, including Awe, Lafia, Akwanga, Bassa, Jos,
Keffi, Barkin Ladi, Kanam, Nasarawa, Langtang, Mangu, Wase, Pankshin and Shendam. In
1996, Nasarawa State was carved out of Plateau State, thereby leaving Plateau State with her
present seventeen Local Government Areas of Jos North, Jos South, Jos East, Barkin Ladi,
Riyom, Mangu, Pankshin, Bokkos, Kanke, Kanam, Bassa, Wase, Langtang North, Langtang
South, Mikang, Qu’an Pan and Shendam. The official language in Plateau State is English,
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though Hausa is widely spoken across the state in daily communication and commerce. With
the exception of Langtang North and South, other local government councils in Plateau State
are multi-ethnic and multi-lingual (CAPRO 2).
3.1.2 Geographical Features
“The greatest asset and the greatest liability of the city of Jos are one and the same –
its geography” (Ishaku 59). Plateau State derived her name from her rich geographical
features, more specifically, the Jos Plateau. Jos Plateau is situated at almost the centre of
Nigeria; Plateau State falling within the middle belt region of Nigeria. Jos Plateau covers an
area that approximates 8600km2, and is surrounded by mountainous ridges which range from
300 to 600 metres high. Jos Plateau towers averagely an altitude of 1280 metres above sea
level; its highest point reaching 2010 metres. The area is characteristic of enjoyable temperate
climate as well as the source of many tributaries. The cultural geography of Plateau State
makes it a meeting point for the Christian South and the Muslim North. It also creates a mix
of the state’s multiple ethnic groups; a blend of different ethnic nationalities from various
parts of the country to form a microcosmic Nigeria and a haven for other nationals.
Plateau State has a land mass of 54,232 sq. km, and is located between latitude 110
North and longitude 700East. The state shares boundaries with Bauchi State to the North East,
Kaduna State to the North West, Taraba State to the South East, Nasarawa State to the South
West, while Kogi State and the Federal Capital Territory are to the West (CAPRO 1). It is
usually very cold in the month of December, January and February, due to the harmattan
winds. The chilly weather has for a long time served as an attraction to many nationals to
visit Jos or settle there and has also encouraged many mission agencies and firms to establish
their bases and maintain rest houses in the town.
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Annual rainfall ranges from 131.75cm (51in) in the South to 146cm (57 in) in Plateau.
Rain could be falling on one part while other parts are dry and sunny. Rainfall begins from
April or May and lasts till October or November. The weather condition determines the
vegetables to be expected. Savannah is the predominant vegetation, with tropical grass and
trees scattered, such as shear, acacia and baobabs in the north and dense forest in the South.
The average temperature ranges from 180C to 220C. The warmest temperatures are
experienced in the months of March and April. The highest rainfall is recorded in the months
of July and August. The average low temperatures in Plateau State has attributed to reduced
incidences of some tropical diseases, like malaria. The picturesque Jos Plateau is a
mountainous area with captivating rock formations. Bare rocks are found scattered over the
grassland. Valleys, ponds and lakes are leftover effects of years of tin mining found at
various parts of the state (http://enwikipedia.org/wiki/plateaustate).
3. 1.3 Economic Activities
Farming is the predominant occupation of a majority of people in Plateau State. The
farm produce include assorted vegetables farmed in commercial quantity, such as cabbage,
carrot, cucumber, lettuce, spinach, okra, garden egg, tomatoes, etc. Also, they produce huge
amount of Irish potatoes, sweet potatoes, maize, yam, cocoyam, guinea-corn, rice, acha
(Hungary rice), etc. Many people farm manually with tools like hoes, machetes, sickles, etc.
Mechanized farming is also practiced. Farming is done on the Plateau both at subsistence and
commercial basis; and during both rainy and dry seasons. A good number of the people also
rear livestock, while some are engaged in blacksmith, carving, weaving, carpentry, trading,
stone breaking and mining. A large number of cattle supply milk to the Farm Fresh Dairy in
Vom. Poultry is also a lucrative business in the state. The favourable weather encourages
large production of chicken and eggs there, as the Jos egg is rated one of the best in the
country. Lories come from different parts of the country to purchase and load off various
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agricultural produces from different markets in Jos, Bukuru, Vom, Mangu, and Pankshin etc.,
all in Plateau state on daily basis. There are also industries such as Nasco, Coca-cola, Grand
Cereals and Oil Nigeria Limited, Swan Waters, Quarries, etc. that contribute immensely to
the economic well-being of Plateau state.
Plateau State is also known as the most important mining part of Nigeria, and a major
exporter of tin and columbite. The metals are moved by rail to Port Harcourt for export. Other
minerals exploited on the Plateau are tantalite, kaolin, tungsten (wolfram), zircon, and
uranium and thorium compounds. Zinc, silver and lead are excavated on a small scale around
Wase, Kigon and Zurak. The world’s largest known deposits of columbite (ore of niobium
associated with tin) have been exploited in Plateau State since 1940s. The mineral wealth of
the Plateau attracted Europeans, Igbo, Hausa, Yoruba and some other migrants since the 20th
century and the absence of tsetse fly at this elevated upland attracted many Fulani herdsmen
into the state. All these continue to compete for the natural and economic resources that
Plateau is endowed with. The discovery of oil in the Niger Delta area of Nigeria, however,
caused a major economic set back on the Plateau, but the environmental impact of mining is
still written all over the landscape of the state (Encyclopedia Britannica 38919).
Tourism is another sector that contributes majorly to the socio-economic wellbeing of
the state. Nature has truly blessed Plateau State with so much to see and enjoy; little wonder
the state is addressed as the home of peace and tourism. The following sites are tourists’
havens in Plateau state.
1. Jos Wildlife Safari Park: It is located about 4km (2mi) from Jos, the state capital city.
The park is within 8km2 (3.095q. miles) of undamaged savannah bush, and keeps such
animals as lions, buffalos, monkeys, pythons, jackals, crocodiles, hippopotamus,
eagles, etc.
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2. National Museum: This is located in Jos. Founded in 1952; it is reputed as one of the
best museums in the country. It has some samples of Nok terracotta heads and other
artifacts dating from 500 to 200 AD.
3. Museum of Traditional Architecture: Located in Jos, it has a variety of building,
replicas and interesting articles relating to colonial times, old railway and tin mining.
4. Jos Zoo: Established in 1957, it is also called “old zoo”’ to differentiate it from the
new Jos wildlife park. It is located beside the museum in Jos, and has animals, birds
and reptiles.
5. Assop Falls: This is one of the most notable Nigerian waterfalls. It is located about 40
miles (64km) from Jos city, on Abuja road. It is popular for those shooting soap
operas and useful for advertisement. It is also a tourist pick nick and swimming
scenery.
6. Kurra Falls: Located 77 kilometres southeast of Jos, it is the state’s first hydroelectric
power station, still used today by Nesco Electricity Company. It serves other purposes
of boating, rock climbing and camping.
7. Wase Rock: Located about 216 kilometres southeast of Jos town near Wase, it serves
as one of the five centres in Africa that breed white pelican. Hence the state
government presently protects about 321 acres (1.30 km2) of the land which surround
the rock for wildlife development.
8. Kerrang Highlands: Located about 88 kilometres from Jos, these volcanic hills
provide natural springs, from which the popular Swan Spring Water is produced.
9. Shere Hills: Some of the highest Plateau peaks are found here. Mountain climbers and
hill walkers have their day on these hills. Nigeria Police Force trains their officers
also on these hills.
103
10. Riyom Rock: Located 25 kilometres southwest of Jos, near Riyom town, the rock
formation if of a captivating sight.
11. Pandam Game Reserve: This is a protected area of natural habitat which harbours
Crocodiles, various species of snakes and hippopotamus; furnished with tourist
accommodation.
12. Kahwang Rock Formation: Situated in Bangai village, Bachi District of Riyom Local
Government Area, this set of basalt rocks have drawn tourists from within Nigeria and
abroad.
13. Miango Rest House: A conference and a retreat home established in 1914 by
missionaries of Sudan Interior Mission (SIM), Nigeria. It has artificial dam, farm, hill
and accommodation which provide tourist enjoyment.
14. Solomon Lar Amusement Park: Located in the city of Jos, it is a tourist relaxation
centre. All these tourist centres are revenue earners for the Plateau State Government.
3.1.4 Political Organization
The administrative structure of Plateau State is made up of the State Cabinet, House
of Assembly and Local Government Areas. The affairs of the state government is run by the
Governor who is the chief executive, Deputy Governor, Secretary to the State Government
(SSG), Commissioners (cabinet members), special advisers, permanent secretaries, board
chairmen and general managers. The present Governor is Rt. Hon. Simon Bako Lalong, from
Shendam Local Government Area (L.G.A) elected on the platform of All Progressives
Congress (APC) and sworn in on May 29, 2015. The immediate past Governor, Jonah David
Jang hails from Du, Jos South Local Government Area, of the Peoples Democratic Party
(PDP). He serves currently as a senator. Plateau State House of Assembly is made up of 25
members and 11 special advisers. The current speaker is Rt. Hon. Peter Azi, from Jos East
L.G.A. (APC). The Local Government is headed by a chairman (Chief executive) and his
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cabinet includes councillors who make up the legislative arm. The local governments are
subsequently divided into electoral wards, districts, and villages. Traditional administrative
institutions (chiefdoms and emirates) operate at local government level. Paramount
traditional rulers (such as Gbong Gwom Jos) and Emirates are followed by District Heads,
and then the Village Heads.
Paramount rulers are elected or appointed from many contestants who may or may not
be related to past leaders, whereas succession to the emir is hereditary. These leaders
represent the cultural and ethnic groups, serve as the custodians for their traditions and
culture, and are also required to protect the interest of residents within their domain (Best 4).
Plateau Indigenous Development Association Network (PIDAN) recognizes and records 18
Royal Fathers within Plateau State, out of which two are emirs. Each is addressed as His
Royal Highness (HRH), and listed in the following order of recognition.
1. HRH Gbong Gwom Jos, Chairman Council of Chiefs, Plateau State.
2. HRH the Long Gamai of Shendam, Shendam LGA.
3. HRH the Ngolon Ngas, Pankshin LGA.
4. HRH the Mishkaham Mwaghavul, Mangu LGA.
5. HRH the Saf Ron Kulere, Bokkos LGA.
6. HRH the Ponzhi Taroh, Langtang LGA.
7. HRH the Long Pan, Qua’an-Pan LGA.
8. HRH the Long Tehl, Mikang LGA.
9. HRH the Agwom Izere, Jos East LGA.
10. HRH the Utu Ugo Kiche, Bassa LGA.
11. HRH the Bra Ngwe Irigwe
12. HRH the Ogomo Pengana
13. HRH the Ujaj of Anaguta – Paramount Ruler of Anaguta, Jos North LGA.
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14. HRH the Atta Atten
15. HRH the Agwom Izere of Jos – Paramount Ruler of Jos Izere.
16. HRH the Long Kwo Qua’an-Pan LGA
17. HRH the Emir of Wase, Wase Emirate
18. HRH the Emir of Kanam, Kanam LGA (xvi-xvii).
Plateau is the twelfth largest of Nigerian’s 36 states. The state has seventeen local
governments, which are shared among the three Senatorial Districts, namely, the Northern
Senatorial District, Southern Senatorial District and Central Senatorial District. Plateau North
Senatorial District comprises of Jos North, Jos South, Jos East, Bassa, Riyom and Barkin
Ladi Local government areas. Local government Areas which make up Plateau Central
Senatorial zone are Mangu, Pankshin, Bokkos, Kanke and Kanam. The Southern Senatorial
Zone is made up of Wase, Langtang North, Langtang South, Mikang, Qu’an Pan and
Shendam local government councils (Best 14).
The following are the executive governors who have governed Plateau State: Dan
Suleiman, Joshua Anaja, Solomon Lar, Samuel Atukum, Chris Ali, Lawrence Onoja, Aliyu
Kama, Joshua Madaki, Fidelis Tapgun, Mohammed Mana, Habibu Idris Shuaibu, Musa
Shehu, Joshua Dariye, Michael Botmang, Joshua Dariye, Jonah David Jang and Simon Bako
Lalong (incumbent). Politically, Jos Plateau is accorded regard as the pearl of the Northern
Region; while some address it as the headquarters of the Middle Belt (Ishaku 60).
3. 1.5 Religious Institutions
Calvary Project Research Department reveals that there are basically three main
religions practiced in Plateau State, namely, Traditional Religion, Islam and Christianity (7).
Plateau State is one of the most religiously plural states in Nigeria, and incidentally the
strongest meeting point of Christianity and Islam in the nation (Best and Hoomlong 94). Best
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and Hoomlong observe that both the Nigerian Christians and Muslims have intense
sentimental attachments to the city of Jos and environs. They maintain that Christian’s
sentimental attachment to the city comes from the fact that many national Christian
headquarters are located in Jos, such as Evangelical Church Winning All (ECWA), Church of
Christ in Nations (COCIN), Fellowship of Christian Students, various Pentecostal churches
among others. Also there are numerous Christian seminaries such as Theological College of
Northern Nigeria (TCNN), Bukuru, Evangel Theological Seminary (ETS), Jos, Jos ECWA
Theological Seminary (JETS), Jos, Saint Augustine’s Major Seminary, Jos, et cetera; and so
many other Christian establishments.
The Muslims, on the other hand, who also express sentimental attachment to the city,
argue that they are instrumental to the founding of Jos city and so, cannot be undermined in
the affairs of Plateau State. The Muslims trace the origin of some of the Islamic organizations
to Jos, such as Izala, Jamatu Nasir Islam (JNI), and other Islamic educational and health
institutions. This makes it easy, therefore, to understand why religious identity has always
been the basis for frequent urban and rural violent crisis in Plateau State. Best and Hoomlong
stress that despite the frequent religious violence in Plateau State, Jos has remained the
greatest centre of attraction in northern Nigeria after Abuja, though the potentials for
bloodshed are not yet eliminated (95).
Buttressing this stand, Ishaku affirms that when talking in terms of religious
orientation, many people regard Jos as the Jerusalem of the Christian North for the absolute
fact that the number of Christian organizations having their headquarters in the city is quite
enormous, and also the fact that a majority of the population are Christians. This, he says is
the reason Christians spell Jos as an acronym to mean Jesus-our-Saviour. Ishaku also points
out that Jos is equally a kind of Mecca to Muslims who have many Islamic movements there,
such as Jam’at Izalat al Bid’a wa Iqamat is Sunna (Society for the Removal of Innovation and
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Re-establishment of the Sunna), also known as Izala, which was founded by a Jos resident,
Sheikh Ismaila Idris in 1978 (60). He quips further that the crises in Jos did not begin as a
result of religious diversity, but because of the importation of religion into the public space,
which he blamed the government to have neglected until it bred bad blood among the
population (62-63).
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Figure 2: Map of Nigeria Showing Plateau State
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Figure 3: Map of Plateau State Showing Local Government Areas.
Source: dailytimes.com.ng.
110
3.2 NATURE OF BOKO HARAM’S TERRORIST ACTIVITIES
The nature of Boko Haram’s terrorist activities was revealed in the weapons they used
in carrying out their attacks, tactics of the attacks and targets of those attacks.
3.2.1 Weapons Used by Boko Haram in Plateau State
Of a worrying concern are the calibre, magnitude and sophistication of the weapons
used by the Boko Haram group in carrying out their terrorist onslaughts in Plateau state.
Some of the dangerous weapons they use included small and light weapons (SALW), such as
firearms (assorted rifles, pistols and ammunition), Improvised Explosive Devices (IEDs),
rocket-propelled grenades (RPGs), rocket launchers, anti-aircraft missiles, swords, machetes,
swords, knives, daggers, charms, etcetera. Some of these weapons have been intercepted in
Jos and other places.
The Special Task Force (STF), a joint security unit made up of the police, military
and civil defence in Plateau state in March 2011 intercepted a truck load of explosives being
conveyed to Jos from Kaduna in the heat of terrorist activity in Plateau state. The truck was
loaded with 15,000 kilogrammes of ammonium nitrate (a very important chemical in bomb
manufacturing), 5,000 pieces of electric detonators, 1,000 pieces of cord relays of 25
centimetres length, 775 kilogrammes of super powder and drilling rods. A police constable
was escorting the truck. The same scenario played out at the Abuja City Gate in July 2011,
when at a military check point loaded with 700 explosives was intercepted, being escorted by
two police men. Again 51 rocket launchers were found in a house at Barunde, Gombe in
April 2012. On 30 July 2012, 10 RPGs were captured at Daban Massara on the Chad-Nigeria
border, while on the following day, another cache of 10 rocket chragers, 10 rocket bombs,
and 8 rocket launchers were intercepted in Monguno (Ishaku 174-75).
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The Nigerein forces near Nigeria in November 2011 lost 14 soldiers in clashes with a
Libyan convoy, overpowering and seizing from the convoy two 14.5mm guns, four 12.7mm
machine guns, two ML-49, three M-80 machine guns, assorted number of rocket-propelled
grenades and large quantity of ammunition. In another raid, they intercepted a convoy 1, 420
tonnes of Semtex plastic explosives and 445 detonators. Semtex contains a chemical called
pentaerythritol tetranitrate (PENTN) the major component used in the production of IEDs
used by the Boko Haram terrorists (166). On 4 August 2013, men of the Multi-National Task
Force (MNJTF) intercepted four Toyota Hilux vans, 10 AK-47 rifles and magazines, two G3
riffles and 10x4 40mm bombs, three RPG tubes, and 85 rounds of special ammunition.
Episodes of similar interceptions abound in the fight against Boko Haram. The access of the
sect to RPGs and several other high capacity arms is a matter of serious concern within
security organisations. RPGs are projectile explosive weapons which the terrorists use on
long distant targets; whereas they use launchers to propel missiles or explosives over long
ranges. Some launchers travel for 900 metres. Possession of this high calibre weaponry by the
Boko Haram group confers deadly firepower on them and invariably poses serious threat on
security agencies and aviation industry (Onuoha studies.aljazeera.net).
This is just as the Nigeria Army Theatre Commander of Operation Lafiya Dole, Major
General Leo Irabor in April 2016 disclosed the recovery of a large cache of arms worth over
20 million naira buried in a graveyard by Boko Haram terrorists in a village called Gursum,
around Alagarno in Borno state. Irabor announced the recovery of 36 boxes of .50MM
equivalent to 12.7mm buried concealed in a place that looks like a grave. Other weapons
found there include 5/20 lethal brief case as well as a mixture of 7.6mm NATO and 7.62
special concealed in cellophane. Equally discovered is one generator, one Hilux vehicle and
several motorcycles (Audu premiumtimesng.com).
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3.2.2 Operational Tactics of Boko Haram
A tactic is a course of action followed or a method used to achieve immediate result
or a short-term goal (Hornsby 370). Boko Haram gained so much fame such that the sect was
declared the deadliest terror group in the world in 2014. One wonders how the sect, with a
supposed crude membership and unprofessional fighters could overrun and capture many
Local Government Areas, towns and villages; and ransack many military and police barracks,
armouries and stations in northern Nigerian states in such rare displays of courage. How were
the terrorists able to achieve such feats? Does it mean that the Nigeria military and other
security agencies are incompetent? Or are the terrorists better trained? It suffices to say that
the success story of the terrorists and the recent successes of the Nigeria security forces in
countering them all boil down to operational tactics. Hence an analysis of the major
operational tactics exercised by Boko Haram terrorists is an important aspect of this study.
Sequel to the death of Mohammed Yusuf and many of his followers, coupled with the
mass arrest of many others, the Boko Haram group retreated, re-strategized and resurfaced in
two major ways. The first was adopting Abubakar Shekau, Yusuf’s ruthless and vicious
deputy as the new spiritual and administrative head of the sect. The second was redefining the
tactics. They improved on their traditional hit-and-run approach to more volatile, flexible and
unpredictable terrorist tactics (Onuoha 169). The operational strategies that have been
employed by Boko Haram include guerrilla attacks, armed assaults, targeted assassination,
drive-by-shooting, use of IEDs, suicide bombing, use of women and girls in terrorist actions,
kidnapping, disguising as mad (insane) people, raids on towns and villages, and capturing and
taking control of towns and villages. The choice of a tactic to be used depends largely on the
chosen target, context and goal to be achieved (170).
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i. Guerrilla tactics
It is quite necessary that a significant attention be given to the guerrilla tactics of
Boko Haram assaults. This is because most Boko Haram attacks resonate around guerrilla
tactics. A guerrilla is an irregular soldier or fighter, usually politically motivated with a
political objective such as overthrowing an existing government. Guerrillas operate usually in
small groups to harass and carry out sabotage (Hornby 78). Guerrilla tactics involve
constantly changing or shifting attack strategies, operations, positions and patterns. It also
involves terrorism and deliberate destruction of human life and property in order to
destabilise and weaken the government. Guerrillas use overall political-military strategies to
combat conventional military forces. The term, guerrilla (diminutive of Spanish guerra,
meaning “war”), was used first used in describing the Spanish-Portuguese irregulars or
guerrilleros (equally called partisans and insurgents), who assisted the Duke of Wellington to
drive away the French from the Iberian Peninsula in the wars of 1809-13. Traditionally
speaking, guerrilla warfare has usually been a weapon used to protest alleged wrongdoings of
a bad and unfavourable government.
The fundamental strategy in guerrilla tactics is to keep harassing the enemy till
military strength is sufficiently built up to defeat the enemy in battle, or at least, till adequate
military and political pressure is mounted to force the enemy to seek redress. Guerrillas could
operate independently, as is the case of Boko Haram; or complement orthodox military
operations. Sun-tzu (c. 350 BC), a Chinese general developed the essential rules of guerrilla
tactics in “The Art of War”, where he advised that the tactics should be based on surprise and
deception. An aspect of the guerrilla tactics teaches that “guerrilla strategy must be based
primarily on alertness, mobility, and attack”, and further advises guerrilla fighters to “select
the tactic of seeming to come from the east and attacking from the west; avoid the solid,
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attack the hollow; attack, withdraw; deliver a lighting blow, seek a lighting decision” (Asprey
Encyclopaedia Brotannica).
The various strews of Boko Haram attack are carried out in guerrilla combatant tactics.
This assault strategy has been unprofessionally described as a “hit-and-run” technique. The
competence of the terrorists in guerrilla combat skills suggests that the sect members would
have received proficient training in the technique, in addition to bomb production and
weapon handling. They keep changing tactics and hitting targets abruptly such that they have
become largely unpredictable and nearly invincible, making it difficult for security agents
predict their attacks.
ii. Armed Assault
Open armed assault is a major operational tactic that Boko Haram terrorists have used
since 2009. This tactic entails the deployment of numerous fighters to carry out surprise
attacks on security formations and establishments, such as barracks, stations, and prisons; and
equally on soft targets (civilians), as in churches, mosques and markets. This strategy is
usually adopted if the group they have a very large number of fighters that can overpower
security operatives (Onuoha171).
iii. Targeted Assassination
After the military crushed the strenght of Boko Haram and destroyed their
headquarters in Maiduguri called Markaz Ibn Taymiyya, which was completely razed to the
ground, the surviving leaders of the group went underground, while most of their members
fled to safety and many melted into the local population. Some respondents reveal that at this
stage, the traditional rulers and many people in the communities were unwilling to give out
any information about the boko haram members living among them. The state, however,
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compelled the traditional leaders and their people to reveal the identities of the sect members
to the security agents. Lack of confidentiality within the security apparatus and the sect’s
intelligence details and network helped the Boko Haram to know those who led the cat out of
the bag. The initial phase of the sect’s resurgence began with the targeted assassination of
village and ward heads and individuals who had collaborated with the security agents,
prominent politicians of the then ruling All Nigeria Peoples Party (ANPP) in Borno state who
the terrorists declared enemies, prison officials accused of poisoning and torturing sect
members who were in custody, and identified security personnel (Mohammed Kyari 25).
Targeted assassination tactic is adopted when the Boko Haram sect perceives and
underlists a person or group as enemy. The target is assigned particular assassins whose duty
it is to trail the victim to where he could be easily and successfully killed. Such targets are
shot on the abdomen, head or chest to ensure their chances to survive is quite slim. Boko
Haram have targeted, trailed and murdered several religious leaders, politicians, civil servants,
security agents, educationists, and community leaders who opposed their ideology and
condemned their activities, including both Christians and Muslims. Examples abound. On 8
July 2012 in Plateau state, two serving legislators were killed in an attack that was claimed by
the Boko Haram terrorists. Senator Gyang Dantong was a Nigerian senator, representing
Plateau North Senatorial District, whereas Honourable Gyang Danfulani was the majority
leader of the Plateau State House of Assembly. These lawmakers were among those who
attended a mass burial service held for the victims of violent attacks the previous day, 7 July
2012 on Plateau villages of Ruk, Kuzen, Maseh, Pwabuduk, Karuruk, Kufang, Kai and
Ningong in the Garshis district of the state (Lipdo 166).
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iv. Drive-by-shooting
This tactic is similar to targeted assassination. It involves the terrorists riding on
motorbikes to shoot at their targets and escaping at once. This became a common tactic
following the July 2009 revolt and beyond when many people, including notable politicians
and other important personalities were shot dead by suspected boko haram members riding
on motorcycles. The reason for adopting drive-by-shooting, perhaps, is to get rid of targets
that have evaded or survived other execution attempts. Also this method is flexible as it is
used in killing targets that operate usually in city centres. The target is shot at a very close
range, while the killers manoeuvre their ways easily and escape security agents (Onuoha 172).
The prevalence of drive-by-shootings was what led to the banning of the operation of
commercial cyclists popularly called okada or going most northern Nigeria states, including
Plateau, Bauchi, Gombe, Adamawa, Yobe, Borno, Kaduna, Kano, and other such states
which have experienced serial Boko Haram incursions. This brought about the approval of
tricycles (keke) as alternative means of intra-city transportation in those places, in addition to
the already existing cars and buses. A few cases of tricycle attacks have been reported,
mostly when it involves IEDs. The tricycle’s capacity to manoeuver is quite limited when
compared to the motorcycle.
v. Use of Improvised Explosive Devices (IEDs)
The use of IEDs is another tactic that has gained prominence for Boko Haram since
July 2009. IED is a homemade bomb, manufactured from either military or non-military
components, mostly used by guerrillas, insurgents or terrorists, and other non-state actors as a
crude but quite effective weapon to attack the conventional military or civilian targets.
Basically, all IEDs contain an initiating mechanism, an explosive charger, a detonator, and a
casing or a collection of projectiles such as nails or ball bearings which produce lethal
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fragments or chips upon detonation. Practically, IEDs can be produced with different kinds of
material, such as certain kinds of fertilizers, trinitrotoluene or TNT (C7H5N3O6), artillery or
mortar rounds, aerial bombs, and other explosives. IEDs can also consist of chemical,
biological, or radiological fillers to increase their psychological and lethal impacts. Terrorists
use varieties of initiating systems to set off detonations. These trigger systems are in two
main categories, namely command-initiated system and autonomously initiated system.
Command-initiated IEDs are blown up through human interaction with the triggering system
or mechanism. Once an electronic impulse is sent via wireless signal or over a wire circuit, a
receiver on the explosive triggers detonation. Familiar examples of command initiators
include wireless doorbells, remote-controlled toys, cell phones, cordless telephones, pagers,
car alarms, and automatic garage-door openers. Autonomously initiated IEDs, on the other
hand, are detonated without human intervention. Common examples of autonomous initiators
are trip wires, infrared systems that activate the triggering mechanism when a vehicle breaks
a beam's contact with its receiver, pressure plates that activate the triggering mechanism
when a certain amount of weight is placed on them, and magnetic detonators that are
triggered by changes in a magnetic field (as when a vehicle passes by). The use of IEDs
has proven to be extremely effective in the hands of terrorists (Mansoor 117).
Ishaku maintains that the use of Improvised Explosive Devices has been the tactic of
first choice for Boko Haram and other terrorist groups all around the world. He explains
further that the term, “improvised” entails that explosives are made in a do-it-yourself (DIY)
situation. On his list of popular DIY explosives are Perosol can bombs, DVD shit bombs, AA
battery bombs, Molotov cocktail and Napalm. He observes that IEDs should be differentiated
from standard factory manufactured bombs. However, he asserts that the fact that some IEDs
are nearly equal to standard factory manufactured bombs, such as nitrate-based explosives
has made IEDs so dear to Boko Haram terrorists (169).
118
Boko Haram terrorists configure IED in such a way that it can detonate easily when
thrown off, or with the use of a remote control and a timer. They usually select strategic
points where they place or plant the explosive such that it should produce maximum impact
upon explosion. Bombs have been placed on the overhead bridge at Gada Biu in Jos; at a
bridge at Rim in Riyom Local Government Area, and other strategic locations in Plateau state.
Bombs have also been planted at cinema houses, forcing cinema centres to close down in Jos
and other cities in northern Nigeria. Other places that received IED attacks include churches,
mosques, car parks, bus stops, restaurants or hotels, rail lines, and schools. The United States
Joint IED Defeat Organisation reveals that Nigeria experienced about a fourfold increase in
IED attacks in 2011. Nigeria witnessed 196 bomb attacks in 2011, against 52 incidents in
2010 (Straziuso cited in Onuoha 172). Also, not less than 20 bomb incidents have been
recorded in Plateau state between 2010 and 2015. The level of sophistication Boko Haram
has attained in the construction of IEDs has forced security experts to conclude that the sect
has been receiving support in the areas of acquisition of explosive materials, arms and
training from foreign terrorist organisations, such as AL Qaeda in the Maghreb (AQIM).
Boko Haram IEDs are mostly made with very strong explosive materials, such as
pentaerythritol (PETN), trinitrotoluene (TNT), and ammonia fertiliser. Boko Haram’s IED
expertise is a major cause of worry to the Nigeria security forces.
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Table 4: Bomb Incidences in Plateau State
S/N DATE INCIDENCE
1. 08/10/2010 Bomb blast between COCIN and 1st Baptist Church in
Bukuru, Jos South LGA
2. 20/03/2011 Bomb exploded in Nasarawa Gwom, Jos North LGA
3. 23/03/2011 Men of State Joint Force (STF) arrested some persons
with bomb making equipments at Millionaire Quarters,
Jos North LGA
4. 08/04/2011 Suspected terrorists arrested with bombs in Dengi,
Kanam LGA
5. 04/09/2011 Some bomb that failed to explode was discovered in
Riyom market, Riyom LGA
6. 11/09/2011 Bomb exploded and injured 4 persons in West of Mines,
Jos North LGA
7. 10/12/2011 Three bombs exploded in a football viewing centre in
Jos, Jos North LGA, killing at least three persons
8. 22/02/2012 Bomb blasts recorded at COCIN headquarters church
during Sunday morning service in Jos, Jos North LGA,
killing at least 2 persons
9. 11/03/2012 Two suicide bombers attacked St. Finbarr’s Church, Jos,
Jos North LGA, killing at least 5 and injuring 3 persons.
10. 10/06/2012 Suicide bomber detonated in a Volkswagen gulf car at
Christ Chosen Church, Jos, Jos North LGA. The military
van that the suicide bomber escaped, while 2 motorcyle
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S/N DATE INCIDENCE
11. 06/07/2012 Locally made IEDs were defused at Congo Russia,
Chwalnyap, Jos, Jos North LGA.
12. 17/07/2012 A blast was recorded opposite the new Jos South LGA
secretariat by Bukuru expressway, Bukuru. A man
reportedly parked his car and shot a Rocket-Propelled
Grenade (RPG) into Kerana area.
13. 17/08/2012 A bomb blast incidence was recorded at night in Rikkos,
Jos North LGA. No casualty was reported.
14. 20/05/20114 There were two major bomb blasts in Jos this day, along
Murtala Muhammed way. Both explosions came from
Vehicle Borne Explosives (VBE). The first explosion
came from a VBE laden in a J5 bus with Plateau state
number at about 1500hours. The second explosion came
about 1525 hours in a Sienna bus with Gombe state
number plate. The second explosive was kept about 50
metres away from the first. At least 46 persons died,
while unascertained number of people sustained various
degrees of injury.
15. 24/05/2014 A bomb explosion was recorded at Bauchi Road, Jos.
The explosion was caused by VBE in a Honda Odyssey
bus with Bauchi number plate, parked inside a mechanic
workshop behind a football viewing centre. About 3
persons died following the incidence.
16. 22/07/2014 Gunmen, dressed in military fatigue used explosives and
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S/N DATE INCIDENCE
17. 11/12/2014 Twin bomb explosion at Terminus Area of Jos at about
1630 hours. About 16 persons died, with numerous
people injured.
18. 25/02/2015 Twin blasts were recorded. The first occurred at a bus
stop opposite University of Jos, while the second was
around Bauchi Road motor park, all in Jos North LGA.
Over 12 casualties were reported.
19. 05/07/2015 A female suicide bomber attacked Shagalinku Restaurant
along Bauchi Road, Jos at 2115 hours, killing about 19
persons and injuring 11 others. Same day, at about 2120
hours, gunmen in military uniform shot sporadically at
worshippers in a mosque at Yan-tyre, along Bauchi
Road, Jos before a male suicide bomber blew himself up
during the attack. About 18 persons were killed, while 12
others sustained injuries. Twin bomb blasts occurred at
Yantaya mosque, Jos, Jos North LGA. In reaction,
Muslim mob set ablaze the Cherubim and Seraphim
church at nearby Dilimi, while damaging an Apostolic
church close-by.
20. 12/07/2015 Two bombs were detonated at ECWA Gospel church 1,
Tudun Wada, Jos. No casualty was recorded.
21. 18/10/2015 STF/Operation Safe Haven (OPSH) detonated land
mines at Gembos, along Kadunung road, in Mangu
LGA, killing about 20 and displacing over 500 villagers.
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S/N DATE INCIDENCE
22. 11/03/2012 Two suicide bombers attacked Saint Finbarr’s church,
Jos, Jos North LGA, killing at least 5 and injuring 3
persons
23. 04/12/2014 Failed IEDs were discovered at Obasanjo Model Primary
School at Wholshe, Jos South LGA. The explosives
contained two large canisters/gas cylinders attached to an
electronic detonator.
Source: Field Survey
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vi. Suicide terrorism
So worrisome is the adoption of suicide terrorism tactic by the Boko Haram group.
Suicide terrorism denotes a pattern of extreme violence, usually committed by a person who
intends or has been deceived or coerced to take his or her own life along that of a chosen
target, in order to further a religious, ideological, or political objective. The suicide terrorist
knows that the death of the perpetrator is the precondition for the mission’s success; so he or
she chooses to die in order to carry out the planned attack. The pattern of suicide terrorism
mostly used by the Boko Haram is suicide bombing. This entails ideologically or politically
inspired violent attack usually carried out purposely and actively by a person who is aware
that the attack will cause his or her death and that of the chosen target (173). Boko Haram
terrorists have used IEDs in various ways to carry out suicide attacks in Plateau and other
states of northern Nigeria. These include body-borne improvised explosive devices (BBIEDs),
vehicle-borne improvised explosive devices (VBIEDs), motorcycle-borne improvised
explosive devices (MBIEDs), and tricycle-borne explosive devices (TBIEDs). While most of
the suicide attacks of Boko Haram have been successful, considering the quantity of damage
done to life and property and the notoriety gained by the sect, some of the attacks were
partially successful or totally failed. Basically, the following four factors account for the
adoption of suicide terrorism by the Boko Haram. 1. Emergence of a more hard-line and
radical leadership of the group following the aftereffect of the July 2009 insurrection. 2.
Increased counter-insurgency measures brought up by the Nigerian security agents to
suppress the sect’s usual tactics of armed assault and IEDs placement. 3. Increased funding of
the sect from local and international supporters. 4. Nexus between the sect and other foreign
terrorist organisations, which serves as a psychological booster and intensifies martyrdom
ideology (Onuoha 173).
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The Nigerian underpants suicide bomber, Farouk Umar Muttalab strapped IED made
of PETN and TATP in his underpants in the abortive 2009 Christmas Eve suicide bombing.
He was preceded by Richjard Reid the “shoe bomber” who concealed a PETN IED in his
shoe in an attempt to blow up a Northwestern Flight 253 from Paris to Miami in 2001.
Likewise, Abdullahi Hassan al-Asiri, a younger brother to an acclaimed Yemeni IED expert,
Ibrahim Hassan al-Asiri attempted assassinating one of the members of the Saudi royal house
and deputy Minister of interior by hiding a PETN IED on his body. Many Boko Haram bomb
manufacturers and suicide bombers have been killed in many towns in northern Nigeria,
including Jos, Kaduna, Suleija, and Maiduguri. In 2010, two terrorists riding on a motorbike
were blown up in pieces while taking a TATP IED to ECWA Angwan Rukuba in Jos, Plateau
state (Isaku 170-72).
vii. Use of Women and children in terrorist actions
Another tactic of Boko Haram is the use of women and girls in terrorist actions. This
has become like a trademark of the sect. Women and children have been used as shields and
for other onerous tasks by the terrorists. Within the organisation, women have actively played
various imposed supporting roles, ranging from simple to complex functions. These include
washing of clothes and dishes, cooking, fetching firewood, sexual roles, arms smuggling,
armed assaults, and suicide bombing. The reason for using women and girls in terrorist
activities by Boko Haram is not farfetched. 1. Women are less suspicious than men. 2.
Women are not searched like men. 3. In northern Nigeria, men are required to keep their
distance from girls and women not related closely to them. 4. Their loose dresses and veils
(yijab) enable them to easily hide bombs and other weapons. The terrorists have taken
advantage of these lacunae to engage women and children in various successful terrorist
attacks.
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Many people maintain that most of the women and girls that engage in terrorist
actions are forced to do so by the Boko Haram terrorists. The use of women and girls in
terrorist actions was a carefully thought-out and planned tactic, which was boosted with the
Boko Haram’s kidnapping of about 300 school girls in Chibok in April 2014. Since then,
other hundreds of women and girls have been abducted, forcefully trained and used in various
terrorist attacks. Since the 2014 kidnapping, over 100 women and girls have been used by
Boko Haram in suicide bombings in public places like schools, markets, and refugee camps
for internally displaced persons in Nigeria. In an attack carried out in a Nigerian camp in
2016, where two female bombers aged 17 and 20 blew themselves up killing about 60 and
injuring over 80 persons, the third female bomber refused to detonate her explosive on
realising that members of her family were staying in that camp. Similarly, according to
Aljazeera news, 80 percent of the suicide bombings carried out in the neighbouring
Cameroon in 2016 was perpetrated by women and girls aged 14 to 24 years (Pricopi 47-48).
viii. Disguising as insane (mad) people
Suicide bombing became so rampant such that security forces and people in the
society became quite privy of the tactic and always raised suspicion on potential attackers.
Security agents became more alert and developed strategies to counter suicide bombers,
while people started canvassing against the use of long veils (hijab). The terrorists started
changing their tactics again, this time disguising themselves as mad or insane people. This
they do in a bid to gain unsuspicious access to public places. They would wear explosives to
such places, which they would detonate to kill themselves and their targets. As Premium
Times reported on 30 January 2016, two male suicide bombers who disguised as insane
women gained access into a public market and detonated the explosives they wore, killing
and injuring many people. In response to this shift in tactics, Nigeria security forces raised
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security alerts among the citizenry, warning them to be quite wary of insane persons seen
around crowded areas, markets and other public places.
ix. Taking control of towns and villages
The main mandate of Boko Haram in Nigeria is to overthrow the secular government
and impose sharia on the people, turning Nigeria to an Islamic nation. Thus, theirs is a
religious war – a form of jihad aimed at exterminating every person and creed that differ from
their salafist ideology. Ishaku reveals that “in all the police interrogations of the arrested sect
members, they confessed that they were on a jihad mission to turn Nigeria to an Islamic
state” (55). Lipdo laments that “all terrorist attacks in North and Central Nigeria is indeed a
campaign to impose Shari’a against the ethnic and religious people of the region” (167).
Several bomb and arm attacks have been unleashed on the cities of Jos, Bukuru and
numerous villages in the Local Government Councils of Riyom, Barkin Ladi, Bassa and
some other rural places in Plateau state. Many people in Plateau state have lamented that
Boko Haram terrorists are attacking the state in other to subjugate the people and impose
sharia on them. These attacks in Plateau state are in continuum with the terrorist attacks on
the north-eastern states of Borno, Adamawa and Yobe states, where the Boko Haram
terrorists had seized and declared some towns, villages and Local Government Areas as their
caliphate. Comparing the suppressive and destructive impacts of Boko Haram terrorism on
the two northern cities of Jos, Plateau state and Maiduguri, Borno state, Ishaku further opines
that “if Maiduguri is the road to Mogadishu, a precursor to a state of anomie, a failed state;
then Jos is the road to Sarajevo, a harbinger to the dissolution of the Nigerian federation” (57).
Amnesty International in 2015 outlined the sequences leading to the capture of towns
or villages by Boko Haram. First, a large number of the terrorists will attack the targeted
community, initially attacking military and police formations and units. After neutralising
governmental forces and forcing them to abandon their posts, the terrorists would seize the
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abandoned arms and ammunition. Then they will attack the civilians, either gunning them
down as they try to escape, or killing them in their houses, at times setting fire on the building
with the occupants inside. The terrorists would be simultaneously looting shops, private
valuables, setting houses on fire and abducting residents. The terrorists declared the town of
Goza in Adamawa state their first caliphate in northern Nigeria, after killing the emir of Goza,
ransacking the Mobile Police Training School and sacking many of the residents. The
Nigerian military claims to the public that there is no area currently under the control of Boko
Haram in northern Nigeria, though some people doubt the authenticity of such a statement.
Security forces have gained commendable successes in the fight against the terrorists;
however, Boko Haram still carries out sporadic raids on various communities in northern
Nigeria.
x. Kidnapping
On the night of 14-15 April 2014, 276 female students were kidnapped from a
Government Secondary School, Chibok in Borno state, north-eastern Nigeria. Boko Haram
claimed responsibility for the kidnapping. The students were between 16 to 18 years of age.
After some months, some 57 of the kidnapped girls reportedly managed to escape from their
abductors. 21 girls were further freed in October 2016; with one more rescued the following
month. In January 2017 another one was found, while 82 of the girls were exchanged for
some of the Boko Haram terrorists by the Nigerian government in May 2017. Many of the
kidnapped girls have died, some of them in suicide action; whereas the whereabouts of others
is not known. Chibok is a Christian community in Borno state. Jonathan N.C. Hill of King’s
College, London asserts that Boko Haram took to kidnapping due to the influence al-Qaeda
in the Islamic Maghreb exercised over the group. He said the kidnapping of the Chibok girls
is similar to the kidnapping episodes of girls in Algeria in 1990s and 2000s
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(https://en.m.wikipedia.org). The tactic of kidnapping, therefore, like other terrorist tactics
proves the existing links between Boko Haram and other foreign terrorist organisations.
Meanwhile, as situations and challenges changed for Boko Haram, the terrorists
adopted kidnapping, a strategy they rejected in the past. This they did to weaken and
intimidate the civilian population and discredit the Nigerian government as being unable to
protect her citizens and visitors. There have been various incidents of kidnapping and killing
of foreigners in northern Nigeria since 2012. Korean doctors and road construction workers
were killed in Yobe and Borno states, with the subsequent killing of members of staff of
Setraco, a construction firm in Jama’are town of Bauchi state. Another is the kidnapping of a
French family, including Tanguy Moulin-Fournier, his wife, four children and brother at the
Waza National Park in Cameroon. The French family, however, were released unhurt and
returned to Paris on 19 April 2013 (Mohammed Kyari 28). Ansaru, a splinter group of Boko
Haram claimed responsibility for the kidnapping of Franco Lamolinara and Chris MacManus
in May 2011. The targeting of foreign interests and foreigners was the driving concern of
Ansaru, who warned France that it would target her citizens for banning Islamic veil and her
planned intervention in northern Mali. Ansaru further claimed responsibility for the
kidnapping and killing of the seven construction workers in Jama’are in Bauchi state as a
retaliation for alleged un-Islamic activities in Afghanistan and Mali carried out by European
nations (30).
3.2.3 Targets of Boko Haram’s Attacks
The targets of Boko Haram’s attacks are quite diverse. These objects of attack include
local and international establishments, police, prison and military personnel and formations,
civil servants, business men and farmers, children, youths and adults, farms, markets,
hospitals, parks, hotels, cinemas, recreation centres, restaurants, drinking joints, schools, and
churches, mosques, in both city centres and rural areas. When it comes to hitting a target,
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Boko Haram can go to any length. They have killed people for giving information on their
activities, harming of their sect members, selling bush meat, playing cards, which they
interpret as gambling, and drinking in beer joints. Boko Haram terrorists have killed many
Christians and fellow Muslims. The leadership of the sect justify such deaths of anyone that
does not follow sharia. Abul Qaqa, a spokesperson of the sect once issued the following
statement: “there are no exceptions. Even if you are a Muslim and you do not abide by sharia,
we will kill you. Even if you are my own father, we will kill you” (Harnischfeger 54).
In the early phases of their attacks after the death of their leader, Yusuf, Boko Haram
selected their targets carefully. While targeting a Muslim area, they were careful not to hurt
the ordinary people. School buildings were razed at night to avoid killing innocent children.
Harnischfeger notes that “when attacking Christians, however, they killed indiscriminately.
Churches were bombed during Sunday services in order to produce as many casualties as
possible: men, women, and children” (56).
In the first week of January 2012, spokesman of Boko Haram, during an interview
with Daily Trust, issued a two weeks ultimatum to Southern Nigerians who are basically
Christians to vacate northern Nigeria or risk being killed. On the expiration of the two weeks,
this threat was made real by the sect by viciously attacking the Southern Nigerians in Kano,
killing about 400 people (Ishaku 2). In another statement issued the same year, Boko Haram
demanded that the President, Goodluck Ebele Jonathan and all other Christians in Nigeria
should convert to Islam if they should escape carnage (Walker 11). In yet a third and rather
conflicting announcement, Abul Qaqa assured that Christians could be protected in an
Islamic state. In his explanations, Qaqa asserted that Islamic orthodoxy provides for the
protection of Christians and Jews under Islamic government. However, he insisted that
Nigerian Christians were not entitled to enjoying this privilege, since the Christians have not
requested to be placed under Islamic protection. He expressed his embitterment that
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Christians are not ready to submit to Islam as they have resisted sharia implementation. In
addition to this, Christians are seen as representatives of western civilization, who have
brought along various vices of the West that corrupt Islamic societies. Thus, clever ways of
dealing with them is to supress, attack and exterminate them. This made Christians and
churches major targets of Boko Haram (Harnischfeger 57-58).
Perouse de Montclos adduces that the early attack of Boko Haram on Christians was a
tactical way of becoming a part of the global jihad. When the sect pretends to be defending
Muslims against alleged Christian aggressions in Plateau states, it is covertly trying to gain
external financial and moral support from radical Islamic organisations based in Arab nations.
Such attacks would also attract to them the sympathy and endearment of Nigerian Muslims
and make them to take sides (138). No wonder the Boko Haram sect in their early years were
able to raise such a teeming membership, intimidating arsenal and financial support. Hence
targeting Christian communities makes sense, as it easily creates terror or panic, challenging
the secularity of the Nigerian state as it affects freedom of religion. This is even as so many
Nigerians view Boko Haram’s attacks on Christian as a very serious problem (Lugo et al 43).
Boko Haram terrorists also target Muslim clerics who are opposed to their ideology.
Armed assaults and bomb attacks are taken to mosques and other Islamic gatherings where
the terrorists perceive Muslims gather to criticise or discuss against them. The radical
ideology of Mohammed Yusuf generated serious friction between Yusuf and some prominent
northern Islamic scholars such as Yahaya Jingir, Sheik Abba Aji, and the late Ja’afar
Mahmud Adams. The meetings of Adam and Yusuf between 2004 and 2007 (the year Adam
was killed) was characterised by bitter theological arguments. Adam, a seasoned Islamic
theologian described Yusuf’s theological perception as “stupid”, “ignorant”, and very
dangerous for the political aspirations of Nigerian Muslims. Against Yusuf’s position, Adam
encouraged secular and Western education for Muslims, noting that “only the conscious
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adoption of Western and secular boko education would eventually enable Muslims to
effectively fight the Western enemy” (Loimeier, cited in Onuoha 168). This, no doubt, earned
Sheik Ja’far Mahmud Adam a bullet on the forehead as he bent down to pray in a mosque.
On 5 July 2015, bomb blasts occurred in a mosque during prayer time at Yan Taya in
Jos, Plateau state. In outrage, Muslim mobs set on fire the adjoining Cherubim and Seraphim
church (Stefanos Foundation). Perouse de Montclos opines that:
Since the first recorded act of violence committed by the so-called ‘Taliban’ in
November 2003, Boko Haram has actually struck against political targets: police
stations which were sometimes the only effective presence of the state in remote
villages; prisons which were attacked to release militants; schools which symbolised
Western education and the colonisation of the mind; mosques and Muslim scholars
who contested the moral authority of the deviant sect; politicians and godfathers who
were fraudulently elected and who were accused of failing to implement properly
Islamic Law, etc. After the assault of the army and the extrajudicial killing of
Mohammed Yusuf in July 2009, then the group started to operate outside of Borno
and Yobe, hitting churches in Jos in December 2010 and United Nations offices in
Abuja in August 2011… Boko Haram aimed to further destabilise Nigeria by going to
the South to attack strategic targets such as bridges, power plants, the radar facilities
of international airports, and radio and television transmitters (137).
It is quite clear that the Boko Haram sect targets and attacks everyone and everything that
does not belong to their fold. Their pattern of attack suggests that the sect members are on a
mission to destroy the secular Nigerian state and replace it with a religiously pure Islamic
society where only the religious ideas of sect can thrive. This confirms that Boko Haram is a
religious terrorist group; while their war of terror is a total jihad.
3.3 CAUSES OF BOKO HARAM’S TERRORIST ACTIVITIES
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The causes of terrorism, such as Boko Haram are usually difficult to assess, ascertain
or explain. This is due to the fact that terrorism, terrorists and terrorist tactics are quite
dynamic and not static. They keep changing according to time, social milieu and diverse
motivating factors. In the same vein, scholars who tend to understudy terrorism differ, owing
to changing trends in terrorism and varying scholarly approaches. Hence, those searching for
the causes of terrorism, and in this case, Boko Haram, approach the study diversely, including
the religious, social, economic, political, cultural and historical dynamics. Some view it as
both internal and external developments.
While psychologists have postulated psychiatric and behavioural defects, sociologists
consider Boko Haram to be the resultant effect of years of poor governance, which has
resulted to a failed state. Whichever side of the prism an analyst views from, the fact remains
that Boko Haram terrorism constitutes serious ethical vices suggestive of an unhealthy
society. Crenshaw warns that whatever the method one adopts to study the causes, Boko
Haram terrorism should not be taken out of specific historical context or treated as a generic
phenomenon. This she says is because terrorism is not a monolithic phenomenon, but is
rather diverse in inception, ideology and organisation; and is usually rooted in political
discontent and always attempts to sustain or legitimise violence (405).
Scholars, analysts and respondents have identified different factors responsible for the
emergence and protraction of Boko Haram terrorism in Nigeria. Lipdo looks at the causes of
Boko Haram terrorism in Plateau state and other Central and Northern Nigerian states to
include religious, cultural and political factors, which he says have their root in injustice. He
states further that these three factors act together in northern Nigeria due to the fact that the
North comprises three basic social classes that have never been one at any time, including 1.
The core northern Muslims; 2. The ethnic Middle Belt Muslims; and 3. Christians and natives.
He reveals that “the problem is that the dominant and the powerful of old wish to continue to
133
oppress the minorities, but the oppressed minorities want their freedom” (41). Supporting
Lipdo’s argument, Mbaezue maintains that the causes of Boko Haram in Plateau state as well
as other northern states could be understood from political, religious, structural dimensions
and foreign effects (vii).
To Sani, anyone discussing the causes of Boko Haram must consider manipulation of
religion, disconnect between the government and the governed, social and economic injustice,
global terrorism, collapse of public education, massive unemployment, unguarded borders
and proliferation of fire arms, underdevelopment of the north by previous administration,
human rights abuse and extra-judicial killing, economic collapse of the north, capitalism,
disunity in the north, and distortion of religious realities (Ikenna vanguardngr.com). It
suffices to say that Boko Haram resulted from a combination of many problems. For the
purpose of this study, the researcher, from his surveys has deciphered and analysed critically
the following factors.
i. Colonial Legacy
A legacy is a situation existing now due to actions and events that took place in the past.
It is something handed down or the remains from a previous time or generation (Hornby 843).
The type of legacy which the British handed over to Nigeria on independence has been
largely blamed for the emergence of political instability and various forms of insurgency in
the nation, with Boko Haram currently ravaging northern Nigeria. Boko Haram terrorism in
the north symptomizes a deeply rooted malaise spanning back to colonial days when colonial
educational policies that forbade western education in northern Nigeria helped to make the
region to fall behind the southern region in every aspect of endeavour. This has made the
spate of civilisation, development and modernisation to be rather slower in the north than in
the south.
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This accounts for the frustration of the teeming northern youths, who find it difficult or
rather impossible to compete with their southern colleagues. This failure and not only
religious difference explains the deep-rooted grievances of Boko Haram in northern Nigeria.
Thus, Boko Haram lies at the root of the fragile political institutions inherited from the
British by Nigeria at independence in 1960. For Nigeria, colonialism was both a factor of
cohesion and a source of discord, friction and hostility (Fafowora 8). Mohammed Kyari
affirms that “the disdain for western education is as old as the imposition of colonial rule, but
the resort to violence to overturn it is entirely new” (22).
ii. Fundamentalist Islamic Ideology
Adamu acquiesces that in northern Nigeria, since 1980, the rise of what might be
“eventually placed within the rubric of militant Islam has shifted the focus from a band of
albeit fundamentalists in the 1980s to a committed hard-core Islamists with a clear political-
and-violent-ideology in the 2000s” (26). Dating from the time of Ali, the fourth Caliph (after
Abubakar, Umar and Usman) events in Islam have been full of various groups who have
preferred toing a different path other than that of the main Sunni orthodoxy. The first group
to undermine, resist and rebel against Ali’s authority earned for themselves the sobriquet,
Kharijites (defectors or rebels, from Arabic khawarij; singular: khariji, literally those who
went out) (Kenny 22). The culmination of their resistance to authority came with the
assassination of Ali, the Caliph in AD 661 by one of the Khairjites. Known for their
fundamental slogan, la hukum illa li-llah (there is no judgement but that of Allah), they
adopted a strict and puritanical interpretation of the Quran, rejecting every other knowledge –
an ideology that the Boko Haram sect came up later to imbibe.
Mohammed Kyari reports that the charge of Kharijism was levelled against Yusuf and his
Boko Haram group by the local Izala ulama, even in various debates led by Mallam Bashir
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Mustafa (Kashar’ra), going by the fact that Boko Haram labelled other Muslims as
unbelievers, could not clearly distinguish between sin and unbelief, killed people
indiscriminately for no just cause, including Muslims, and rebelled against constituted
authority. All these traits featured prominently among the Kharijites. However, in an attempt
to defend their position and exonerate his sect from alleged kharijism, Muhammad Yusuf
authored a book which he titled Hazihi Aqeedatun wa Minhaju Da’awatuna ( This is Our
Manifesto and Our Path), a 300 paged book published in Arabic in 2009. His self-defence
efforts failed, as other Muslim bodies equally dubbed Boko Haram Kharijites, with their
continued violent and rebellious strides (19).
The birth of the Wahhabi motivated Izala in Jos in 1978 under the guardianship of Sheik
Mahmud Abubakar Gumi (1922-92) is another stimulus in radical or fundamental Muslim
ideology in northern Nigeria. The Izala criticised traditional rulers, condemned the
government and rejected the moral standard of the society, calling for strict Islam. Following
this was the booster of the 1979 Iranian Revolution that overthrew the Pahlavi dynasty,
establishing in its place an Islamic state despite the resistance of United States of America
(USA). This event greatly inspired the Islamic Movement of Ibrahim El-Zakzaky of Zaria
and his likes in different parts of northern Nigeria (22). This is one of the factors that inspired
the Maitatsine uprising.
The Maitatsine Islamic sect, led by its founder, a Cameroon born Alhaji Muhammad
Marwa who was resident in the city of Kano, staged a religious riot in Kano in their attempt
to overthrow the secular government and enforce full-scale sharia law in the society. Though
Marwa was killed in that uprising by the soldiers under the military regime of President
Olusegun Obasanjo, the Maitatsine followers viciously attacked five northern states with
heavy destructive impact in five battle-drawn years of bloodshed. This includes Kano (18
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February 1980), Borno (28 October 1982), Kaduna (29 October 1982), Kano again (30
October 1982), former Gongola (27 February 1984), and Bauchi (26 April 1985).
The effect of this fundamentally based violence is that the entire northern region became
a battlefield of sort, with outbreaks of ethno-religious violence instigated by Islamic
extremists. Shiites demanded sharia law over Nigerian constitution; Muslim students attacked
and disrupted Christian meeting at College of Education in Kafanchan in 1987. In Tafawa
Balewa, Bauchi state Hausa-Fulani Muslims clashed with the Christian Sayawa in 1991 over
the usage of the market. Muslim fanatics rioted over the visit of the Archbishop of
Canterbury in Kano in 1982. There were serious crises in Kano, Katsina, Sokoto, and Funtua
following the alleged FUNTIMES magazine’s “blasphemous publication”. There were also
the 1992 Zango Kataf riots; 1994 attacks on Christians and churches, and 1996 riots in
Maiduguri against the teaching of Christian Religious Knowledge (Ishaku 62). Major
violence hit Plateau state in 2001 with terrible destructive impacts, and has remained
protracted and unabated.
The introduction of Sharia and its supposed preference to Nigerian constitution in
Zamfara state, and its subsequent adoption in twelve other states in northern Nigeria was
another mega expression of fundamentalist Islamic ideology. The imposition of sharia
sparked off violent crises in northern Nigerian states, leading to the death of over 2000
victims, burning of churches and mosques, and loss of considerable amount of properties.
The campaign for sharia was not started by Boko Haram, as many Muslims have made such
moves in the past. Boko Haram only continued the age long struggle. T. H. Gwarzo, in a
research on the sharia campaign in Kano state discovered that all the Muslim organisations,
from the conservatives to the radical Shiites, supported sharia with the call for the
establishment of an Islamic state (cited in Harnischfeger 42). The failure of the sharia states
to implement a full-scale sharia was a disappointment to many fundamentalist Muslims in
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Nigeria; a situation that Boko Haram came up to challenge. The sect rejects the Zamfara
modelled sharia, and has always insisted on total sharia imposition in Nigeria. This is an
attempt many fear could lead to the Islamisation of Nigeria or its disintegration (Muhammed,
Kyari 22). Harnischfeger affirms that Boko Haram is unarguably fighting for the Islamisation
of the Nigerian state and society through the sharia legal code (34).
iii. Politics
Harnischfeger observes that the Islamisation of the Nigerian state, which is what Boko
Haram is fighting for, is a battle which was began by Hausa-Fulani politicians many years
ago (34). He opines that:
The campaign to transform state and society on the basis of shariah was begun by Muslim
politicians in 1999, when military rule ended and power shifted to the Christian South.
Although pious campaign was mainly a matter of political intrigues, it established a
paradigm that still frames debates. Few Muslims in the far north of Nigeria would openly
question what the imams are preaching: that the will of God takes precedence of man-
made laws and constitutions. Like most other Islamic organisations, Boko Haram refers to
this principle. With its call for a consequent islamisation, it seeks to achieve what Muslim
politicians in the North have promised, but failed to deliver. This makes it difficult to
denounce the aims of the rebels, and the Islamic establishment appears unable to
formulate a coherent counter-paradigm (33).
Mazrui, while supporting Harnischfeger’s argument stated in his “shariacracy”, that
following the shift of power to the South, northern political elites used the sharia advocacy as
a “bargaining chip” to pressurise and destabilise the Christian president and his government
(cited in Harnischfeger 35). During the sharia conflicts between February and May 2000,
President Olusegun Obasanjo entreated the northern elders to retract their position on the new
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sharia legislation, so as to halt further bloodshed and restore peace, but they remained
resolute, insisting that Allah’s law must be held second to none. Some of the prominent
politicians took the issue rather personal and went to the extent of declaring self-sacrifice and
total commitment to the course of sharia. Olowolabi reports that the current president of
Nigeria, Muhammadu Buhari had to assure his followers that “I can die for the cause of
Islam” (36). Another strong man in northern politics, Bukar Abba Ibrahim, who served as the
governor of Yobe state corroborated that “if necessary, we are ready to fight another civil war.
We cannot be blackmailed into killing sharia (Harnischfeger 34).
As Harnischfeger asserts, Buhari, Balarabe Musa, Shagari and other northern elders who
supported sharia project knew well that the “apostle of sharia”, Ahmed Sani, former governor
of Zamfara state had canvassed for sharia to achieve his political ambition. Campaigning on
sharia ticket in 1999, Sani was able to oust a formidable contestant, Aliyu Gusau. Seeing
governor Sani’s success, other northern politicians equally jumped on the sharia bandwagon
as a means of advancing their political objective. They promised to transform the entire
public life on sharia orientation. This, however, was not to be realised. As soon as the
politicians achieved their political goals and stabilised their grip on power, sharia gradually
started dying a natural death. Poverty has continued to be on the increase, while the ruling
class, in a pretentious piety under the garb of religion, keep on amassing and exhibiting
wealth to the disappointment of the people (Suleiman 26).
Again, there is this established practice in Nigerian politics, whereby the politicians arm
the youths, mostly the unemployed ones and use them as thugs to secure election victory,
dumping them after the election. This situation is true in the south as it is in the north.
Commenting on thugs and northern politics, Ojo reports that:
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Northern politicians use various groups such as Yan Sara-Suka in Bauchi, Yan Kalare in
Gombe, Yan Daba and Yan daukan amarya in Kano and ECOMOG in Borno and Yobe
states. In Adamawa state, the Political thugs are known as Damagun Boys and Shinko
Boys. In Taraba state, they are called Bani Israila (cited in Onuoha 67).
It is reported that Ali Modu Sheriff used the services of two groups to snatch power from
the former governor and his predecessor, then Governor Mala Kachalla, including Boko
Haram (called Yusufiyya then) and Ecomog. Sheriff is said to have promised the Boko
Haram movement full implementation of sharia in the state, a cash reward of 50 million naira,
50 units of motorcycle, and the office of the Commissioner for Religious Affairs, which the
sect’s national secretary, Alhaji Buji Foi occupied (166).
Trouble started when among other issues, governor Sheriff reneged on full
implementation of sharia. At the height of the dispute, Muhammad Yusuf pressured Foi and
other members of the sect serving in Sheriff’s government to resign. As their relationship
further broke down, Sheriff used the rival group to attack Yusuf’s movement, while Yusuf
continued to preach against and discredit Sheriff’s government as corrupt and full of other
immoral activities, describing them as yan boko (deceivers). Other youths who were equally
discarded by their sponsors, frustrated and having no other means of livelihood joined Yusuf
to champion his radical cause. The altercation between Governor Sheriff and Ustaz Yusuf
culminated in the death of the later in 2009 in the hands of security agents, thereby escalating
Boko Haram terrorism in northern Nigeria.
iv. Poverty
Poverty and deprivation have been used interchangeably to explain Boko Haram
terrorism, as both terms mean the same thing. Poverty is the state of being poor or not being
able to take care of one’s needs. Deprivation is the state of being denied or without something
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which is necessary for survival, such as adequate food, shelter, and other basic necessities. It
is the suffering caused by one not having the essential requirements to take care of basic
needs (Hornby 393). Many people, including politicians, humanitarian organisations, scholars
and respondents argue that the root cause of Boko Haram terrorism in northern Nigeria is the
deprivation of social and economic amenities which has played out largely in the region in
poverty, unemployment, underdevelopment, marginalisation, poor education or illiteracy,
frustration, misery and beggary. Socio-economic deprivation suggests that these antecedents
expose people to terrorist inclinations and tendencies, and could as well drive them to
outright terrorist acts (Sanusi 183). Academic inquiry requires plain objectivity. Thus, the
researcher endeavours to present objective analysis of the various arguments for and against
this position.
Ali Modu Sheriff, former governor of Borno state, in 2006 told journalists that about 95
per cent of Borno people were illiterates, whereas less than 2 percent of the residents had
access to newspapers (Abba 47). Subscribing to Sheriff’s position, Adesoji deduces that Boko
Haram has been able to develop and spread in northern Nigeria due to poor standard of living,
grievances and frustrations against the leaders, poor service delivery and insensitive
leadership. According to him, Boko Haram came up to fight and humiliate the politicians
who have exploited them for long in the name of Islam (cited in Abba 47). Mohammed Kyari
infers that the decline in economic fortunes following the harsh economic realities has
increased the poverty and suffering of Nigerians. This condition becomes more precarious
with the ruling class displaying so much wealth amidst widespread poverty in the north,
leading to anger, disappointment and frustration among the people. Mohammed states further
that in matters of infuriation, disaffection and uncertainty, “Muslim societies naturally react
in religious terms” (23), making Boko Haram a religious struggle for credible solution in
Nigerian leadership.
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Kwanashie equally concurs that poverty and marginalization provide fertile soil for
terrorism, as it is easy to brainwash the poor, vulnerable and helpless to join violent or
terrorist groups. He expresses sadness that poverty in Nigeria has been on a steady increase
(82). The steady rise of poverty incidence in Nigeria is vividly displayed on the tables below.
Table 5: Poverty Profile of Nigeria from 1980-2010
Year Poverty Incidence
(%)
Estimated
Population (million)
Population in
poverty (million)
1980 27.2 65 17.1
1985 46.3 75 34.7
1992 42.7 91.6 39.2
1996 65.6 102.3 67.1
2004 54.4 126.3 68.7
2010 69.0 163 112.47
Source: National Bureau for Statistics, 2010
Table 6: Zonal Incidences of Poverty in Nigeria
Zone Food Poor Absolute Poor Relative Poor Dollar Per Day
North Central 38.6 59.5 67.5 59.7
North East 51.5 69.0 76.3 69.1
North West 51.8 70.0 77.7 70.4
South East 41.0 58.7 67.0 59.2
South-South 35.5 55.9 63.8 56.1
South-West 25.4 49.8 59.1 50.1
Source: NBS National Poverty Profile January 2012
142
The region with the highest poverty profile is the North East and North Western
Nigeria, as is subsequently demonstrated in the table below.
Sanusi Lamido Sanusi, former governor of Central Bank of Nigeria and current Emir of
Kano argues vehemently that the woe of the north is as a result of marginalisation and
unequal revenue allocation (5). Reasoning along, Lengmang posits that issues of
marginalisation and unemployment result to frustration and social unrest, which forces
individuals and groups to become violent. He adds that Boko Haram terrorists use violence to
express the frustration of the people due to years of corruption, poor governance, extreme
inequality between the poor and the rich, unemployment, illiteracy and economic degradation
(cited in Mbaezue 72).
Blaming the rise of Boko Haram on the socio-economic misfortune of the north, however,
has forced the researcher to raise some pertinent questions. Who is marginalising who? Who
has actually made the north poor? Are northern elites fair to accuse the south of
marginalisation? Are poor people everywhere always violent? Is violence an answer or
solution to poverty? Does killing one make another better? Can anyone be justified for taking
up arms just because he feels alienated? Are there no other better options in expressing one’s
grievances than terrorist violence? Has the Boko Haram movement revealed any socio-
economic plan that could make the northern region or Nigeria better in their years of terrorist
onslaughts? A few records may serve well in this regard.
Ya’ Usman is of the opinion that anyone who desires to investigate the socio-economic
deterioration of northern Nigeria should focus his search lenses on the north. He blames the
marginalisation and poverty experienced in the “core Muslim North” on the northern political
elites and traditional rulers. He states that the blame for the emergence of Boko Haram lies at
the door steps of the politicians and traditional institutions who turn blind eyes on the
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suffering of their people whom they are pretending to lead on God’s behalf under the cover of
political Islam. He admits that the present condition of the north is an embarrassment, which
should not be. This, he says is because northern Nigeria has produced more presidents than
any other region in the country, who had the capacity to transform the living condition of the
people in the north. He observes that this negligence betrays the legacy of Sardauna, who in
his time used only groundnut to transform the economy of the north
(www.compassnewspaper).
Furthermore, Abba observes that it is an aberration of thought for anyone to blame the
south for the troubles of the north. This is, according to him, because northern Nigeria has 19
out of Nigeria’s 36 states, in addition to the Federal Capital Territory (FCT) located in the
north, leaving the South-East, South-South and South-West regions with 17 states. The north
also has 409 Local Government Areas (LGA) against 387 for the entire south (50). Each of
the states and LGAs receive federal allocation for both human and capital project
development, coming from majorly the oil wealth in the South.
Despite the stream of allocations that have poured into the North, the North has remained
the poorest region in Nigeria, as revealed by recent studies. The United Nations carried out an
extensive research on the occurrence of poverty in the 36 Nigerian states and the FCT. Their
research report is based on data collected on years between 2004 and 2014. The United
Nations Global Multi Dimension Poverty Index has three dimensions and 10 indicators in
estimating Overall Poverty. Each dimension is equally weighed, while each indicator within a
dimension is also weighed, and added. 10 indicators are used to measure poverty in three
dimensions, namely education, health and living standards. This report was published in 2015.
The researcher has created a table, chart and graph with the data, as represented below.
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Table 7: Poverty Rates of Nigerian States
S/N STATE POVERTY RATE
(%)
1. Lagos 8.5
2. Osun 10.9
3. Anambra 11.2
4. Ekiti 12.9
5. Edo 19.2
6. Imo 19.8
7. Abia 21.0
8. Rivers 21.1
** FCT Abuja 23.5
9. Kwara 23.7
10. Akwa Ibom 23.8
11. Delta 25.1
12. Ogun 26.1
13. Kogi 26.4
14. Ondo 27.9
15. Enugu 28.8
16. Bayelsa 29.0
17. Oyo 29.4
18. Cross River 33.1
** National Average 46.0
29. Plateau 51.6
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20. Nasarawa 52.4
21. Ebonyi 56.0
22. Kaduna 56.5
23. Adamawa 59.0
24. Benue 59.2
25. Niger 61.2
26. Borno 70.1
27. Kano 76.4
28. Gombe 76.9
29. Taraba 77.7
30. Katsina 82.2
31. Sokoto 85.3
32. Kebbi 86.0
33. Bauchi 86.6
34. Jigawa 88.4
35. Yobe 90.2
36. Zamfara 91.9
Sources: The Global Multidimensional Poverty Index by the U.N
http://www.dataforall.org/dashboard/ophi/index.php/
REGIONAL AVERAGES
1. South West - 19.3% Poverty (+ Average)
2. South-South - 25.2% Poverty (+ Average)
3. South East - 27.36% Poverty (+ Average)
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-----------------------------------------------------
** National Average: 46.0% Poverty
-----------------------------------------------------
4. North Central - 45.7% Poverty (+Average)
5. North East - 76.8% Poverty (- Average)
6. North West- 80.9% Poverty (- Average)
From the data presented above, it could be observed that northern Nigeria is poorer
than southern Nigeria. The entire northern region falls below the national poverty average of
46.0%. The north east and north west are the poorest geopolitical zones, with negative (-ve)
poverty status that is far below the national average, with 76.8% and 80.9% respectively.
These are the zones that adopted sharia, following Zamfara state in 2000, and the epicentre of
Boko Haram terrorism. Zamfara state is at the bottom of the poverty line, with 91.9%. This
further explains that the sharia campaign of governor Yerima, which preceded Boko Haram,
is nothing more than mere political jingoism used in blindfolding the electorate, as the lives
of the people are not improved by their leaders in any significant way.
Records equally prove that the impoverishment of the north is not caused by poor
funding from the federal allocation. This is revealed in the breakdown of 1.4 trillion naira
federal allocation shared from the federation account in the first quarter of 2017. The
breakdown is contained in the monthly Federation Account Committee (FAAC) report,
released to News Agency of Nigeria in Abuja on 22 May 2017. The main agencies that remit
fund into the federation account are Nigerian National Petroleum Corporation (NNPC),
Federal Inland Revenue Service (FIRS), and Nigeria Customs Service (NCS). The allocation
was made using the revenue sharing formula: Federal Government, 52.68 per cent; states,
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26.72 per cent and local governments 20.60 per cent. This same sharing formula has always
been used, even in the previous years that saw larger allocations. The report showed that
before distribution, state liabilities were deducted. The researcher used the data to prepare the
table below.
Table 8: Federal Allocation of Nigeria for First Quarter 2017
S/NO STATE ALLOCATION (BN)
1. Abia N8.42
2. Adamawa N7.8
3. A-Ibom N34.88
4. Anambra N8.7
5. Bauchi N7.9
6. Bayelsa N22.9
7. Benue N8.16
8. Borno N9.74
9. C-River N4.28
10. Delta N21.54
11. Ebonyi N7.56
12. Edo N6.5
13. Ekiti N4.97
14. Enugu N7.86
15. Gombe N6.35
16. Imo N7.92
17. Jigawa N9.66
18. Kaduna N10.56
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19. Kano N14.02
20. Katsina N10.05
21. Kebbi N8.37
22. Kogi N8.28
23. Kwara N6.9
24. Lagos N19.03
25. Nasarawa N7.41
26. Niger N9 billion
27. Ogun N4.98
28. Ondo N10.22
29. Osun N1.76
30. Oyo N8.9
31. Plateau N5.7
32. Rivers N26.8
33. Sokoto N9.07
34. Taraba N6.9
35. Yobe N8.33
36. Zamfara N5.91
Source: Vanguard Media Limited, Nigeria www.vanguardngr.com Accessed 15 August
2017
From the above record, it could be seen that the northern states of Adamawa (N7.8
billion), Borno (N9.7 billion), and Yobe (N8.33 billion) where Boko Haram started and
blossomed earn white higher than some southern states, like Osun (1.76 billion), Ogun (4.98
billion), Ekiti (4.97 billion), and Edo (6.5 billion). However, the human and capital
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developments in these southern states far outweigh those of their northern counterparts. This
suggests that the poverty in the region is not necessarily caused by the absence of cash inflow
into the states. The area could have been impoverished by their corrupt leaders who amass
stupendous wealth for themselves at the detriment of the people. So corruption, rather than
marginalization is a major factor in northern destitution. Buttressing this point, Yemi
Osinbajo, Nigeria’s Vice President laments that corruption among public servants fuelled
terrorism in North-Eastern Nigeria, which has brought adverse effects in the areas of
healthcare, education, social services, poor infrastructure and low quality of life
(Dailypost.ng). Further affirming this position, former Nigerian President, Olusegun
Obasanjo reveals that abject poverty arising from the corruption of Nigeria leaders was what
led to Boko Haram. He opines that:
One of the reasons that members of the extremist group – Boko Haram, gave for their
insurrection is that they became disillusioned when they saw how corrupt that
Western educated leaders were. According to them, if those who occupied
government offices by virtue of their Western education would corruptly enrich
themselves and deprive others of the basic things of life, then that education is
‘haram’ which means forbidden. I am told that when Mohammed Yusuf, the original
leader of Boko Haram and his early followers first started, they all gathered and tore
their certificates because they said a certificate, which could not fetch them a source
of livelihood, is useless to them. Similarly, they saw Western education as corrupting
the individual. We may not agree with their position, but the disappointment and
disillusionment of citizens over the inadequacy or poor performance of their leaders is
real (Nwachukwu dailypost.ng).
The above facts also prove that Boko Haram is an organised crime, based on terrorist
ideological underpinnings. This could be so; going by the fact that many leaders of terrorist
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organisations are hardly poor. It is on record that most of such leaders are from influential
and wealthy backgrounds, such as Osama bin Laden and al Zawahiri. Muhammad Yusuf,
founder of Boko Haram sect has never been presented as a pauper either. Some members of
his movement were equally wealthy and quite influential, including Buji Foi, Kadiru Atiku,
Bunu Wakil, and others. Farouk Abdulmutalab, the USA convicted Nigerian failed plane
bomber hails from a very rich Nigerian family and was a student in United Kingdom. One
may also ask: are the suicide bombers attacking their targets due to poverty or in order to get
money from them?
Equally, one may not rule out socio-economic deprivation and the attendant effects as
causation of Boko Haram terrorism, going by the number of unemployed youths and adults
coupled with the high quantity of vulnerable almajirai that loiter the streets of northern
Nigeria states. A research carried out by the Ministerial Committee on Almajiri Education in
2010 under President Goodluck Ebele Jonathan shows that Nigeria had 9.5 million almajirai,
and over 70 percent of them cluster in northern Nigeria, living under very sympathetic
conditions (Onuoha 162). This number should have increased exponentially after seven more
years of negligence. Many of these almajirai constitute a sizeable number of Boko Haram
foot soldiers and suicide bombers. They are easy preys with little bait. They are easily
recruited, brainwashed along the line of religious fanaticism and deployed for an all-out
violence, as has been witnessed in several conflicts in Plateau sate and parts of northern
Nigeria. A respondent revealed that the voices of the almajirai followers usually announce
the presence of Boko Haram fighters with chants of Allahu Akbar (Allah is great) while they
advance for destructive operations. The almajiri boys loot conquered places and burn what is
left with fire, while some of them are trained on shooting and slaughtering of enemies. They
also serve Boko Haram in intelligence gathering, as they easily mix up with people in the
society.
151
In a nut shell, if Boko Haram could be excused due to the socio-economic failures
brought upon the north by past leaders, it goes without saying that the terrorists should be
held responsible for the total socio-economic crumbling of northern society, particularly the
north-western Nigeria which they have destroyed. They are the ones who attack the markets,
schools, hospitals and health workers. They kill the innocent and fight anyone they see as an
opposition to their mandate. They burn churches at will and attack Muslim clerics and
mosques that do not support them. They have scared off migrants and investors who could
have helped to develop the north. If the past leaders made the people destitute, Boko Haram
movement have reduced them to slaves, orphans, widows and widowers. Thus, in the few
years of their operation, the Boko Haram sect has done worse to the people, society and
economy than the northern political elites they condemn.
v. Human Rights Abuse and Extra-Judicial Killing
Nigerian security forces have been variously accused of human rights abuse and
extra-judicial killing. In its 2015 annual report, Amnesty International accused the Nigerian
military of violating human rights and committing war crimes, especially in their war against
Boko Haram and suppression of Biafra. They faulted the military for torture, excessive use of
force, extra-legal killings, non-abolition of death penalty, gagging of freedom of expression,
violation of court orders; while the government has not done anything to protect the right of
her citizens. The country director of amnesty international, Mohammed Kaura Ibrahim stated
in Abuja that the clashes between Boko Haram and the military resulted in the death of
thousands of civilians and over 2 million Internally Displaced Persons (IDPs) at the end of
2015. He reiterated that
Torture and ill-treatment by the police and security forces were widespread.
Demolitions of informal settlements led to the forced eviction of thousands of people.
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Death sentences continue to be imposed; no executions were reported. The military
continue war crimes against humanity in response to Boko Haram between 2011 and
2015 (www.nij.com/74295-amnesty-internation2).
Many scholars, analysts, observers and respondents hold the opinion that the death of
Muhammad Yusuf and some other key members of Boko Haram in the hands of security
agents is the most important factor that radicalised the sect members and turned them against
the institutions of government. Pe`rouse de Montclos reports that “Nigerian ranks highest in
terms of the ratio of militant to security force deaths compared with other counter-insurgency
operations, in Northern Ireland, Columbia and Chechnya.” The situation, he said is so
horrible that “the ratio between arrests and killings has increasingly shifted towards killings
with a corresponding rise in abuses and collateral damage amongst civilians” (5).
Boko Haram would always provoke the military by killing their men and melting into
the local population, conscious of the fact that the military would vent their anger on the
people in retaliation. That is why a Boko Haram fighter ridiculed the military in the following
language: “when we killed the big unbelievers, they kill the lesser unbelievers”. The big
unbelievers here refer to the military men, while the lesser unbeliever are the local population,
whether Christian or Muslim (Mohammed Kyari 26). That was the pattern of military
response demonstrated at Baga, Kukawa LGA, Borno state on April 2013 in the killing of
about 185 civilians and burning of over 2000 houses by the military following an attack on
their patrol vehicle that led to the death of their men. Other similar incidences have been
reported by both local and foreign media, though the military always deny such claims
(www.vanguardngr.com/2013/04/bloodbath-in-maiduguri).
Nigerian security forces have been badly criticised for not obeying international best
practices and deviating from approved rules of engagement in the fight against the Boko
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Haram sect. While this is capable of dampening the morale of the soldiers on one side, it
should be appreciated that a positive reputation of the military among the people will benefit
them a lot as they engage the terrorists, mostly in the areas of people’s trust, information
gathering or intelligence.
vi. Perennial Violent Conflicts in Northern Nigeria
Since the 1980s, Nigeria has witnessed a great upsurge in the occurrence of violent
conflicts. Most of these conflicts have taken place in northern part of the country (Best 3).
These conflicts have always followed either religious or ethnic paths, or both. The crises have
been so frequent that northern Nigeria has become synonymous with ethno-religious violence.
The media has usually portrayed it either religiously as clashes between Muslims and
Christians; or ethnic and religious as involving Southern Christians and Northern Muslims.
This made the former Libyan President, Muammar Gadhafi to suggest that Nigeria should be
divided into two – north and south, following religious boundaries after the model of India
and Pakistan. When told that adherents of both religions live in the two regions, he further
recommended a disintegration of the country along ethnic lines. Though Gadhafi was
severely criticised, the perennial conflict in northern Nigeria has remained a global puzzle
(Abdu xii).
Following the burst of the Shiites and the Maitatsine violence in early 1980s
respectively in Zaria and Kano cities, various breeds of fanatical ideology developed in
northern Nigeria. This led to most of the ethno-religious crises experienced in the north in the
1980s and 1990s. The declaration of Sharia law in Zamfara state in year 2000 and its
subsequent adoption in eleven other states of northern Nigeria eventually led to bitter clashes
between Christians and Muslims in those states and other neighbouring states. Though calls
were made to the leaders of those states by the presidency and other well-meaning Nigerians
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to rescind their decision, they insisted on the prevalence of sharia. With the stage set for
Islamic emancipation, the Boko Haram sect came up to enforce their puritanical Islamic
ideology aimed at Islamising the northern, and thereafter the southern Nigeria. Their terrorist
violence has done heavy human and material damages on the nation, mostly in Plateau state
(Ishaku 1).
Plateau state has suffered different degrees of violence in the history of conflict in
northern Nigeria. The state recorded her first conflict in Jos in 1932 at the height of the Great
Depression. The 1945 Jos conflict registered the first blood shedding in the state. It took
about fifty more years for bloody violence to return to the state, with the 12 April 1994
bloody clashes that followed President Ibrahim Babangida’s creation of Jos North LGA, and
the subsequent appointment of a Hausa-Fulani Muslim as Chairman. Gero Road conflict
followed in 1998. The September 2001 conflict in Jos and other parts of the state has been
described by analysts as “the most grievous bloodletting ever witnessed” (85). Since 2001,
Plateau state has been immersed in protracted violence till date, with other major incidences
in 2002-2004, 2008, and 2010. The warfare in Plateau state has always been fought on both
ethnic and religious fronts – either between the Hausa-Fulani and the indigenes or between
the Christians and Muslims. Records on conflicts in northern Nigeria show that “Plateau State
is the most volatile with 53% instances of attacks that befell northern Nigeria from 1980 till
date” (Stefanos Foundation 89).
Conflict in Plateau state became outright terrorism in 2010. Though the Terminus
Market in Jos was bombed and destroyed earlier with multiple explosives following the 2001
bloody violence, people could not accuse the Boko Haram then, because nothing much was
known about them in Plateau state at that time, and no group claimed responsibility for the
attack. With recent developments, however, many people now suspect that Boko Haram
might have been the perpetrators of the bomb attack on the market structures in their
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formative years. Boko Haram and their counterpart Fulani herdsmen have grievously
terrorised Plateau state with such a destructive feat that the state now lay bare, vulnerable and
injured. People find it difficult to distinguish between Boko Haram attacks from Fulani
terrorist attacks, with many holding that most of those who disguise as Fulani herdsmen are
actually Boko Haram terrorists. Both the city centres and villages are generally attacked.
With the 7 March 2010 attack on Dogo Nahawa village that took the lives of about 400
people, mostly woman and children, and the 24 December 2010 (Christmas Eve) multiple
bombing of two Christian settlements of Kabong and Gada Biu in Jos claimed by the Boko
Haram, it became clear that Plateau state was in for terrorist onslaughts. Boko Haram claimed
that their attack was in revenge of perceived maltreatment of Muslims in Plateau state;
referring to the previous incessant conflicts in the state that had assumed a religious nature –
between Christians and Muslims. They promised more attacks, which they surely fulfilled
with the subsequent bombings, killings and destructions carried out in churches, mosques,
market places, city centres and rural communities. Considering the magnitude of Boko
Haram destructions in the state, Fafowora laments that “Plateau state has suffered more
casualties from Boko Haram attacks than any other state in northern Nigeria” (9). Meanwhile,
the perennial crises in Plateau state and other northern Nigerian states have metamorphosed
into full blown religious terrorism, as is being exhibited by Boko Haram.
vii. Failed Status of Nigerian State
While reacting to the question, “is Nigeria a failed state?”; Ladi Olorunyomi brought
in the most current edition of Fragile States Index (FSI), released on 15 May 2017, that
scored Nigeria 101.6 out of 120 failed status points. FSI score shows the magnitude of
pressure coming from economic, political and social indicators on conditions within each
country on the index. The higher the total score and ranking of a country, the more fragile
and failure prone it is. The FSI is an early warning measuring system for determining internal
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threats that could potentially lead to escalation of main national conflicts with international
consequences. Early warning systems became popular following 11 September 2001 attack
on USA. The concept has been known as Failed State Index until 2014, when it was changed
to Fragile State Index (FSI). Though the index was renamed in 2014, the defining criteria or
indicators of state fragility remain same as used in 2005.
Fund for Peace (FFP), a Washington, DC, USA based research organisation, released
the first edition of Failed State Index (FSI) twelve years ago, precisely in 2005 when they
studied weak and failing states in the world. Then, Nigeria was ranked 54 in the index, the
best position the nation has ever attained. Nigeria’s ranking has been on a steady decline
since 2005. Nigeria poorly ranked 17th in 2007; 18th in 2008; and 15th in 2009. From 2010 to
2012, Nigeria maintained a negative high ranking of 14th most fragile or failed country in the
world. Nigeria’s current position for 2016 and 2017 is still worse, at 13th position. Perhaps
this could get more severe at the end of the year, considering the socio-economic dilemma
being suffered in the country this physical year. Then, Olorunyomi opines rhetorically:
So, is Nigeria a failing state? For those who always choose to look at the glass as a
half full, it is painful to admit that, at this point in time, however hard we look, the
answer cannot be in the negative. Nigeria is a weak state. Yes, Boko Haram is on the
run but famine is gaining ground in its retreat. Yes, there are ongoing works around
militancy in the Niger Delta, but the Niger Delta Action Plan is in the cooler. And the
rest of the country is still wound up in infrastructure decay, public sector larceny,
stunted healthcare delivery and so on (www.premiumtimesng.com/news).
The FFP report groups Nigeria with eight other nations in the High Alert category.
These are countries with high scores of 110 and 100. They include Afghanistan, Iraq, and
Democratic Republic of Congo. This group is described as a danger zone. To equate Nigeria
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with countries that have been torn apart by war and terror spells out potential danger for the
nation. Meanwhile, Boko Haram could have developed as a result of the weak and failed
status of the Nigerian state. Their continuous terrorist onslaughts, coupled with weak
economy are fast driving the already fragile nation to the brink of total collapse. This is just
as Olorunyomi notes that “nothing says a country is going down the path of a Failed State as
loudly as being placed in the same category as war torn countries”
(www.premiumtimesng.com/news).
Ibrahim Mohammed asks another pertinent question: “do we have any reason not to
see Nigeria as a failed state?” He retorts that no nation has the guarantee of continuous
existence when her citizens continue wallowing in untold hardship and abject poverty in the
midst of abundant natural resources. He states that once any nation cannot meet up with its
primary responsibility of providing security and development, it becomes a failed state. When
a government is so weak and ineffective that it cannot protect its territories and borders,
rather it resorts to fighting and killing its own citizens, it becomes a failed state. When a
nation cannot provide public services, such as good hospitals, sustainable education, good
roads, steady power supply and clean water for her citizens, it becomes a failed state.
Corruption, high crime rate such as kidnapping, robbery and cultism, migration/brain drain,
poor policies, and economic bankruptcy all characterise Nigeria as a weak, failed state. The
list is inexhaustive, he said. Mohammed is saddened that Nigerian leaders have been looking
the opposite direction while things were going wrong with religion, security, economy and
society. He maintains that all those things they ignored are now hunting the nation and her
leadership (gamji.com).
Kwanashie corroborates Mohammed’s argument, insisting that Nigeria has no
strength as a nation. He states that the religious, ethnic and regional activities of each
successive government continue to stir up emotions that threaten the nation and widen the
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gap that already exists in the society (69). This he blames on the poor political, economic and
administrative foundations laid and handed over to Nigeria by the British colonialists, whose
major interest was the continuous exploitation of Nigerian resources. Persistence of the
capacity gap, he says, proves the failure of the Nigeria state in meeting the essential needs of
most of her citizens. He refers to Mo Ibrahim’s African Government Index report for 2011 in
which Nigeria ranks 41 out of 53 African countries in the governance index report. The report
lowly scores Nigeria on four basic governance indicators, including safety and rule of law,
participation and human rights, sustainable economic opportunity, and human development.
The report shows that Nigeria is still far below minimum globally accepted standard of
governance. The report challenges Nigeria in the areas of weak and poor governance. With
this, Kwanashie avers that if a nation is not capable of giving protection to her citizens,
groups will naturally spring up to that. When the people perceive their leaders as being unjust,
groups will rise up to challenge the injustices. Nigerian leaders, he said, have failed to direct
the economy and society on the path of progress, justice and equality, leading to the failure of
the state and that of the economy. This is why Boko Haram and other insurgent groups have
emerged to challenge the strength of the nation (80).
viii. Foreign Stimulations
Foreign stimulations of Boko Haram terrorism in Nigeria occur in two ways. The first
comes from perceived western incursion on Islam, while the second comes from foreign
terrorist organisations. United States of America and other Western superpowers have been
variously blamed for the upsurge of religious terrorism and Islamic great awakening being
experienced in the world today. This is due to different United Nation’s (UN) policies in the
Middle East, America’s unrelenting support to Israel, triumph of democracy and
emancipation of Western culture. Various Muslim nations and groups perceive this as a
threatening challenge to the survival of their faith; so they rise up to fight for the soul of
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Islam. This has given rise to the various terrorist groups, and in some cases, state sponsorship
of Islamic terrorism. Boko Haram is a reaction to this foreboding by a Nigerian Islamic sect
(Muhammed, Kyari 23).
Syed Abul A’ala Mawdudi (1903-1979), an Islamic scholar from Pakistan was one of
the first few Muslim intellectuals to take initiative in this fight. In 1941, he started a
movement called Jamaat-e-Islami (Islamic Revivalist Party). They developed and operated
on the mantra that Islam is not only a religion; but is also a political system and must be seen
as a total way of life. They held that Muslims should fight and uphold the purity of Islam by
enforcing sharia to replace the secular order. Adamu observes that this mantra has remained
the central and controlling ideology of radical Islamic movements wherever they are found
(28). Patel buttresses this fact when he argues that:
Islamic political radicalism in the last half-century has followed a tight pattern as a
direct response to mainly US foreign policies, stretching from the installation and the
support of the Shah of Iran in 1953, which led to the Islamic Iranian revolution, to the
US backing of the brutal Sudanese regime of Jaafar Nimeiry leading to a coup by a
radical Islamic military in 1989. The US involvement in Lebanon, with the aid of
Israel as a proxy, led to the demise of a fragile coalition in the country and ushered in
radical elements, which until today remain unsettled. The US in the former Soviet
Republics like Tajikistan has even allied with communists in order to counter the
growth of Islamic movements (42).
Demant adds that radical Islam spread out rapidly following the 1991 Gulf War,
becoming a global threat with the Algerian civil war; Hamas in Palestinian regions; the
Bosnia and Chechnya wars; the Taliban in Afghanistan; international terrorism of al-Qaeda;
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rise of Islamist parties and movements in Indonesia, Pakistan, Central Asian Republics (of
former Soviet Union), and other places around the world (28).
Adamu asserts that contrary to popular opinions, the 1979 Iranian revolution and 11
September 2001 events in USA did not initiate international terrorism, but only accelerated it,
because it already existed. He observes that two main types of Islamic militancy have existed,
majorly at the Middle East, both sharing the same radical political philosophy. The first group
restrict their operations within their countries or territories, while the second group are
transnational in operation. First is the Fateh, literarily meaning “opening”, and referring to
the Palestinian National Liberation Movement (PLO). This was founded in 1954 by the
members of the Palestinians in diaspora, who were mostly refugees from Palestine Working
as professionals in the Gulf States. Yasir Arafat was among the founders. Also in 1987 in
Gaza, another group was founded, called the Hamas (Harakat al-Muqawamah al-Islamiyyah),
meaning Islamic Movement. Hamas was primarily formed by the Sunni Muslims to resist
Israeli occupation of Gaza. The Hezbollah, (literarily the “party of God”, derived from the
Qur’an Al-Mujadala, 58:22) was set up in 1982 as a Shi’a resistance force against Israeli
invasion of Lebanon. Al Shahab (The Youth) was formed in Somalia as an armed Islamic
group. They fight to establish a sharia sate governed by Islam, declaring jihad against non-
Muslims, and urging attack on foreign forces, especially the African Union, United Nations,
Ethiopia and Uganda. Al Jama’ah was established in South Africa and registered on 20 April
2007 as the first religious political party in the country, with the aim of introducing sharia in
South Africa and Islamising the nation. In Algeria, in 1990-91, a newly formed Islamic party,
the Front Islamiqye du Salut (FIS – Islamic Salvation Front) surprisingly won local and
parliamentary elections. The army’s support for a constitutional coup and official banning of
the FIS prevented the Islamic fundamentalists from forming a new government. This led to
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protracted terrorist insurrections, reminiscent of Boko Haram experience in Nigeria, as
recorded by Volpi:
Political violence began with the arbitrary arrests and torture of pro-Islamic
demonstrators by the army and police, and with the revenge killings of civil servants
by Islamic guerrillas. Later, these violent tactics were used against people who were
not directly involved in the struggle for political power. At first the Islamic guerrillas
waged a spectacular campaign of assassination and bombing directed at foreign
nationals and assets in a desperate attempt to force foreign governments to drop their
support for the Algerian junta. By the mid-1990s the use of terror had spread even to
the most apolitical segments of the rural population, as blood feuds, struggles over
land ownership and organised crime grew out of the confrontation the pro-
government militias and Islamic guerrilla groups (vii).
The escalation of the Algeria terror violence in 1993 led to the coalition of various
terrorist and guerrilla movements to form a single militia group known as the Groupements
Islamiques Arme`s (GIA) or Armed Islamic Group that became notorious in their organised
attacks on the government personnel, institutions and establishments through assassinations,
bombings, car bombings and other tactics (Adamu 30). These national and transnational
terrorist organisations, such as al-Qaeda, ISIS and others have greatly influenced and
supported the operations of Boko Haram in Nigeria. Balogun observes that while Al-Shaba
gives technical support, al-Qaeda provides the background ideological orientation that
radicalises Boko Haram along terrorist onslaughts. Al-Qaeda, which has spread terrorism all
over the world, ISIS, and other terror groups have great influence on Boko Haram.
To Lengmang, the ambition of America to expand her western values beyond the
shores of the West has been viewed by Muslims, particularly those in the Middle East as an
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unfavourable incursion on the Islamic values. This, added to the negative effects of
secularisation has led to the rising of terrorist groups in different countries, including Boko
Haram in Nigeria. General F. Ham, US commander of African Command (AFRICOM)
reported in September 2011 that three African terrorist groups, namely Al-Shaba of Somalia,
al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb across the Sahel, and Nigerian Boko Haram publicly and
explicitly declared their intention to target westerners, and the US more specifically. The US
leadership were seriously concerned about this threat, and more worried about the synergy
that existed between these groups. It is a known fact that Boko Haram pledged allegiance to
and has operational links with both al-Qaeda and Islamic State (IS) (86).
Also, members of the Boko Haram group have been trained diversely in weapon
handling by terrorist groups in Mauritania, Somalia, Algeria, Chad, and etcetera. Abubakar
Shekau, the dissident leader of Boko Haram once boasted in 2012 about having 300 suicide
bombers trained in Mauritania, Algeria and Somalia who were set to attack the cities of Jos,
Abuja, and Kaduna. It has also been reported that the membership of Boko Haram is drawn
from northern Nigeria, Cameroon, Chad, and Niger. Some of the arrested members were
reportedly having foreign identity cards and passports. In many of the killings in Plateau state,
foreigners, including nationals of Chad and Niger have been identified as perpetrators. From
all evidences, therefore, foreign incitement is a factor in Boko Haram terrorism (86-104).
ix. Proliferation of Arms and Unguarded Borders
Arms and ammunition move easily across Nigerian porous borders, making it easy for
terrorists to access weapons without much difficulty. Trafficking in Small and Light
Weapons (SALW) is an area that Nigeria has a very serious challenge. Nigeria endorsed
some international agreements committed to eradicating SALW. One of such is the protocol
for arms control in West African region, called the Economic Community of West African
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States (ECOWAS) Mechanism for Conflict Prevention and Moratorium, signed on 31
October 1998. Another is the ECOWAS Convention on Small and Light Weapons, signed on
14 July 2006. Notwithstanding these treaties, the Defence Industry Corporation of Nigeria
(DICON) which was established in 1964 became revived under President Olusegun Obasanjo
to produce small and light weapons. Though the industry was pronounced bankrupt in 1972
and the German manager deported, a Russian firm was contracted that revamped DICON.
The Kaduna factory manufacture small arms and ammunition, while Bauchi workshop
assembles light armoured vehicles (Ishaku 160).
Some of the weapons produced by DICON include Nigeria Rifle 1 Model 7.62mm
(code named NG1-7.62) which is manufactured under and Anglo-Belgian licence; Sub
Machine Gun (PM 12S Calibre 9mm) under the licence of an Italian firm, Beratta; Nigerian
Pistol 1 Model 9mm (NP1-9mm); DICON M36 Hand Grenade; DICON SG1-86 single barrel
shotgun. Others are 9 by 19mm Parabellum Cartridge; 7.62mm by 51 blank bullet; 9mm
Blank Star; 12 Bore Shotgun Cartridge; and OBJ006, which is a Nigerian model of the
Russian AK-47 riffle named after the former President Olusegun Obasanjo. Also, some other
African countries are known for manufacturing arms, including Egypt, South Africa,
Morocco, and Zimbabwe (160). One wonders where Nigeria places the ECOWAS pacts she
signed with other nations on the prohibition of arms manufacturing. This is not even the
problem.
The major issue is that about 30 million arms in sub-Sahara Africa (under which West
Africa and of course Nigeria falls) are not produced in African countries. This figure (30
million arms) represents 5 percent of the total arms produced in the world. Shocking is the
fact that 80 percent out of these firearms lie in the hands of civilians, terrorists, militants and
rebels. One may then ask, what is responsible for small arms and light weapons proliferation
in Nigeria and surrounding nations? Ishaku indicts the leaders of Nigeria and other African
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countries for filling the region with weapons. He reveals that Libya, Morocco, Algeria, Niger
and Burkina Faso supply various rebel and extremist groups in West Africa with weapons to
fight and bring down governments they disagree with. Kenya, Sudan, Ethiopia, and Eritrea
have at different times armed rebels in Darfur, Somalia, Ogden, northern Kenya, and etcetera.
Congo’s insurrection is fought with arms supplied from South Africa, Zimbabwe and
Rwanda. Through Burkina Faso, Libya supplied arms to Charles Taylor and Foday Sankioh’s
Revolutionary United Front (RUF) in Sierra Leon in the 1990s (161).
Furthermore, separate from state actors, individual and group smugglers traffic
SALW across the borders. Florquin and Burman reveal in their research that Nigerian borders
are open to arms smugglers by land, sea and air (80). Serious arms trafficking persists around
Nigerian boundary with Cameroon and Equatorial Guinea, at the Bight of Bonny and through
northern Cameroon into north-eastern Nigeria, carried out mostly through boats around the
coastal areas. In October 2010, Nigeria Customs impounded 13 containers at Apapa port,
Lagos. On opening the containers, it was discovered that they were filled with Norinco
rockets, the type used by the Taliban in Afghanistan, grenades and other destructive arsenal.
The weapons were shipped from Bandar Abbas, a port city located in southern Iran. The
person behind the consignment was Sheik Ali Abbas Othman Hassan (popularly known as
the radical Sheik Abbas Jega), a Nigeria Islamic scholar based in Tehran. Mohammed Tukur,
a clearing agent who worked for Alhaji Aliyu Oroje Wamakko’s clearing firm was the person
to clear the failed deal (162).
Considering the spate of Boko Haram violence during this period, one could be forced
to raise some questions. Is Iran a state sponsor of terrorism in Nigeria? What is their interest
in the sovereign state of Nigeria? Could there have been other successful shipments of this
nature before this discovery? Could there be Boko Haram representatives at various Nigerian
borders and ports? Could the assertion of President Goodluck Ebele Jonathan be real that
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Boko Haram pervades the entire strata of Nigerian society? Are there publicly known steps
that Nigerian government has taken as it affects their relationship with Iran? Whatever the
answers to these questions may be, the fact remains that Nigerian border security has been
seriously compromised.
Even the Nigeria airspace is not left out of arms smuggling. In June 2009, a Ukrainian
plane carrying 18 crates of explosives and various ammunitions was seized at Aminu Kano
International Airport, Kano. At the same airport, on 11 November 2011, a heavy consignment
of military uniform was intercepted from a Nigerian civilian pilgrim returning from Saudi
Arabia. Again, in January 2012, Gary Hyde was arraigned in a London court for smuggling
into Nigeria, through China a frightening 80,000 guns and 32 million ammunition. It is even
more surprising that the same man, in 2007, reportedly smuggled into Nigeria 40,000 AK-47
rifles and 10,000 units of 9 mm pistol. To this, Ishaku regrets that “one finds the display of
lethargy by Nigerian authorities in the face of collapse…completely inexplicable” (164).
The quantities of arms that enter into northern Nigeria by land come in through the
porous borders with Cameroon, Chad and Niger. The insurrection in Chad, violent activities
of Nigerein Tauregs and Malian rebels have created illicit arms deals controlled by al-Qaeda
around the Sahel and Maghreb regions. Al-Qaeda in the Maghreb had boasted of taking
possession of a large reserve of Gaddafi’s weapon store that was hidden in various dumps of
the desert around Cyrenaica. Mahamadou Issoufou, Nigerein president, while spelling out the
potential dangers such arms have on the sub-region, told president Jacob Zuma of South
Africa that “arms are stolen in Libya and are being disseminated all over the region. Sahara
countries are facing terrorist threats, arms and criminal activities.” He asserted that the
Libyan crisis has amplified violence in the region (166). With the links Boko Haram has with
other terrorist organisations in Africa and beyond, it is not a surprise the kind of weapons
they brandish.
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x. Media Propaganda
The importance of the media in a contemporary era cannot be overemphasised. The
media addresses social actions as it defines social realities. The media has actually reduced
the world to a global village and universal happening to an on-the-spot assessment. Whatever
the media calls an issue, that becomes its address; and because the media says so, many
would not border if that is the reality. Yes, the media is an instrument of modernization and
development; but as Abdu puts it, the media is a veritable tool for ethno-religious
mobilisation, violence and division (177). The mass media, like other identities, is an
ideological tool in the hands of the people who control the cost of production. The media says
what they want it to say. The media has always projected Nigeria as a battle field, albeit so.
Abdu doubts, however, if the media can ever be objective in their reportage. This is because,
according to him, while they cover events and make their reports, there are strong forces
behind the scene that decide or determine what should be said to the public. Thus, the media
has contributed largely to inflaming the embers of hatred and violence in Nigeria, mostly in
Plateau state (179). Nigerian mass media has grown phenomenally since they started
publishing the first newspaper in 1857. One area that has given them growth is the news on
violent conflict. News on conflict, no doubt, raises sales, with increased profit; whereas profit
decreases when conflicts drop (180). Abdu asserts that the manner of media reportage on
violence in Nigeria further incites more violence. That is why he addresses the mass media as
the “media of conflict” (190).
There are two basic ways the Boko Haram and other terrorists use the media to their
advantage, whether print, audio-visual or social. The first is that they use the media to create
so much fear among the people from their terrorist acts such that the people feel so frightened,
threatened and intimidated. The second way is that they use the media psychologically to
weaken public support for the government and to demoralise security forces (Ishaku 187).
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Boko Haram terrorists score cheap victories far away from real battle fields through the
media who blow their impact out of proportion. Through the newspapers, radio, television,
phone, internet, and other ways the Nigerian public has been terrified, terrorised and
traumatised on account of the Boko Haram.
The terrorists have advantage over the government in the use of the media for the
following reasons. 1. The government is required to tell the truth, but the terrorist is not. 2.
Governmental forces are careful to avoid collateral damage but the terrorists are not. 3. The
terrorists take the initiative in the battle, deciding who and where to attack, while security
forces react only after the attack. 4. The government forces should be transparent and fight
according to rules of engagement, while the terrorist can choose to be the anonymous fighter,
and can easily deny any attack that may not give him a favourable reportage. 5.
Government’s vulnerability is worsened by the sophistication of modern social media such
that any terrorist act or reaction to it, however minute, is picked by satellite and aired around
the world instantly. This has been tagged “CNN effect” or “Aljazeera effect”. 6. The cost of
accessing the media is little for the terrorist, while it is heavy for the government. While the
government spends much on press conferences, the terrorist requires just a single dial on his
phone to hit the headlines (188-90).
The fact that people from different walks of life depend so much on the media to
source information places the media in a very strategic position in human society. They
influence situations with much ease, whether positively or negatively. Their reports quell or
fuel passions, calm or raise sentiments, and leave a community in peace or set it on the fire of
violence. Both the local and international communities rely on the media for information. The
Boko Haram terrorists understand this very well; so they are always very quick to release
propaganda, especially after launching an attack. Since the people are not there to ascertain
the reality, coupled with the gullibility of the general public, the terrorists have their way
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easily. Lipdo accuses some international media firms of biased reportage of various crises in
Plateau state, leading to further escalation of conflicts and consequently Boko Haram
terrorism in the state. Such media outfits include basically the Hausa services of BBC (Hausa
service), VOA (Muryan America), Radio France International (Hausa service), and Deutshe
Welle (Hausa service). He laments that the Hausa services of these channels are used to raise
propaganda with inflamed and distorted information, leading to multiple killings and
destruction of property (91).
While equally blaming the same foreign media as mentioned by Lipdo, Abdu adds
that local media equally contribute immensely in inflaming the embers of hate and violence.
In his study, Abdu selected four national newspapers, two from the north (New Nigeria,
Weekly/Daily Trust), and two from the south (The Punch, The Guardian). After carrying out
a critical content analysis based on the character and the pattern of their reporting during the
crises in Kaduna from February 2000 to June 2002, Abdu placed the four newspaper
industries on the same failed pane of inciting reportage and inflaming speeches. He
concluded that media establishments all contribute to prevailing crisis and equally help in
triggering new ones (179-90).
Ishaku argues strongly that nothing has helped more in fuelling violence and reprisal
attacks in Plateau state more than the “news”. This news at times circulates as rumours; but in
most occasions, it comes as orchestrated propaganda from media houses (183). He views the
terrorism in Plateau state as a “premeditated mayhem orchestrated to plunge the state into a
state of anarchy for political ends using ethno-religious sentiments” advanced by the media
(181). Ishaku holds that Boko Haram propaganda in Nigeria is modelled after the Palestinian
Hamas asymmetric manipulation of the media in the world; maintaining that “the public is
being fooled by the asymmetric manipulation of the media” (193). He states that the worst
form of propaganda that has occurred in Plateau state is the film that supposedly recorded
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those killed following the 28-29 November 2008 electoral violence in Jos North LGA, which
was circulated via Global System for Mobile Communication (GSM) phones and YouTube.
This in turn, provoked vicious Boko Haram attacks in the state. Questioning the veracity and
reliability of that video clip, Ishaku frowns that the perpetrators premeditatedly cooked up the
video to whip up religious sentiments that resulted to religious terrorism in Plateau state (194).
xi. Psychological Causes
Psychologists study the mind and behaviour of the human person. Major areas in
psychological research include biopsychology, clinical, cognitive, developmental, and
sociopsychology. Sociopsychologist studies how people feel, think, and behave in social
settings or situations. The researchers here try to address such questions as, how do people
form impression about others? How do people get persuaded to change their beliefs and
attitudes? What makes people to join certain groups? Under what conditions do people obey
or resist orders? (198).
Many psychologists have joined the discussion on the causes of terrorism. Some
blame terrorism on major clinical illnesses, such as schizophrenia or major depression, while
others attach it to antisocial personality disorder (APD). Of all their theories,
psychopathology (sociopathy) stands out as it relates to Boko Haram terrorism. This
antisocial disorder was called psychopathology until mid-1950s, and thereafter the term came
to be known as sociopathy. A sociopath has been differentiated from a psychopath.
Psychopathology suggests Psychosis or insanity. A psychopath or insane person is mentally
deranged such that he does not know right from wrong. “Psychosis” is the psychological term,
while “insanity” is the legal term. On the other hand, a sociopath knows wrong from right but
chooses to do wrong due to his selfish reasons, and does not show any remorse or pang of
conscience for doing wrong. Boko Haram terrorists can be classified as sociopaths, not
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psychopaths (Victoroff 12). Discarding the notion that terrorists are insane persons, Victoroff
opines that “while terrorist groups are sometimes led by insane individuals, and while a few
terrorist acts might be attributed to unequivocally insane reasons, terrorists rarely meet
psychological criteria for insanity” (12).
David Lyken, an expert psychiatrist states that psychopathology results from
psychological brain defect, while sociopathy is a result of social neglect and abuse of the
child. He adds that at the long run, both cases share the following common features: 1.
Disregard for the right of people 2. Failure to feel guilt or remorse 3. Disregard for social
mores and laws 4. Tendency to display emotional outbursts and violent behaviours (Ishaku
31). In addition to anti-social personality disorder (ASPD), Martha Crenshaw adds that
shared ideological commitment and group solidarity are significant determinants of terrorist
behaviours (409). While acceding to sociopathological causation, Knutson asserts that the
violent acts of terrorists stem from the feelings of hopelessness and rage. Hudson, in his own
efforts, advices that that psychological explanation of terrorism should not ignore other
potent drivers such as religious, political, social, economic and possibly biological factors
which have contributed in motivating terrorist activities (23).
Raymond H. Hamden, a Clinical Forensic Psychologist reveals that deceit and
manipulation are the controlling features of people with antisocial personality disorder. He
stated that this problem could begin in childhood and last through adulthood. Such people
could be performing repeatedly antisocial or criminal acts such as destruction of property,
stealing, harassing and harming others. They have no value for the rights, feelings and wishes
of other people. They manipulate and deceive to gain for themselves pleasure, profit or fame.
They can be extreme or fanatical. They blame and mock their victims for being helpless,
foolish, or deserving their fate and punishment. They show complete indifference of those
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they harm. Hamden opines further that this personality disorder could be caused by child
neglect and abuse, unsteady parenting, and poor parental discipline (5-6).
Though psychological research may not have all the answer to the causes of terrorism,
it suffices to say that the various features outlined above of a sociopath are quite
characteristic of the Boko Haram terrorists. The picture presented above describes both the
leadership and membership of the sect, considering the magnitude of the harm they have
done to innumerable persons and unquantifiable properties. This is equally demonstrated in
the callousness and cruelty with which they kill and maim their victims. Also revealed in the
psychological causation of Boko Haram terrorism is the almajiri syndrome. Years of non-
parentage, negligence, abuse, destitution and beggary have turned millions of children in
northern Nigeria to rascals, mischievous miscreants and churned them out as potential
dangers to the society. They become tools for violence with little bait in the hands of the
terrorists, willing to destroy the same society that has been so unfair to them. This is largely
due to the fact, in the words of Alade that “they have their own axes to grind against their
parents, authorities and the society at large” (cited in Ishaku 31). Thus, ironically, an army of
sociopaths, which have been bred over the years, with a ready leadership in the Boko Haram
movement has finally returned home to settle.
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CHAPTER FOUR
THE EFFECTS OF BOKO HARAM’S RELIGIOUS TERRORIST ACTIVITIES AND
THEIR ETHICAL IMPLICATIONS
The activities of the Boko Haram religious terrorists registered a lot of devastating
effects on Plateau State. The terrorists made a mockery of peace and stability in the state that
had been known as the “Home of Peace and Tourism.” This chapter investigated the
detrimental effects of the terrorist activities and their ethical implications on Plateau state,
Nigeria.
4. 1 BACKGROUND OF RELIGIOUS TERRORISM IN PLATEAU STATE
At this juncture the researcher makes a brief historical overview of some of the major
violent religious uprisings, which preceded Boko Haram, and of course formed the
background of religious terrorism in Plateau State.
4.1.1 The Jos 1932 Religious Uprising
The first recorded history of uprising in the history of Plateau state was interpreted as
having religious terrorist undertone. It bothered on the majorly Christian Berom, Anaguta and
Afizere who are regarded as the indigenous people or owners of Jos, the capital city of the
state and the Muslim Hausa/Fulani, who the indigenes regard as settlers (Ishaku 69). This
unrest took place at the height of the Great Depression. The Great Depression refers to a
period of drastic fall or decline in global economy that began in United States of America and
resulted in widespread poverty and unemployment, lasting from 1929 till 1939 (Pells 332).
Due to the collapse or decline of international demands for columbite and tin, many lucrative
mines in Jos started folding up, while the European miners were leaving en mass.
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This development gave rise to contradictory rumours among the local people in Jos
about the British colonialists. One of the rumours held that the Muslim Hausa/Fulani were
planning a jihad in order to take over what would be left behind by the Europeans, drive out
all the non-Muslims from Jos and impose Islam on the area. Another rumour had it that
should all the Europeans eventually leave, the natives had a plan to sack all the Hausa/Fulani
Muslims from the town as they had attempted before the coming of the colonial masters
(Ishaku 69-70). Both rumours raised serious tension and apprehension in the town such that
the markets were emptied of machetes, daggers and other weapons in preparation for the
impending war. At the end, the Europeans did not eventually vacate Jos completely, and the
tension fizzled out with time.
4.1.2 The Jos October 1945 Religious Uprising
The population of migrants in Jos had grown significantly in 1940. This population
increase is attributed to commerce. This resulted to a serious competition among the people,
especially the Igbo and Hausa. The Igbo of South Eastern Nigeria, regarded as major
adherents and missionaries of the Christian faith were evangelised by the early European
missionaries. Like the Hebrews, the Igbo take his Christian faith to wherever he goes. The
Hausa of Northern Nigeria were conquered and subjected to Islam in the Othman Dan
Fodio’s jihad. The Hausa Muslims equally move around with their religion. The Igbo grew
greatly and occupied a section of the town called “Igbo Quarter” (Present Sarki Arab ward),
and the Hausa were reportedly not happy about the influx of the Igbo. Nnoli observed that
“before, this residential area, as well as the rest of the Native Town, had been occupied by the
Hausa migrants who had cultivated a possessive attitude toward it” (234). Thus, a clash of
religious identity ensued.
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Furthermore, Ishaku details that the hardship that followed the end of World War II in
1945, coupled with the difficulties suffered due to the national strike led by Nnamdi Azikwe,
a Christian Igbo, for independence made the British colonialists to fuel an already breeding
anti-Igbo sentiment. Thus, in October 1945, Jos town broke down in two-day violence, before
soldiers drafted from Kaduna came to restore normalcy. Two persons were reportedly killed
and many others were wounded, with property belonging to both the Hausa and Igbo
destroyed. This was, perhaps, the first time blood was shed in Plateau State as a result of
seeming religious violence. The Igbo moved out of the Native Town segment to Township,
following this incidence (Ishaku 71).
4.1.3 The Jos 12th April 1994 Religious Uprising
Religious uprisings in other parts of Northern Nigeria, such as Kaduna, Kano, Bauchi,
Yola, etcetera since the 1980s had been eluding Jos, with people from such affected places
coming to settle in the peaceful Plateau State. This peace, however, was shattered when the
military president, Ibrahim Babangida decided to create Jos North Local Government Area.
This was loudly celebrated by the Jasawa (the Hausa/Fulani residents in Jos), and strongly
opposed by the indigenous people of Berom, Anaguta and Afizere, who saw this a religious
jihad, and opposed the appointment of Aminu Mato, an Hausa/Fulani Muslim, as the
chairman of Jos North LGA (Alubo 79). This position was portrayed by the Fiberesima
Commission of inquiry into the 1994 conflict.
From the evidence placed at the disposal of the commission it is obvious that the
immediate cause of the crisis in Jos stemmed from the appointment of Alhaji Aminu
Mato as the chairman of the caretaker management committee of Jos North LGA.
Evidence showed that Alhaji Aminu Mato was a Hausa-Fulani man. While his
kinsmen nodded approval to his appointment, the Afizere, Anaguta and Berom tribes
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gave it an outright rejection. A battle line was drawn between the tribes (Plateau State
Government, White Paper 6)
The indigenes interpreted this as a religious Jihad, whereby the government of the day,
headed by a Muslim President was trying to empower the Hausa-Fulani Muslims to rule over
their land and impose Islam on their people (Gofwen 13). Venting his anger on this, Nenfort
Gomwalk, an academic Professor from Plateau state lamented that there was no justifiable
basis for creating Jos North Local Government at all, except carving out a safe haven for the
Muslim Hausa Fulani settlers (Ishaku 63). In the ensuing violence, four persons were
reportedly killed, with several properties destroyed, including a part of Gada Biu and Jos
main markets, Mosques and Churches, NITEL and individual properties and vehicles. The
crisis was quickly contained. However, the 1994 uprising became the fore runner of similar
religious violence in Plateau State (Alubo 80).
4.1.4 The Gyero Road 1998 Religious Uprising
Gyero is a small rural community settled about 4 kilometers east of Bukuru,
headquarters of Jos South Local Government Area. The people are predominantly Christian
Berom with a sizeable Muslim Hausa/Fulani settlers along Gyero Road. The major
occupation of the people is farming, done during the rainy and dry seasons.
Violence broke out in the community in 1998, following the death of a Berom man
killed by a Hausa farmer for taking garden egg (yalo) from his farm without permission.
Infuriated by this act, Berom relations of the deceased from Bukuru-Gyel fought the
Hausa/Fulani viciously, leading to the death of many of them. Though the conflict did not go
beyond Bukuru, it added to the deteriorating relationship between the Christian Berom and
the Hausa Fulani Muslims in Plateau state (Gofwen 16).
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4.1.5 The Jos 7 September 2001 Religious Uprising
This uprising was adjudged religious following two major incidences that triggered it
off. The first was the appointment of a Muslim Hausa/Fulani, Alhaji Muktar Mohammed, as
the Jos North coordinator of the Federal Government Poverty Alleviation Programme
(NAPEP). The indigenous people of Berom, Anaguta and Afizere contested that such an
important position ought to have been given to an “indigene” rather than a “settler”. They
interpreted this as a form of jihad, reminiscent of the 1994 episode (Alubo 80).
The second and most important incident which triggered the violence was clearly
religion. A Christian Berom lady, Miss Rhoda Haruna Nyam insisted on crossing the only
road to her office while returning from a lunch break, at Congo Russia area of Jos. By this
time the Muslims who were gathered to observe their Juma’at (Friday) prayer at a Mosque in
this area had blocked the road. In the ensuing argument, Miss Nyam was thoroughly beaten
up by the Yan Agaji (Aid group) who usually performed police duties during Muslim
gatherings. As she ran to her house, the worshippers turned riotous, chased after her, beat up
her father, smashed her mother’s car and set the entire house on fire (Ishaku 84).
Attracted by the pandemonium, the Christian youths who dominated the area reacted
equally violently against the Muslims, and within minutes, the clash had spread around the
entire Jos city and environs, including other parts of the state. The police alone could not
contain the riot, so the military were drafted to help calm the situation. Over a thousand lives
were reportedly lost and properties worth over N4 billion were destroyed. This religious
violence was assessed as the first most grievous bloodbath ever witnessed in Plateau State
(85).
Various religious versions were given on the terrifying violence by both Christian and
Muslim bodies. Christians alleged that the 2001 carnage was not a mere happenstance, but
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was pre-planned and orchestrated by the Muslims who had piled up caches of arms in various
locations, such as houses of prominent people around Eto Baba, Dadin Kowa, Angwan Rogo,
Jos Central Mosque, Bukuru Mosque among other places. It was also alleged that
mercenaries were brought in from other states and climes for a full Islamic Jihad in order to
conquer, take over and subjugate the Christian dominated Plateau State. The Police
Commissioner, Alhaji M. D. Abubakar was accused of providing security for mosques and
Muslims’ properties, whereas leaving churches and Christian establishments to be vandalized
and burnt down by Muslim marauders. This is why many Christians in Plateau state angrily
opposed the appointment of M. D. Abubakar as an Inspector General of Police in Nigeria
(Alubo 80).
Muslims, on the other hand, accused the Plateau state Christians of showing no
genuine regard for the Hausa/Fulani and Islam. They revealed their anger about the
oppositions previously put up by the indigenes against the appointments made to the Muslim
Hausa/Fulani as chairman of Jos North in 1994 and also as coordinator of NAPEP in 2001.
They upheld that the mosque incident was a demonstration of the contempt for the Muslim
community. Killings and destruction of property in the name of religion lasted steadily and
devastatingly from 7th-12th September, 2001, totally destroying peace and order in Plateau
State in a magnitude never seen before (Alubo 81). The spill over bloodshed continued in
other places within the state, even after the violence was contained in Jos metropolis. It
suffices, therefore, to state that the 7th September 2001 Jos religious violence, just like the
11th September 2001 (9/11) attack on United States of America, presaged religious terrorism
in Plateau state, Nigeria, which got worsened with Boko Haram activities.
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4.1.6 The Eto Baba Uprising of 2002
Following the 2001 religious violence in Plateau state, subsequent clashes in the state
have always been fought along the line of religion, whether the causative factors were
religious or not. Eto Baba is a community on the fringe of Jos metropolis, located along
Bauchi Ring Road, and dominated by the Anaguta tribe and people of the Christian faith. It is
also the headquarters of Naraguta ward “B” (Gofwen 22). The ward congress of People’s
Democratic Party (PDP) was scheduled to take place in Eto-Baba in May 2012. It was moved
from Angwan Rogo after the 2001 mayhem (Alubo 82). Best reports that the Hausa/Fulani, in
their determination to win positions in the congress, brought in so many supporters in Lorries
and open trucks estimated crudely at about sixty thousand persons (60,000). This large
number of people or supporters raised a lot of suspicion, panic and tension, with the
indigenes pointing out that those supporters were imported from outside the ward and other
places to intimidate and subdue them (76).
Within a short time, confusion and rowdy fighting broke out between the Christians
and the Muslims. Before the matter could be brought under control, many were killed and
others injured, with many of the vehicles belonging to the Hausa/Fulani and their supporters
smashed or burnt. Soon the crisis escalated to the city centres, with the youths from both
sides of religion mounting road blocks and harming people of “other faith”. The intervention
of the Joint Security Teams was able to arrest the situation. Consequently, the animosity
between the indigenes and Hausa/Fulani, and generally the Christians and Muslims got
deepened. Muslims residing at Christian dominated areas relocated to Muslim dominated
settlements, while Christians living in Muslim populated areas left for safe Christian comfort
zones. This form of residence has become a pattern since the 2001 bloody violence in Plateau
State (Best 77).
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4.1.7 The Southern Plateau 2002-2004 Religious Uprising
The 2001 Jos bloodbath, which was fought along the line of religion in different parts
of Plateau state, basically between the Christians and Muslims, had presaged subsequent
violence in Plateau state. The pattern is such that once violece broke out, various groups
would form a common religious front, depending on which religion one chooses to identify
with. In 2002, terrorist violence erupted in the Southern Senatorial Zone of Plateau State
made up of Langtang North, Langtang South, Wase, Mikang, Shendam and Qua’npan Local
Government Areas (LGAs). The most affected areas in the violence were Wase LGA,
Lantang North LGA, Langtang South LGA and Yelwa in Shedam LGA. While the violence
had some local dynamics, the killings and arson in Jos metropolis and their escalations appear
to have provided the impetus in the Southern area (Gofwen 24).
4.1.8 The Yelwa-Shendam 2002-2004 Religious Uprising
Administratively, Yelwa is under Shendam LGA, with headquarters in Shendam town,
about 20 kilometres away. Yelwa has the predominance of Jarawa and Hausa/Fulani Muslims
who historically originated from Dass (Bauchi State) and migrated to their present location
since late 19th century. Also, Shendam residents and surrounding areas are predominantly
Muslims (Higazi 108). Violence broke out in June 2002 between the Muslim Hausa/Fulani
and Jarawa, and the Goemai who are majorly Christians with a good number of traditionalists,
leading to the destruction of churches and mosques, loss of lives, property and homes. Best
describes the terrorising violence in the following way:
The conflict at Yelwa-Shendam became the straw that broke the Carmel’s back. The
violence at this location came in different waves, and had given the town a reputation
of a notoriously violent settlement with passion for large scale violence and killings.
First was the killings of June 2002, then later the killing of some 47 persons at a
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church on 24 February 2004 by armed Muslim militants, and then the reprisal attack
launched by ethnic non-Muslim militias on May 2 and 3 2004 against what was
essentially the remaining Muslim population of Yelwa-Shendam. After the February
2004 attacks, sporadic attacks continued throughout the southern zone of the state
(112).
Gofwen gave two positions as to the immediate cause of the conflict. A part is that
Christians had prohibited relationship between their daughters and Muslim men, which led to
a fight in Angwan Pandam on the night of 26th June 2002, resulting to the death of a Christian
man. Muslims recounted that the violence started as a result of masquerades coming out with
weapons from their shrine during a Taroh traditional festival same night at Angwan Pandam.
Added to these factors were the prior soured relationship between Muslims and Christians,
competition for traditional and political power, and ownership of the town (25).
After May 3, 2004 violent killings, President Olusegun Obansanjo declared a state of
emergency in Plateau state, which, though adjudged controversial, lasted from May 18 to
November 18, 2004. Democratic administration was completely put on hold for the period,
while an interim government headed by a retired Army General was constituted (Best 113).
Terrorist violence in Plateau State, however, did not abate during the emergency rule period.
4.1.9 The Wase 2002-2004 Religious Uprising
In terms of land mass, Wase is the largest Local Government Area in Plateau State.
Wase is an emirate founded as a vassal of Bauchi by the Jihadists in about 1820 when they
conquered Basharawa. The two dominant tribes in Wase are, perhaps, the Fulani and Taroh.
Jukun constitute a minority among other ethnic minorities in Wase, though the Jukun were
the earliest inhabitants. Farming and animal rearing are the predominant economic activities.
The religious uprising of 2002 to 2004 also had Wase as a major theatre (Higazi 109).
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The uprising in Wase could have been propelled by the spill-over of the bloody
violence in Yelwa-Shendam with reprisal killings and sacking of Muslims and Fulani
herdsmen from Langtang South LGA into Wase, just as Christians were expelled from Yelwa
into Langtang. Another key event that fuelled the conflict in Wase was the killing of four
prominent elders of Taroh supposedly by the Hausa- Fulani. On July 3, 2002, after a peace
meeting on the invitation of the emir at his palace in Wase, the Taroh elders were
assassinated on their way back outside Wase town. The Taroh saw the killing as a set up at
the instigation of the Emir, though the emirate tried to deny the accusation (Best 153).
Consequently, five Muslims were killed on their farms in Southern Wase on July 4,
2002, while many Christians were attacked the same day in Wase town, the seat of the
emirate which is predominantly Muslim in population. People were killed, churches burnt
and properties were destroyed, forcing all the Christians to flee the town and surrounding
villages. 25 Taroh people were killed on July 5 at Saluwe, whereas 32 Boghom and Fulani
were killed between July 5 to 6. The greatest loss happened on Saturday, April 19, when no
fewer than 37 residents of Wase and two soldiers were murdered during a Taroh retaliation
raid. Taroh and other Christians fled Muslim dominated settlements, while Muslims departed
Kadarko and various parts of Maro districts majorly occupied by Christians (Higazi 16). In a
continuous vigilante stride, the Taroh blocked the road between Wase and Langtang for about
two years. This was the situation in the Southern Zone when President Olusegun Obansanjo
declared a state of emergency in Plateau State in May 2004 (Gofwen 30).
4.1.10 The Jos November 2008 Religious Uprising
Council elections were held peacefully in all the 17 Local Government Areas in
Plateau State on Thursday, November 27th, 2008 (Ishaku 90). In the early morning hours the
next day, 28th November 2008, killings, looting and burning of houses had started at some
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parts of Jos Township. At that time, the Plateau State Independent Electoral Commission
(PLASIEC) had not even declared anybody winner of the Jos North Local Government Area
polls, as results were still being collated. However, rumours went out that the election of Jos
North Local Government Area was being won by the candidate of People’s Democratic Party
(PDP), Barrister Timothy Gyang Buba, a Christian who was defeating the candidate of All
Nigeria People Party (ANPP), Alhaji Aminu Baba. This violence was adjudged highly
religious. Places of worship were burnt down instead of party offices; while people and their
property were attacked according to the faith they professed.
Hon. Justice Ajibola Judicial Commission of Inquiry into the November 2008 unrest
presented a vivid picture of the violence, stating that:
As early as between 0230-0330 hours of 28th November 2008, information filtered to
the police that some Muslim youths were holding nocturnal meetings in Muslim
dominated areas and soon thereafter there were reports of people shouting “Allahu-
Akbar” along Ali Kazaure street and other Muslim dominated areas in Jos North…
More worrisome is the pattern of the attack. Places of worship rather than party
offices were the targets of attack. Individuals were attacked based on their religious
leanings rather than political leanings. The whole crisis took a religious dimension
(24-30).
Areas affected mostly by the violence include Katako, Congo Russia, Ali Kazaure,
Rikkos, Tudun Wada, Angwan Rogo, Farin Gada, Sarkin Mangu, Angwan Rimi, Dilimi,
Bauchi Road, Nasarawa Gwom, Apata, Jenta, Kwararafa, Zaria Road, Bukuru etc. Over 1000
persons were killed, with many missing. Numerous churches and mosques were burnt, and
properties worth billions were looted and destroyed. Over 30,000 persons were displaced,
with Police Headquarters, Police Staff College, Air Force Base, Maxwell Khobe Cantonment,
NDLEA Base and other places turned into temporary refugee camps (Gofwen 38).
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The 2008 violence, however, raised a new dimension to religious terrorism in Plateau
state. At the peak of the mayhem, during curfew hours, 26 men were arrested in a bus at a
military check point at UTC junction, Jos. The soldiers searched out from the suspects,
military uniforms and identify cards, and a cache of guns and ammunitions. The mission of
the suspected mercenaries with such quantity of incriminating exhibits in Jos during curfew
hours could not be explained. They claimed to be vigilantes from Bauchi hired by Okene
Local Government Area, Kogi State. The next morning the men were moved to police
headquarters, Abuja and nothing more was heard about them (Ishaku 91).
4.1.11 The Jos January 17, 2010 Religious Uprising
As stated earlier, since the 2001, violence in Plateau State always assumes a religious
nature. This is because since then, Plateau State has been religiously polarized into two broad
lines, namely, Christianity and Islam. The situation is such that even traditionalists always
identify with either of the religions to vent their anger on their perceived enemies. On January
17, 2010 a Muslim man went to rebuild his house which was destroyed in 2008 violence
located in Duste Uku in Nasarawa Gwom area of Jos, a predominant Christian area, with over
200 “workforce”. According to Christian account, the “workers” started attacking passers-by
and worshippers in a nearby ECWA church. The Muslims said that the Christians opposed
the reconstruction (Alubo 92).
Stephanos Foundation, a non-governmental organization in Jos that researched into
the conflict reported that:
various accounts reveal that one Kabiru NEPA (as he is called in the area), a staff of
Power Holding Company of Nigeria (PHCN), brought in some over 200 Muslim men
to rebuild his house on Sunday, 17th January, 2010. Kabiru’s house is one of those
burnt during the 28th November 2008 crisis … Kabiru is the first to attempt rebuilding
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in this area … Kabiru did not bring this project to the notice of the village head ….
200 Muslim men on Sunday morning is not a common sight in this area since the last
crisis, this certainly raised the tension in the area. The builders kept chanting
intimidating noise, referring to non-Muslims as “Arna” (meaning infidels). Tension
mounted in the area and got out of control when the driver of the lorry hauling sand to
the site got into a quarrel with one of the non-Muslims in the area. This attracted the
Muslim workers and later resulted into attack on any non-Muslim sighted around. The
loud chants of “Allahu a’kabar” had attracted other Muslims to the area and
worshippers in ECWA Church about 500m away were attacked (1-3).
The violence that started at Nasarawa Gwom area, soon spread to Angwan Rukuba,
Congo Russia, Tina Junction, Bauchi Road, Kwararafa, Massalaci Juma’a, Channel 7, Dogon
Karfe in Jos North LGA. Also Affected were Bukuru town and Angwan Doki in Jos South
LGA. Over 300 persons died, and thousands were injured and displaced. Newswatch reported
that soldiers intercepted a truck carrying about 15 mercenaries covered with tarpaulin, in
Dadin Kowa area going to fight at the city centre. Also arrested were suspects in military
uniform at Rikkos. Other over 100 suspects were equally arrested with various dangerous
weapons like AK-47 rifles, locally made guns, axes, daggers, cutlasses, etc., in Dutse Uku,
Rikkos, Angwan Nasamu and Congo Russia (23). Casualties overwhelmed the capacity of all
the hospital spaces and medical personnel.
4.1.12 The Dogo-Nahawa Terrorist Massacre of 7th March, 2010
When relative peace returned to Jos city centres, the attacks and killings shifted to
rural areas, and have continued so till date (Alubo 93). Dogo Nahawa, Rasat and Zot are rural
communities within a distance of 5 kilometres from each other. Dogo Nahawa is less than 3
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kilometres from Du village, location of the personal residence of Senator Jonah David Jang,
former governor of Plateau State, all in Jos South LGA (Gofwen 45-46).
According to Ishaku, Jos violence took an outright terrorist dimension on March 7,
2010 when about 400 residents, mostly children, women and the aged were massacred at
Dogo Nahawa, Zot and Rasat in a night attack by militias identified as terrorists. While many
people accuse Boko Haram for this attack, others blame it on Fulani marauders. Some others
argue that there is no difference between Boko Haram and Fulani marauders; thus describing
this as a terrorist violence against the people of Plateau state (94). This incident drew both
local and international attention. Newswatch reports that:
The motive behind the killings, even though it is done along ethnic and religious lines,
is still shrouded in mystery as some of the suspects arrested claimed they were paid to
avenge the death of some Fulani in the January 2010 sectarian violence at Tim-Tim
and Kuru-Jenta villages. The arrested suspects, numbering about 200, were caught in
possession of 44 guns, live ammunition, 35 live cartridges as well as bows and arrows.
Some confessed they were paid to foment trouble in the state, others said they
volunteered to join in the killings (24).
The gorilla pattern of terrorist attacks that characterised the Dogo Nahawa massacre has
continued unabated in various parts of Riyom, Barkin Ladi, Bassa, Jos North and Jos South
Local Government Areas.
4.1.13 The 24 December 2010 Terrorist Bombing of Gada Biyu and Kabong Areas of Jos
The first incidence of heavy ballistic sounds suspected to be of bomb blasts in Plateau
state, Nigeria occurred on Monday, 11 February 2002 (Ozohu-Suleiman allafrica.com). This
took place in a night attack on the Jos Main Market, popularly called “the Terminus”, and
located in Jos city. This market had been described as one of the largest markets in West
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Africa. Those who heard the sound attested that it was as if powerful bombs exploded at
different parts of the market. The fire that followed engulfed the entire market, destroying it
completely, and leaving many people in severe misery. This incidence had been preceded by
the eruption of bloody violence in Jos that started five months earlier, precisely on 7
September 2001 which affected different parts of the state. The fighting was basically
between Christians and Muslims. Having started around a mosque in Jos, it quickly spread to
different parts of the state. The fight remained protracted and was eventually what brought
about the Boko Haram terrorism to the public space in Plateau state. Though the
responsibility for the blasts that destroyed the Terminus Main Market in Jos was not claimed
by any known group, many residents of Jos are currently point accusing fingers on Boko
Haram, following recent similar developments.
It was, however, in 2010 that Boko Haram admittedly made their first open violent
appearance in Plateau state. This happened on 24 December 2010, usually referred to as
Christmas Eve, while Christians were busying themselves about and anticipating Christmas
celebration the next day. The terrorists detonated several explosive devices in Gada Biyu and
Kabong settlements in Jos North – areas predominantly occupied by Christians. Boko Haram
announced that they carried out the attacks to retaliate what they called atrocities done to
Muslims in Plateau state and in other parts of Nigeria. They promised to launch more attacks
on the state, which threat they made real by the numerous subsequent bomb blasts and
guerrilla attacks that have been recorded in the state since 2010. The pattern of attack of
Boko Haram in Plateau state, however, is quite deceptive. Their attacks and statements would
seem to attract the sympathy of Muslims, while aggravating Christians to believe that the
Muslims are the ones behind the attacks. Thus, Christians would attempt reprisal attack on
Muslims, while Muslims would also fight back. Hence Boko Haram terrorism had heightened
the cycle of bloody violence in Plateau state.
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4.2 EFFECTS OF BOKO HARAM’S TERRORIST ACTIVITIES ON PLATEAU STATE
The activities of Boko Haram’s religious terrorists produced harmful effects on the people
and environment in Plateau state, as discussed below.
4.2.1 Destruction of Life
Boko Haram’s terrorist activities in Plateau state had brought about the death of so
many people in Plateau state. Considering the colossal loss of life, Ihuah lamented that so
many people had been killed and thousands displaced from their ancestral homes, having lost
their homesteads and farmlands to these religious terrorists (iii). Numerous are the
devastating fatalities that resulted from Boko Haram’s terrorist activities in Plateau state. On
7 March 2010, about 400 inhabitants, mostly children and old women were killed in terrorist
onslaughts in a night raid attributed to Boko Haram at Dogon Nahawa, Zot and Ratsat in the
suburb of Jos. This massacre attracted local and international condemnation in the like of past
major horrors such as My Lai of 16 March 1968, Sabra and Shatila of 16-18 September 1982,
Rwanda of 6 April 1994, and Srebrenica of 11-22 July 1995. The Dogo Nahawa carnage just
turned out to be an early sample or the start of unrelenting terror campaign on the inhabitants
of Plateau state. The state kept experiencing similar mass killings and destruction of property
in targeted settlements of Riyom, Barkin Ladi, Jos South and Bassa Local Government Areas,
coupled with the overt bombing experiences in Jos and Bukuru metropolis (Ishaku 94).
The year, 2010 culminated with the bombing of Kabong and Gada Biyu, two major
Christian settlements in Jos on 24 December, usually called the Christmas Eve which left
over 80 people dead (95). Boko Haram claimed responsibility for the bomb incidence. They
announced that they launched the attacks on Christians in retaliation of what they termed the
atrocities done to Muslims in Plateau state and other parts of Nigeria. They also promised to
carry out more attacks on the state, which they surely did (Punch 28th December 2010). Thus,
violence in Plateau state changed methodologically to religious terrorism campaigns of
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bombing and targeted killings, as more people in the city and villages came under subsequent
attacks.
On 7 July 2012, nine villages in the Garshish district of Barkin Ladi Local
Government Area and three other villages in Riyom Local Government were attacked and
burnt down with over 86 fatalities. The next day, while the Christian funeral service was
being concluded for the mass burial, the terrorists dressed in military fatigue invaded the area,
attacking and killing the helpless mourners. Some of the very important persons (VIPs) killed
during the burial service include Senator Gyang Dalyop Dantong, who was representing
Plateau North senatorial district, and Honourable Gyang Fulani that represented Barkin Ladi
in Plateau state House of Assembly. Honourable Simon Mwadkon, member of the House of
Representative who was representing Barkin Ladi and Riyom Constituency was one of the
mourners who survived the attack. The Boko Haram terrorists equally claimed responsibility
for this attack (Adamu 95).
In a statement allegedly issued by the spokesperson of the sect, Abu Qaqa, he boasted
that “Jama’atu Ahlussunnah Lidda’awati Wal-Jihad wants to inform the world of its delight
over the attacks we launched on Barkin Ladi and Riyom in Plateau State on Christians and
security operatives, including members of the National Assembly”. He added that, “We will
continue to hunt government officials wherever they are; they will have no peace again”
(Logbaby.com).
There have been so much terrorist killings happening almost on daily basis in Plateau
state, forcing Bagudu to decry that human life has lost value in Nigeria, thus, debasing
humanity (28). Apart from the massive terrorist killings and destruction of property at the
rural areas in Plateau state, multiple explosives have been detonated at strategic places within
Jos, Bukuru and other locations leaving behind huge damages. Plateau state had recorded
over 20 bomb incidences between 2010 – 2015, which were target at churches, mosque,
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markets, restaurant, and residential buildings. One of the major destructive attacks occurred
on 20 May 2014. On this day, two explosives were detonated in the city centre of Jos, Plateau
state capital, killing over 118 persons; injuring over 56 others, and burning several shops and
vehicles. Some sources put the death toll to over 150. Car bombs were mainly used to carry
out the attack. The first explosive went off in a market place, while the second exploded near
a bus station. The twin blasts occurred 30 minutes apart; the first at 3:00 PM, and the second
at 3:30 PM (Lipdo 215).
4.2.2 Internally Displaced Persons (IDPs): Refugee Problems
Displaced Persons, under international law are defined as:
persons or groups of persons who have been forced or obligated to flee or to have
cause to leave their homes or place of habitual residence in particular, as a result of or
in order to avoid the effect of armed conflict, situations of generalized violence,
violations of human rights or natural or human-made disasters, and they must have
either remain within their own national borders (as internally displaced persons) or
they must have crossed an internationally recognized state border (as refugees),
(Ladan 9).
Displaced persons, therefore, are of two groupings, namely Refugees and Internally
Displaced Persons (IDPs). While refugees have crossed their national boundaries to take
refuge in other countries, internally displaced persons (IDPs) are taking shelter within their
nation of origin, though outside their original places of abode (Ocha 250). This description
brings up two elements of internal displacement, namely the involuntary or coercive nature of
the movement, and the fact that the movements occur within national borders (Tajudeen 2).
Plateau state, Nigeria suffers a double plight of refugees and internally displaced persons
(IDPs) (Onijala 1).
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The National Emergency Management Agency (NEMA), in September 2015, had
reported the presence of about 325,000 Internally Displaced Persons (IDPs) in Plateau state,
who were victims of Boko Haram terrorist activities in northern Nigeria taking refuge in
various camps in the state. Mallam Abdulsalam Mohammed, then NEMA’s North-Central
Coordinator revealed that the figure was expected to drop significantly, following successes
recorded by the Nigerian army in the fight against Boko Haram (www.plateaustate.gov).
Alhassan Barde, executive secretary, Plateau State Emergency Management Agency later
disclosed that the current statistics of Internally Displaced Persons (IDPs) presently taking
refuge in Plateau state stands at a total of 63,000 persons. Barde expounded that the IDPs
come from Plateau, Borno, Yobe, Adamawa, Taraba, and Nasarawa states
(www.premiumtimes.ng).
The IDPs in various IDPs camps in Plateau state face untold hardships and challenges,
which include harsh/cold weather, lack of food and accommodation, poor infrastructure and
inadequate support from the government. While commenting on the challenges the IDPs are
grappling with, Idegu acquiesces that the people are faced with “bad weather, terrible
accommodation, insufficient food, even diseases”. He lamented further that “fate hurts. But
the deepest cut may be that government has essentially turned its back on those who were
violently pushed out of their comfort zones” (Idegu 1). Meanwhile, the upkeep of the IDPs
has been largely left in the hands of some willing Non-Governmental Organisations (NGOs).
Visits to the camps were so revealing. Leader of Stefanos Foundation, which takes care of the
IDPs camp at Zang Commercial Secondary School, Bukuru, Jos South LGA, Mark Lipdo
complained that the camp is supposed to be a temporary one; however, the relevant agents of
government, such as NEMA, have not lived up to their responsibilities.
The predicament of the IDPs is worsened by the fact that the government has
abandoned them to fate. This is so revealed by the prevailing conditions in the camps. If you
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expect to be welcomed at all when you visit, you must go along with some items, particularly
the edible ones. Their care has been abandoned to the benevolence and philanthropy of the
few NGOs and individuals. Since the parents in the camp have no means to trade or farm in
order to carter for their families, they resort to giving their wards out to interested individuals
and families where the children work as nannies and general house helps, while some of the
parents and children engage in begging or scavenging just to eke out a living. This is one of
the factors that have led to the reduction of the IDPs at the various camps in Plateau state.
The practice, however, is not without its challenges, considering the spate of child
molestation and sexual harassment prevalent in the society. The situation of the IDPs in
Plateau state is quite pathetic.
4.2.3 Destruction of Infrastructure
Public structures and services, such as telecommunications, power supplies, health
centres, school buildings, transportation, water supplies, and road and rail networks,
broadcasting services of radio and television houses have been diversely attacked, damaged
and hampered by the Boko Haram terrorists. Damage to infrastructure in areas of Boko
Haram attacks is so colossal that the federal government of Nigeria ear marked the large sum
of N792.7 billion in the 2017 budget for the purpose of rebuilding infrastructure that have
been destroyed by the Boko Haram terrorists (Ahmed 3).
The cost of rebuilding destroyed infrastructure in Plateau state reveals a lot about the
damage the terrorists have caused the government. Many police and military formations,
bases and barracks have been destroyed. School buildings, hospitals, market structures and
office complexes have been equally damaged. One of the social infrastructures the terrorists
attacked viciously is the telecommunication industry. The model of Boko Haram’s attack on
telecom facilities in Nigeria follows the pattern of the Taliban’s attacks on telecom masts and
services in Afghanistan, further indicating a synergy between Boko Haram and other foreign
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terrorist groups. Boko Haram’s attacks on infrastructure have generated enormous casualty,
service and financial costs on the government, private organisations and individuals (Onuoha
57). Thus, Plateau state has received an unfair share of the destruction of infrastructure from
the Boko Haram terrorists.
4.2.4 Disruption of Economic Activities
The destructive effects of Boko Haram on Plateau state are felt in both foreign and
local investments. Terrorist activities have drastically reduced foreign investments in Plateau
state. Equally, the asymmetric gun attacks and devastating bombings have completely
destabilised the economic activities of individuals and organisations in Plateau state (Best 57).
Boko Haram violence have forced many business people to flee Plateau state to the southern
parts of the country, thereby crumbling certain businesses in the state, while shifting the
attendant economic gains to the southern region. Equally, the growing terror and insecurity in
the state has made many traders in the south to feel unsafe to travel to the state in order to
make purchases of their commodities. The Plateau farmers who depend largely on the south
to consume their farm produces suffer great losses following the unsold products that are left
to spoil, mostly the perishable ones, like vegetables (Ovaga 30).
Boko Haram terrorism has seriously disrupted economic activities in Plateau state.
The Jos ultramodern Terminus market was bombed and razed down following the 2001
protracted violence. Bala J. Takaya, lamenting this incidence opines that: “the Jos ultra-
modern market, the only one of its kind in West Africa, which had brimmed to
capacity…was bombed and destroyed. It was such a colossal loss to the Government and the
traders” (20). Following this incidence, traders moved to the satellite market adjoining the
Terminus market, with many other business people clustering around the market areas.
However, with incessant terrorist bomb attacks on the terminus area, many people have been
killed, and several shops and abundant wares have been destroyed, forcing the state
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government to close down the Terminus satellite market with the attendant frustration on the
surviving traders. Many of the traders are now clustering around the road, making the flow of
traffic very difficult; while some others have left Jos city to other places in search of
livelihood.
Tourism, which had been a major income earner for the state is another aspect of the
economy that has suffered a lot of setbacks, as people are afraid of visiting the numerous
tourist sites in the state. Many foreign nationals from the Western countries that made Jos a
haven due to the favourable weather condition and business opportunities have abandoned the
town and relocated their businesses due to insecurity. Many drinking joints, cinema houses,
football viewing points and recreation centres have folded up. The livelihoods of lots of
people have been destroyed by the terrorist violence. Many bread winners have been killed in
violent attacks, leaving their family members in pitiful conditions. A lot of wealthy people
have become impoverished. The disruption of economic activities in Plateau state can be
blamed for the rise in antisocial activities, such as armed robbery, shop lifting and house
breaking. This condition forced Ishaku to dirge that the economic life in Plateau state has
crumbled, with many of the residents just struggling to survive, due to incessant terror attacks
(46).
4.2.5 Destruction of Social Activities
The Boko Haram sect has unleashed untold pain, sorrow, terror and retrogression on
the educational progress in Nigeria. Many school buildings have been razed down; a
considerable number of students have been killed and numerous others kidnapped, including
school teachers and university lecturers. Boko Haram constitutes both open insult and assault
on conventional or Western system of education. After all, the sobriquet, boko haram,
suggests that Western education is totally forbidden and unacceptable, and as such, must be
fought and replaced with Islamic education. A major case in point is the abduction of the
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close to 300 Chibok school girls. Though many of the girls have not been found, a lot of them
are still missing. There are equally several other abductions of children of school age. These
assaults on schools have made various schools to close down, and forced many school
children out of school. By the time some of the schools reopen, their counterparts would be
ahead of them in many aspects of academic schedules.
Over 1 million children have been forced out of school following Boko Haram
terrorist attacks in northern Nigeria and her neighbouring countries of Niger, Chad and
Cameroon. Manuel Fontaine, the West and Central African Regional Director of the United
Nations Children Fund (UNICEF) reveals that this staggering number of children whose
education is being hampered is an addition to about 11 million children who were previously
out of school in Nigeria, Niger, Chad and Cameroon prior to the onset of Boko Haram
violence. Manuel discloses that most of the schools closed down due to Boko Haram attacks
in northern Nigeria last for over a year before they are reopened, with some of the schools
remaining closed for many years. This is because many of the school buildings are attacked,
looted or burnt down. Over 600 teachers have been killed in Boko Haram insurgency in
Nigeria, making many teachers and children afraid of returning to school. When they return,
the classes are overcrowded due to poor infrastructure. UNICEF and other NGOs help in
providing education to children at IDPs camps. The schools at the IDPs camps in Plateau
state are mere shanties and many of the teachers are volunteers (www.unicef.org).
Corroborating this stance, Mark Lipdo reports that the menace of Boko Haram terrorism has
had a wide range effects on the educational sector, with the killing of over 611 teachers,
displacement of 19,000 other teachers, closing down of 1500 schools, and 950,000 children
being denied the opportunity of being in school (Okakwu www.premiumtimesng.com).
Another area that Boko Haram terrorism has affected academics and the attendant
social services is the survival of the National Youth Service Corps (NYSC) scheme. The
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NYSC programme is considered as a unifying plan in Nigeria. The primary purpose of the
scheme is “to inculcate in Nigerian Youths the spirit of selfless service to the community, and
to emphasise the spirit of oneness and brotherhood of all Nigerians, irrespective of cultural or
social background” (NYSC Handbook 8). The programme is patterned in such a way that on
graduation, Nigerian students are posted to serve mandatorily in a region different from their
birth and school places for a period of one year. This unity plan of the nation has been
endangered by Boko Haram activities in northern Nigerian states. In 2011, of the 4,171
NYSC members posted for service in Adamawa state, who were later trained as ad hoc staff
by Independent National Electoral Commission (INEC) for 2011 elections, not less than 1041
fled the state before the elections on account of Boko Haram terrorism.
Following the killing of many of the corps members in some northern states in the
same 2011, many of them crowded the NYSC national secretariat in Abuja with the demand
to be reposted out of northern states. Till date, corps members still protest against being
posted to crisis-ridden states such as Plateau, Bauchi, Adamawa, Borno, Yobe, and etcetera.
Some of them have vowed to quit the scheme should they be forced to serve in such places
they consider as death zones. Many parents have called for the scrapping of NYSC
programme, following fatal terrorist attacks on the corps members. Governor Kashim
Shettima reacted swiftly to the decision of the Federal government not to post NYSC
members to some states in northern Nigeria. While appealing to the Federal government to
reconsider the decision, the governor regretted the negative effects the decision will have on
the education and health sectors of his state. This is due to the fact that corps members
provide over 65 per cent of the total education and healthcare services at the rural areas where
about 75 per cent of the citizens are living (Ovaga 30).
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Furthermore, So many places of worship have been destroyed by the Boko Haram
terrorists in Plateau state. Churches and mosques have suffered various degrees of attacks
from the terrorists, including the killing of clergymen and worshippers, looting of worship
places, destruction of church and mosque buildings, and displacement of worshippers
(Okakwu 2). Attack on places of worship has been quite frequent in Plateau state.
Police respondents revealed various attacks on places of worship in Plateau state. On
20 March 2010, there was a bomb blast between Church of Christ in Nations (COCIN) and
First Baptist church in Bukuru, Jos South LGA by suspected terrorists. Another heavy bomb
blast was recorded at COCIN headquarters in Jos, Jos North LGA on 26 February 2012 that
killed not less than two persons. Two suicide bombers further attacked Saint Finbarr’s church
in Jos around 10:40 AM on 11 March 2012, killing 5 and injuring 3 persons. Again, a suicide
bomber detonated explosives in a gulf car at Christ Chosen church, Jos, Jos North LGA on 10
June 2012; though the number of casualties could not be ascertained. Another attack occurred
on 5 July 2015, when a mosque was bombed at Yan Taya, at the city centre of Jos by
suspected Boko Haram terrorists. The explosions and killings that took place at the mosque
are widely held by respondents to be a vengeance assault on Sheik Sani Yahaya, one of the
victims, who was encouraging the Muslims to live peacefully with their neighbours.
Following the mosque bomb blast, a large number of Muslims gathered and attacked
two church buildings located close to the mosque. Saint Michael’s Parish of the First African
Church Mission near the mosque was completely burnt down, while Evangelical Church
Winning All (ECWA) at the Terminus area suffered different degrees of damage
(www.bpnews.net). Thus, one of the antics of Boko Haram terrorists in Plateau state has been
to incite the Muslims against the Christians, and vice versa. This incitement has led to several
reprisal attacks between Christians and Muslims, resulting in killings, looting, damage to
property and destruction of places of worship.
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4.2.6 Hampering of Agricultural Activities
Nigeria’s National Emergency Management Agency announced that over 17,000
farmers have fled northern Nigeria to the southern part of the country since 2012, following
Boko Haram terrorism (Takaya 15). Most of these escapees are youths who constitute the
working force in agriculture in Plateau state. Plateau state is one of the states in northern
Nigeria whose farmers are worst hit by Boko Haram terrorists. Agriculture is a major means
of livelihood in the state. This is proven by the quantity of agricultural products that leave the
state in Lorries daily to the southern parts of the country. There are crops that appear to be
produced in the state more than other parts of Nigeria, such as Irish potatoes, tomatoes,
varieties of pepper, cabbage, carrot, peas, green beans, acha (Hungary rice) and other
assorted grains, vegetables and tubers.
The production of these crops has become a very serious challenge due to the fact that
farmers are always attacked and killed on their way to the farm, on the farmland, and in their
communities by suspected the terrorists. One of the important recent terrorist attacks involved
a first class traditional ruler in the state, Lazarus Agai, who was ambushed and killed together
with his driver and two of his aids on their way from a farm located in Sha community within
his jurisdiction. The murdered monarch was holding the title of Saf Ron Kulere, which is a
first class traditional status in Plateau state. The state government confirmed that the
paramount ruler and his entourage were killed by the terrorists, who did not spare a survival
among the victims (Abba 13). This is just one among countless incidences of attacks on
farmers in Plateau state.
The terrorist attacks on the farming population of Plateau state have been blamed on
Boko Haram. Many agricultural communities in the state have been sacked through multiple
terrorist onslaughts, mostly on the villages of Barkin Ladi, Riyom, Bassa, and Jos South
Local Government Areas. Writing on this menace, Nankin Bagudu retorts that Plateau state is
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under the siege of terrorism, as the scourge of killings, destruction of property and
displacement of agricultural rural communities continue unabated. Bagudu is saddened that
most of these farming communities under attack in Plateau state have been failed by the
government, as they lack the presence of government, security of life and property and basic
infrastructure; noting that this is why “entire farming communities have been wiped out by
these marauding murderers” (25-29). There are instances when crops growing on the farms
are completely destroyed by the attackers. These incessant attacks have made the farmers to
abandon many of their farmlands. The attendant effect is that farm produces are not as much
as before, contributing to hunger and hike in the price of agricultural commodities.
4.2.7 Widespread Insecurity
Terror connotes fear, horror, dread, shock, panic, fright, trepidation, and intimidation
(Ishaku 101). All these terms are synonymous with the general insecurity that characterise the
daily life of people in Plateau state. The spate of bombings, destructions, serial attacks and
assassinations, rape and kidnapping constantly being carried out by the jihadists have created
an atmosphere of fear, intimidation and general insecurity in Jos and various parts of Plateau
state. Cars are parked hundreds of metres away from worship places; bags are not allowed
into mosques or church buildings; scanners are used to search interested worshippers and
road blocks are mounted during worship hours. Many roads close to places of worship are
blocked until praying time is over. Many parents fear to send their children to school in
Plateau state. Many are so apprehensive that there might be an unannounced attack at any
given time. This insecurity has led many men to move their family members to stay with their
relatives in other safer places. People hardly sleep soundly. Thus, Boko Haram terrorism has
brought untold disquiet, fear, and general insecurity on the inhabitants of Plateau state (Peter
12).
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4.2.8 Environmental Pollution
Pollution entails “the addition to the environment of substances that cannot be
rendered harmless by normal biological processes” (Isaacs 974). The harmful activities of
Boko Haram result to the pollution of the air, water and land. The various chemicals the
terrorists used to produce explosives and smokes from explosions have a lot of harmful
effects on the people, animals and their habitats. Many people have died of the chemical
effects of the pollutants, while some others are suffering from various diseases as a result of
the pollution (Owoseye 3).
Similarly, according to a UNICEF report released on 30 August 2017, the Boko
Haram terrorists have destroyed 75 per cent of water and sanitation infrastructure in Plateau
and some other northern states in Nigeria. The water and sanitation systems are attacked,
damaged by the Boko Haram terrorists and abandoned in disrepair to the point of total
collapse. This has the potential danger of the outbreak of cholera, diarrhoea and other water
borne diseases (Polycarp 5).
Boko Haram has been variously accused of poisoning water bodies and destroying
water facilities in Plateau state. The explosive weapons they use in bombing attacks produce
toxic materials that pollute the air, water and land. As a consequence, the fertility of the land
is also destroyed by the toxins. Water is polluted and the aquatic animals die because they
could neither drink nor breathe in the water in which they lived. The water became so useless
for drinking, cooking, bathing and washing. Air pollution has equally caused various diseases
related to the vital organs of the body, such as the heart, lungs and liver. The pollutants
resulting from Boko Haram activities, therefore, have devastating effects on human beings,
animals and their habitats (Peter 18).
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4.2.9 Destruction of Peace and Stability in Plateau State
While describing the peace, beauty and serenity of Plateau state, and Jos, its capital,
Ishaku wrote the following interesting piece:
The greatest asset and the greatest liability of the city of Jos are one and the same – its
geography…the geology of the plateau makes for a rich endowment of natural
resources especially solid mineral deposits. The boom in the tin industry of the Jos
Plateau in the first half of the twentieth century also encouraged the influx of ethnics
and nationals, making Jos the first cosmopolitan city in the West African region…its
physical geographical attributes – centrality, balmy weather, undulating hills, solid
mineral deposits – and its cultural features – cosmopolitanism, religious pluralism, and
peaceful disposition of its inhabitants – combine to give the town the appellation of
“Home of Peace and Tourism.” It is regarded as the pearl of the Northern Region for
people who believe that all the land lying north of the River Niger constitute the
political north of Nigeria. Others regard it as the natural headquarters of the Middle
Belt, the central belt stretching from Zuruland in the west to the sprawling Jos and
Bauchi plateaux, at the middle, to the Tivland and Kwararafaland, at the lower Benue
valley, onto Buraland, Bwatiyeland and Kilbaland on the western slope on the Mandara
mountainous range in the east (59-60).
The beautiful description of Plateau state as given by Ishaku could pass for a nice poem
or a sweet song. However, all these have become a thing of the past, as the same writer
regrets to admit that the “home of peace and tourism” has lost its innocence and has now
become the “home of peace in full throes of war” (79). Hence, the incessant terrorist attacks
and consequent reprisal attacks in Plateau state have led to the destruction of peace and
stability in the state. A good number of those interviewed revealed that they lived in constant
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fear and uneasiness. They stated that they were so afraid of going out at night, because they
would not know if they might return alive.
4.3 ETHICAL IMPLICATIONS OF BOKO HARAM’S TERRORIST ACTIVITIES IN
PLATEAU STATE
The harmful activities and negative effects of Boko Haram’s terrorism in Plateau state
had raised various ethical issues, problems and implications.
i. Ethical Implication of the Destruction of Life
Boko Haram has made the destruction of life a common activity in such a way that
life has lost its humanity, sacredness, sanctity, holiness, purity and value. Life is an important
thing. Life, however, has lost its unique, distinctive quality in the destructive experiences of
the Boko Haram’s religious terrorist activities. God alone is the creator and giver of life. In
the holy bible, God’s command clearly forbids murder or the deliberate killing of any human
being (Exodus 20:13). Consequently, it is unlawful for anyone to intentionally take the life of
another person for whatever reason, be it provocation, anger, or injury.
Thus, the Boko Haram terrorists are guilty of blood. They move about with their
hands stained with the blood of innocent people; yet claiming to be devout believers. The
slashing of throats of people, shootings, assassinations, bombings, suicide bombings of
human targets that had been carried out by Boko Haram terrorists reveal them to be callous,
heartless, unsympathetic, cruel, pitiless, merciless, cold-hearted, hard-hearted, sadistic and
insensitive to the suffering of other people.
ii. Ethical Implication of the Destruction of Infrastructure
Boko Haram terrorists had destroyed houses, blown up bridges, burnt down school
buildings, damaged telecommunication, roads, parks, markets and other facilities. When
Boko Haram destroy infrastructure, they have denied the people the freedom of movement.
Even if someone had the money, there is little on nothing he could do, since he could not
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move around or access the required services. People’s responsibility of going to the market to
feed the family would be hampered. Heads of families could lose their responsibility of
catering for the family.
This could lead to emotional problems such as depression, frustration, stress, anxiety,
hopelessness, worry, distress, and desperation. Someone could become quite tensed. These
conditions could lead to physical and mental illnesses. Some might commit suicide. It could
become difficult for an individual to take on an intelligent discussion. It takes only a few
people who have very strong moral character to resist such situations. In so many people, it
takes time for them to come down to a normal state of mind. People will lose moral courage.
People will not be in a state of fortitude. They will become completely disorganised.
iii. Ethical Implication of Internally Displaced Persons (IDPs) Problem
Having been displaced, the internally displaced persons become seriously emotionally
disturbed, disorganised, unstable, depressed, frustrated, stressed, worrisome, feeling
despondent, and looking at life from a hopeless point of view. Because of desperation, they
can take any decision or action, not minding the cost. Women can start committing adultery
to survive. There will be the problem of rape, prostitution, stealing, and other moral vices.
People will become morally wicked. They may admit that some decisions they take and
wrong actions they engage in are bad, but they will say that they have no other option. Some
men may become sexually enraged; perhaps their wives were equally displaced or separated
from them, or killed. Even if the privacy is not complete, they may not mind to engage in
sexual activities.
People’s moral strength would have become fragile. There is hardly what they may do
to safeguard personal integrity. Water is not enough. Food, cosmetics, upkeep are not enough.
People should be sympathetic of such internally displaced persons, giving understanding to
their predicament and fragile situations. Their conditions have made them weak and
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indefensible. The Internally Displaced Persons camp has provided a very weak moral
environment because of the consistent sufferings, agonies, pains, anguish, and sadness people
are going through. Even if the people are religious, the conditions they are subjected to make
them ignore upright living. Many descent men and women may do shameful, embarrassing
things. Some may be telling lies to help to save their situations. The internally displaced
persons are in constant hunger and lack basic things needed for day to day activities.
iv. Ethical Implications of the Destruction of Social Activities
Boko Haram’s religious terrorist activities caused the destruction of social activities in
Plateau state, such as religious worship centres, police stations and military bases, recreation
centres, weddings, birthdays, cultural festivals, sports, recreational activities, tourism, and
hospitality management.
Because churches and mosques were destroyed simultaneously, the cordial
relationship that existed between Christians and Muslims were tarnished, obscure, distorted,
and spoiled. This was so because there was a mutual prejudice, suspicion, distrust, lack of
confidence between Christians and Muslims. Christians thought that the Muslims were the
ones who constituted Boko Haram and destroyed their churches, while the Muslims thought
that the Christians were the ones who were destroying their mosques on revenge missions.
Therefore, Boko Haram’s religious terrorist activities intensified suspicion, prejudice, distrust
and lack of confidence between Christians and Muslims in Plateau state. This affects inter-
personal, inter-group, and inter-religious relationships. There is no trust between the two
groups. Everything is negatively interpreted suspiciously.
Boko Haram religious terrorists frequently attacked Police stations and military bases.
They destroyed these security facilities and created great fears among civilians. As a result,
the terrorist violence affects the morale of the security forces and the widespread moral
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support of Nigeria civilians or members of the public. It requires a reasonable effort to re-
encourage the security forces and members of the public.
Due to Boko Haram’s terrorist activities, the enthusiasm and happiness with which
the people of Plateau state engage in recreational activities, weddings, cultural festivals,
birthday parties and sports were badly discouraged, because of the tremendous attacks Boko
Haram terrorists have been unleashing on the people of Plateau state. Consequently, the great
joy and celebration people derive from these activities have been cut down due to Boko
Haram’s terrorism.
v. Ethical Implication of the Destruction of Agricultural Activities
Farmers in Plateau state had been chased away by Boko Haram religious terrorists.
Farms and farmers were violently attacked, and while farmers were killed, their crops were
destroyed. The terrorist activities immediately brought about widespread hunger in the state,
because of the scarcity of food. This situation had compared the people of Plateau state to
look for food from other states of the federation. As a result, the morale of the farmers in
Plateau state was badly damaged. Many farmers cannot go back to their farms for the fear of
their lives. In this context, the people need moral encouragement and material provision from
the government of the federation and international community in order to start farming again.
Consequently, food security became a major challenge to farmers, government and
international community. Apart from the food insecurity in the state, there was a general
insecurity in Plateau state. As a result, the people had tremendous fear of traveling to places,
going to the farm or engaging in various forms of public activities in Plateau state. As a result,
industrial entrepreneurs could not come to Plateau state for business.
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vi. Ethical Implication of Environmental Pollution
Boko Haram’s religious terrorists had engaged in various forms of violent attacks and
destructive activities which involved the use of toxic chemicals, poisons and burning which
produced heavy smoke in the areas affected. Consequently, a number of areas in Plateau state
had suffered from environmental pollution comprising land pollution, water pollution and air
pollution. The places affected became dangerous for human life, as the toxic chemicals,
poisons and heavy smoke could cause various forms of illnesses. Diseases associated with
pollution are quite dangerous to human survival, including lung cancer, stroke, ischaemic
heart disease, acute lower respiratory infection in children among others.
vii. Ethical Implication of Disruption of Peace and Stability in Plateau state
Boko Haram’s religious terrorists in Plateau state had occasionally disrupted peace
and stability in certain places at various times. The disruption of peace and stability was
brought about by suicide bombing, burning of buildings, shooting of persons, killings, and
kidnapping. The news of these violent activities usually disrupted peace and stability in
Plateau state. The disruption of peace and stability was viewed by the people as a failure on
the part of the government which has the responsibility to provide adequate security for her
citizens. Because of this instability, government had to work hard to restore people’s
confidence in security forces and government’s competence to deal with such situations
effectively, in order to restore peace and stability.
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CHAPTER FIVE
SUMMARY, CONTRIBUTION TO KNOWLEDGE, RECOMMENDATIONS, AND
CONCLUSION
The preceding chapters of this study have presented a comprehensive and detailed
understanding of Boko Haram, and have also described the character of the various effects of
their terrorist acts in Plateau state. In this chapter, the researcher has summarised the work,
made recommendations, spelt out the contribution to knowledge and given concluding
remarks based on the findings of the study.
5.1 SUMMARY
This thesis has studied the ethical issues in Boko Haram’s religious terrorism in
Plateau state, Nigeria. The study critically examined the ideology of Boko Haram, which, it
was discovered, to be deeply rooted in Salafi jihadism (Salafism). Salafism is an aspect of
Islam that seeks to purge the religion of every outside influence while striving to return the
Muslims to the kind of Islam which was practiced by those considered as the pious ancestors
(Muhammad and the early Islamic community). This school of Islamic thought interprets
everything western as religious deviation and consequently unislamic. They consider western
influence on Islamic society as the reason for Islam’s weakness in the society. Therefore, they
declared western education, and of course all western institutions as haram (forbidden), and
as such, should be avoided and fought against by all Muslims. Various issues were
discovered to be responsible for Boko Haram activities in Plateau state. Some of the factors
include poverty, manipulation of religion, politics, and perennial conflict in northern Nigeria,
and fundamentalist Islamic ideology.
The study equally revealed that the effects of Boko Haram on Plateau state are rather
destructive and harmful. This is seen in the large number of lives and property that have been
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destroyed in the state following Boko Haram’s religious terrorist attacks. Many people have
been killed through various assault tactics that have been employed by the terrorists,
including guerrilla attacks, armed assaults, targeted assassinations, drive-by-shootings, use of
Improvised Explosive Divices (IEDs) and suicide bombing. Churches were bombed during
Sunday services in order to produce as many casualties as possible. Mosques were attacked
where the imams condemned the activities of the sect. Also targeted and attacked were police,
prison and military personnel and formations, civil servants, business men and farmers,
children, youths and adults, markets, hospitals, parks, hotels, cinemas, recreation centres,
restaurants, drinking joints and schools. Boko Haram attacks have been carried out in both
city centres and rural areas in Plateau state. Other effects of the religious terrorists include
internally displaced persons (IDPs) problems, destruction of infrastructure, disruption of
economic activities, hampering of agricultural activities, widespread insecurity,
environmental pollution, destruction of educational progress, and disruption of peace and
stability. As a result, the people of Plateau state have experienced emotional problems such as
trauma, depression, frustration, stress, distress, worry, hopelessness and desperation in
different degrees. In the context of this situation, there have been tension, threat and fear
among the people of Plateau state.
The study has then made some recommendations. Religious terrorism should be
included in the educational curriculum in Nigeria. Sound theological education should be
inculcated by Christians and Muslims. Adequate and sustainable welfare programmes should
be provided for internally displaced persons (IDPs). Comprehensive reconciliation,
rehabilitation and reconstruction should be carried out in Plateau state. Finally, for efficient,
creative, innovative, effective, productive and prompt service delivery by the security agents,
maximum funding and effective equipment should be provided promptly in order to maintain
and sustain high morale among them.
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The study, therefore, has achieved its desired aim of investigating the Boko Haram’s
religious terrorist organisation in Plateau state in terms of the nature of their activities, causes
of their activities, effects of their activities and making appropriate suggestions as to the ways
of tackling Boko Haram terrorism in Nigeria. The study has contributed to the understanding
of the problem of Boko Haram. It has exposed the way the terrorists reason, behave, plan, and
carry out their activities. It has equally shown how the minds of the religious terrorists are
morally devoid of emotions – how they are totally hardened to human feelings. The study
recognises the fact that human beings are created by God who demands worship and forbids
murder. As rational and moral beings, every human person is liable to the consequences of
his or her right or wrong actions. This principle of divine judgment is being upheld by
Christianity as well as Islam. This is stated clearly in the consequentialist ethical theory
which states that the rightness or wrongness of a person’s action is judged by the
consequences of those actions. Thus, the terrorists cannot escape judgment. The thesis
upholds the virtues of peace, love, unity, mercy, kindness, tolerance, mutual co-existence and
interdependence, and discourages fighting, killing, assassinations, shootings, bombings,
rebellion, war, hatred, and intolerance.
5.2 CONTRIBUTION TO KNOWLEDGE
The study has made both academic and social contributions to knowledge. The
research has revealed that religious terrorism is present and active in Plateau state. The Boko
Haram terrorists have functional cells in Plateau state. They use various disguising tactics to
carry out their attacks on the people both at the towns and villages. Thus, the antics of the
terrorists have been uncovered by the study.
Boko Haram’s religious terrorism has caused a major division among Plateau state
residents along religious lines. The religious divide affects a lot of issues in the day to day
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activities in the state. There is mutual suspicion and distrust between the Christians and the
Muslims. The situation is so bad such that people now reside at places where the adherents of
their own faith are the majority. That is, Christians live only among Christians, while
Muslims live among Muslims. Purchase of land, house or other property is also viewed from
religious angle.
The study further contributed to knowledge by revealing that Boko Haram’s attacks in
Plateau state were patterned in such a way as to intensify confusion and enmity between the
Christians and the Muslims. The terrorists started their first attacks in Plateau state on
Christians and their property, while making public statements that their mission was to
avenge the killings of Muslims in Plateau state. By this, the terrorists seemed to attract the
sympathy of unsuspecting Muslims. The attacks enraged the Christians, and they carried out
counter attacks on the Muslims because they thought the Muslims were the Boko Haram
terrorists that attacked the Christians. The Muslims equally carried out retaliatory attacks on
the Christians.
In the course of time, however, the Boko Haram terrorists equally attacked mosques
and killed Muslims in Jos. Infuriated by this, the Muslims who suspected the Christians for
the attack fought Christians and burnt down church buildings. This cycle of reprisals has
continued in Plateau state. Thus, the Boko Haram terrorists are using both the Christians and
Muslims to further their terrorist agenda. This has affected inter-personal, inter-group, and
inter-religious relationships. There is no trust between the two groups. Everything is
negatively interpreted suspiciously. Boko Haram’s religious terrorist activities have
intensified suspicion, prejudice, distrust and lack of confidence between Christians and
Muslims in Plateau state. It is pertinent, therefore, for both the Christians and the Muslims in
Plateau state to know that the real enemy is the terrorist, Boko Haram, who can go under any
possible guise to incite, terrorise and destroy the people.
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Further contribution of this study in the academic field is that it has provided a broad
understanding of Boko Haram’s religious terrorism. The study has increased our
understanding of the nature of Boko Haram’s religious terrorist activities, such as suicide
bombing, use of Improvised Explosive Devices (IEDs) in crowded places, assassinations,
kidnappings, burning down of buildings, attacking security forces, guerrilla warfare, drive-by
shootings, attacks at market places and parks as well as attacks at churches and mosques.
The study has identified the major cause of the activities of Boko Haram in Plateau
state. The major cause is their rejection of Western civilisation, which includes Western
education, science, technology, medicine, law, governance, and social relationships. In this
context, the study has adequately provided required information about the nature, and effects
of Boko Haram as well as appropriate solutions to the problem arising from Boko Haram’s
religious terrorist activities in Plateau state. Therefore, the study has added a scholarly source
of information for further studies.
5.3 RECOMMENDATIONS
The religious terrorist activities of Boko Haram in Plateau state reflects their
onslaughts in other northern Nigerian states where they had carried out their attacks and, of
course, reveals the state of insecurity prevalent in the nation. This has warranted a
generalisation of the recommendations to a national context. Thus, the recommendations set
forth in this section will benefit both Plateau state and the entire country. These
recommendations will be helpful to the categories of the government, security agencies and
entire citizenry.
The following recommendations have been made in tackling Boko Haram’s religious
terrorist activities.
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i. For understanding the nature, causes and effects of Boko Haram’s terrorist activities
in Plateau state, Federal government of Nigeria should create a widespread public
awareness of all Nigerians through national policy on education. Religious terrorism
should be introduced in the educational curriculum from Primary Schools to
Universities across Nigeria.
ii. Christians, Muslims and other religious believers should include religious terrorism in
their sermons, preachings, teachings, conferences, seminars, retreats, fellowships,
publications and constitutions. The implementation of this recommendation should be
vigorously pursued and enforced by the highest authorities concerned, such as
bishops’ conference, synod, Muslim ulama or Islamic leaders among others.
iii. Religious terrorism should be made a subject of public dialogue in which individuals,
groups, human rights activists, professional bodies, labour unions, Non-Governmental
Organisations (NGOs) and the Mass Media should be actively involved in creating
public awareness on religious terrorism in Nigeria.
iv. Religious terrorism should be made a topic for public lectures, addresses, talks,
speeches and discourses in educational institutions, civil service fora, parastatals,
private sectors and security agencies in order to create public awareness on religious
terrorism in Nigeria.
v. Internally Displaced Persons (IDPs), as the products of Boko Haram’s terrorist
violence should be given adequate attention for the purpose of their welfare, security,
reconciliation, rehabilitation and reconstruction by the Federal government of Nigeria,
state governments, local government areas, humanitarian organisations,
philanthropists and religious organisations.
vi. For efficient, creative, effective, successful and prompt management of Boko
Haram’s religious terrorism by security agencies, maximum funding and provision of
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equipment should be promptly made available within a specific time in which they are
needed. In addition, the welfare of the security agencies should be made the highest
priority of government in order to maintain and sustain a high morale among them.
5.4 CONCLUSION
The study has examined the ethical issues in Boko Haram’s religious terrorism in
Plateau state. The study discovered that the Boko Haram relgious terrorists have carried out
destructive activities in Plateau state. They have used various tactics to carry out their attacks
on the people both at the urban and rural areas, including guerrilla warfare, bombing,
shooting, assassination and burning down of buildings. Boko Haram’s religious terrorism has
caused a widespread destruction of life and property in Plateau state. Many people were
killed in different places, and property was destroyed on a larger scale, such as churches,
mosques, police stations, military bases, markets and houses. As a result, the people of
Plateau state have experienced emotional problems such as trauma, depression, frustration,
stress, distress, worry, hopelessness and desperation in different degrees. In the context of
this situation, there have been tension, threat and fear among the people of Plateau state. The
study has then made some recommendations. Religious terrorism should be included in the
educational curriculum in Nigeria. Sound theological education should be inculcated by
Christians and Muslims. Adequate and sustainable welfare programmes should be provided
for internally displaced persons (IDPs). Comprehensive reconciliation, rehabilitation and
reconstruction should be carried out in Plateau state. Finally, for efficient, creative,
innovative, effective, productive and prompt service delivery by the security agents,
maximum funding and effective equipment should be provided promptly in order to maintain
and sustain high morale among them. It behoves on the people of Plateau state to see the
Boko Haram as a common enemy, form a common front despite their religious differences,
and join hands with the government in order to defeat the Boko Haram terrorists.
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APPENDIX I
LIST OF RESPONDENTS
S/NO NAME AGE OCCUPATION PLACE OF
INTERVIEW
DATE
1. Victor Micheal 13 Student Vom 04/05/2015
2. Favour Dagwi 12 Student Vom 04/05/2015
3. Samuel Silas 13 Student Vom 04/05/2015
44. Irimiya Markus 11 Pupil Vom 04/05/2015
5. Jerry Dung 11 Pupil Vom 04/05/2015
6. Jeremiah Gyang 13 Student Vom 05/05/2015
7. Esther Gyang 12 Student Vom 05/05/2015
8. Francis Bulus 13 Student Vom 05/05/2015
9. Isaac Gyang 12 Student Vom 05/05/2015
10. Pam Dung 10 Pupil Vom 07/05/2015
11. Sandra Davou 10 Pupil Vom 07/05/2015
12. Cynthia Davou 11 Pupil Vom 07/05/2015
13. Gloria Markus 12 Student Vom 07/05/2015
14. Benjamin Dalyop 09 Pupil Vom 07/05/2015
15. Wilfred Iliya 10 Pupil Vom 07/05/2015
16. Gyang Sunday 12 Student Vom 07/05/2015
17. Chungdung Dalyop 12 Student Vom 07/05/2015
18. Daniel Davou 13 Student Vom 07/05/2015
19. Suzanna Samuel 12 Student Vom 07/05/2015
20. Kefas Bulus 12 Student Vom 08/05/2015
21. Emmanuel Dazi 12 Student Vom 08/05/2015
22. Silas Sailus 10 Pupil Vom 08/05/2015
23. Joshua Daniel 10 Pupil Vom 08/05/2015
24. Evelyn Markus 11 Pupil Vom 08/05/2015
25. Won Ibrahim 12 Student Vom-
Chugwui
08/05/2015
26. Goodluck Emmanuel 08 Pupil Vom 08/05/2015
27. Daniel Joshua 09 Pupil Vom 08/05/2015
28. Patience Dalyop 12 Student Vom 08/05/2015
29. Lilian Samuel 12 Student Kassa 16/07/2015
30. Godfrey Gyang 14 Student Kassa 16/07/2015
31. Grace Ilisha 11 Pupil Kassa 16/07/2015
32. Saratu Andrew 12 Student Pankshin 07/02/2016
33. Fwenji Kefas 11 Pupil Pankshin 07/02/2016
34. Nangar Moses 12 Student Pankshin 07/02/2016
35. Sunday Danjuma 12 Student Langtang 03/05/2016
36. Nanma Vongnar 11 Pupil Langtang 03/05/2016
37. Ponfwan Vwannar 13 Student Langtang 03/05/2016
38. Godfrey Joseph 11 Pupil Bacit 17/01/2017
39. Reuben Gyang 11 Pupil Bacit 17/01/2017
40. Godwin Ayuba 13 Student Bokkos 23/02/2017
41. Gideon Monday 12 Student Dangyel 04/03/2017
42. Wilfred Choji 11 Pupil Gyel 06/03/2017
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44. Abraham Solomon 09 Pupil Gyel 06/03/2017
45. Emmanuel Bitrus 12 Student Barkin Ladi 06/06/2017
46. Rebbeca Chollom 13 Student Barkin Ladi 06/06/2017
47. Patience Peter 12 Student Barkin Ladi 06/06/2017
48. Sarah Chung Dung 11 Pupil Barkin Ladi 06/06/2017
49. Saleh Zakka 10 Pupil Barkin Ladi 06/06/2017
50. Micheal Emmanuel 11 pupil Rokon, Barkin
Ladi
06/06/2017
51. Moses Lepshak 13 Student Shendam 14/07/2017
52. Nandom David 14 Student Shendam 14/07/2017
53. Gungshang Nicolas 13 Student Shendam 14/07/2017
54. Victor Elisha 10 Pupil Shendam 14/07/2017
55. Shangsuar Emmanuel 12 Student Shendam 14/07/2017
56. Golfoji Gad 09 Pupil Shendam 14/07/2017
57. Nendrimwa Sunday 12 Student Shendam 14/07/2017
58. Shedrack Yohanna 12 Student Shendam 14/07/2017
59. Ngem Davou 14 Student Chugui 02/08/2017
60. Miracle Markus 10 Pupil Chugui 02/08/2017
61. Shemai Daniel 12 Student Mikang 07/09/2017
62. Alpha Apollos 10 Pupil Mikang 07/09/2017
63. Emdong Daniel 12 Student Mikang 07/09/2017
64. Meshak Dachung 12 Student Haita 17/09/2017
65. Pam Gyang 12 Student Turu 23/09/2017
66. Joel gyang 12 Student Turu 05/10/2017
67. Victoria Moses 11 Student Turu 05/10/2017
68. Pam Dung 13 Student Jol 16/10/2017
69. Vairat Joshua 11 Pupil Dagwiluwal 21/10/2017
70. Luka Sunday 12 Student Kogom 25/10/2017
71. Jere Dagwi 10 Pupil Dagupyam 03/11/2017
72. Abel Mala 47 Civil servant Bukuru 21/02/18
73. Paulina Stephen 33 Civil servant Bukuru 23/05/18
74. Putbak Christy Ezekiel 34 Civil servant Bukuru 23/05/18
75. Salome Augustine 30 Civil servant Tal, Pankshin 21/02/18
76. Dashe Dennis 32 Teacher Bukuru/Panks
hin
21/02/18
77. Lyop Monday 53 Civil servant Vwang 21/02/18
78. Monday Chung Gyang 57 Teacher Vwang 21/02/18
79. Ishaya Hassan 43 teacher Bukuru/Mang
u
21/02/18
80. Manji Habakkuk Yafet 33 Civil servant Bukuru/Mang
u
21/02/18
81. Godiya Manji 28 Cook Mbar, Bokkos 21/02/18
82. Sgt Nanfa Bande 34 Police Counter
terrorist
Jos Base,
Bukuru
23/05/18
83. SP Ali Obed Masoyi 49 Police Counter
terrorist
Counter
Terrorism
Unit, Base 14,
13/06/18
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85. ASP Nuhu Teng 48 Bomb Squad Police Hqtrs,
Jos
21/05/18
86. Sgt Gadong Kumkur 41 Bomb Squad Police Hqtrs,
Jos
21/05/18
87. Sgt Emmanuel
Danjuma
38 Bomb Squad Police Hqtrs,
Jos
21/05/18
88. DSP Cyprain Dariya 48 EOD(Bomb
Squad)
Commander
Police
Headquarters,
Jos
21/05/18
89. Ngovo Gyang 60 Farmer Hwak 17/3/2015
90. Sunday Gyang 34 Farmer Hwak 17/3/2015
91. Dagyang Davou 42 Driver Kuru 06/08/2015
92. Ezra Pam 45 Bricklayer Kuru 09/09/2015
93. Ezekiel Dung 50 Teacher Vom 19/10/2016
94. Moses Jang 48 Shoe Cobbler Nafok 26/10/2016
95. Gwom Pam 52 Farmer Nafok 26/10/2016
96. Gwom Tsok 67 Farmer Nafok 26/10/2016
97. Gwom Ali 70 Businessman Igip 28/10/2016
98. Rev Dung Choji 56 Clergy Bukuru 03/11/2016
99. Abu Mohammed 63 Imam Bukuru 03/11/2016
100. Rev Onye Declan 46 Clergy Jos 04/11/2016
101. Kahlid Wada 43 Imam Jos 04/11/2016
102. ASP Ajik Azih 59 Police Jos 18/12/2016
103. Sgt Miri Y. 32 Police Jos 18/12/2016
104. Vonkur Moses 67 Police (rtd) Dorowa 20/12/2016
105. Sgt Hassan Abdu 28 Soldier Rayfield 03/01/2017
106. Cpl Jude Ossai 21 Soldier Rayfeild 03/01/2017
107. Margret Gwom 38 Banker Bukuru 26/03/2017
108. Pam Dung 50 Mason Riyom 26/03/2017
109. Damaris Mohammed 65 Teacher(rtd) Riyom 26/03/2017
110. John Pam 40 Farmer Riyom 26/03/2017
111. Amarachi Igwe 31 Trader Lahol Chom 07/04/2017
112. Chinelo Onu 50 Trader Lahol Chom 07/04/2017
113. Fatai Moshood 52 Tailer Bukuru 17/05/2017
114. Odabe Francis 72 Trader Bukuru 17/05/2017
115. Godwin Onuh 38 Trader Gyero Road 17/05/2017
116. Dung Davou 53 Mason Gyel 05/08/2017
117. Joshua Onoja 41 Barber Gyel 05/08/2017
118. Amed Suleiman 48 Imam Jos 17/08/2016
119. Tijjani Ahmed 43 Imam Jos 17/08/2016
120. Mohammed Alkafawi 40 Imam Jos 17/08/2016
121. Rev Yakubu Pam 53 CAN Chairman Jos 22/05/18
122. Dr. Khalid 60 JNI Secretary Kaduna 12/10/14
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APPENDIX II
LETTER OF INTRODUCTION
Dear Respondent,
The researcher, Francis Augustine Obasi is a Ph.D student of the Department of
Religion and Cultural Studies, Faculty of Arts, Benue State University, Makurdi
(BSU/REL/Ph.D/12/1763). He is carrying out a research on the Ethical Issues in the Boko
Haram’s Religious Terrorism in Plateau State, Nigeria.
He solicits your responses to his interview questions. Be assured that the information
you may provide will be used only for research purposes, and must be treated with utmost
confidentiality. Therefore, feel free to give your opinion.
Thanks for your cooperation.
Francis Augustine Obasi
Researcher
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APPENDIX III
INTERVIEW QUESTIONS
1. What do you understand by religious terrorism?
2. How can you explain Boko Haram?
3. Do you think we have Boko Haram terrorists in Plateau state?
4. What are some of the causes of Boko Haram terrorism in Plateau state?
5. Can you mention some of the attacks that have been carried out by Boko Haram in
Plateau state?
6. Have you or anyone close to you been a victim of Boko Haram attack?
7. What are the effects of Boko Haram activities on Plateau state?
8. In your own opinion, what should the government do in other to conquer or
end Boko Haram terrorism?
9. Are there things you think the Police and Military officers who are engaged in
fighting Boko Haram should do or not do in order to have success?
10. In which ways do you think that religious leaders, traditional rulers, media,
Non-Governmental Organisations and the general public should come in and
help in the fight against Boko Haram?
11. Can you give any other piece of advice that can help in ending Boko Haram
terrorism?
